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PREFACE

This work is intended to be
fouiidr.tionp. of e’'.Yironmental

a

contribution to the philosophical

studies and environmental education*

particularly in the areas of environmental ethics and values
education.

It employs a broadly integrative approach, drawing

from the natural and social sciences, humanities, and religion.
The value of its contribution lies as much in the breadth of its

scholarship as in the depth of its analysis.
Since the results of this study are likely to be of interest
to people based in a number of different disciplines and educa-

tional movements,
I

I

have taken pains to write it for a non-specialist.

have assumed that the reader is interested in the topic,

intelligent, and has a basic understanding of ecology.

The last

chapter is an exception, in that 1 assume that the reader has a
general familiarity with educational jargon.

The footnotes have

and serve
been designed to both document sources used in the text
as an educational tool.

They contain asides and elaborations

relevant to points raised in the text, consolidate

m.uch

of the

reader an introrelevant literature, and provide the interested

duction to this literature.
dissertation lies in my
Another unconventional facet of this

use of the firsu person.

The

There are two reasons for so doing.

central themes of the work:
first is related to some of the

we

are not alienating, and in
should act in ways which avoid dogma,

Vi

which means and ends are joined.

Use of the third person, although

it gives the appearance of objectivity, can help to blind the

reader to whether or

not.

the study is in fact objective.

Also,

it is a voice' that alienates the author from his or her work.

The

first person introduces the voice of the author and rather than

masking the question of objectivity, forces io.

Given the

conclusions of the dissertation, it is inappropriate to use the

conventional style.
In addition, the convention seems to confuse the mode of

inquiry necessary to conduct objective scholarship with the

manner of writing necessary to effectively communicate the results
of that scholarship.

In the case of this dissertation, it is

important that 1 be able to evoke different views of the world
and value conflicts in the minds of my readers.

I

have attempted

vignettes.
to do this, in part, through a number of anecdotal

The third person is inappropriate to this stylistic device.
dissertation
My use of the first person has been approved by my
the School
committee, the Assistant Dean for Graduate Affairs in

the Graduate School.
of Education, and the Associate Dean of

this volume, and
Many people have assisted me in preparing

extend my heartfelt appreciation to them all.

I

I

am particularly

the members of my
grateful for the contributions made by

comittee:

Horace Reed, Professor of Educations

Linda Lockwood,

Sciences and of Education; and
Associate Professor of Environmental
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unconventional and often ambiguous explorations has been invaluable.
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my words.

Special thanks go to my chairperson, Horace Reed, who

helped to create a mutualistic learning experience.
The following people have read and commented upon two or more
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a'o
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ABSTRACT
The Value Orientation of Mutuality and its Role in

Environmental Studies and Environmental Education
February 1978

Ralph H, Lutts, B.A., Trinity University
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Professor Horace Reed

This dissertation represents an attempt to identify a value

orientation, or ethos, that is compatible with our emerging

ecological view of the world, and to explore the role that
education can play in fostering its development,
A value orientation is a fundamental valuing style; a

predilection to choose certain kinds of values and, thus, actions.
There are three orientations that influence the ways in which we

interact with both people and nature.

Under Submission , one

senses oneself as being powerless before other forces.

Domination emphasizes the welfare of oneself at Lhe expense of
others; a view which is predominant in

o^'r

culture.

Mutuality

Involves a concern for the welfare of all parties in a situation.

Mutuality is proposed as the value orientation that snould underlj
our interactions with our social and non-human environments.
advocated
Much of the literature of environniental ethics has

larger group or
that we should regard ourselves as members of a

community. which includes our entire ecosystem.

People who view

X

their world in this way are likely to consider non-humans
to be
of intrinsic value and not simply as means to an end.

This does

not mean that we must not use the resources in our environment;
there is no v/ay in which we can avoid this.

It does, though,

shift the burden of proof from those who wish to preserve their

environment to ohose who wish to exploit it.

Although the literature of environmental Mutuality is sparse,
there is a large body of literature dealing with mutualistic

relationships between people.

An examination of the philosophies

and actions of Edwin Burtt, Martin Buber, Mohandas Gandhi, and

Paulo Freire reveals three characteristic elements of social

Mutuality.

After carefully examining the differences between

relationships among humans, and those between humans and their

non-human ecological environment, we can also accept these
elements as being characteristic of environmental Mutuality.
Element One: Mutuality occurs within a meaningful whole .

Those

who are engaged in mutualistic interactions are viewed as members
of the same group or community.

As such^ each is of intrinsic

value and each occupies a meaningful position within the whole,

Mutualistic acts promote meaningfulness and wholeness, rather
than alienation and fragmentation.

Means and ends are not

alienated from each other, but are joined and of equal importance.
Element Tvo t Mutuality requires openmindedness .
th:.t

This means

that we
we must strive to be free of dogma, which requires

xi

have the h-umility to recognize our limitations.

It is also

necessary that we try to be aware of our presuppositions and
tiy to be free of self-interests that might distort our

unaerstanding oi others.
Element Three: Mutuality promotes the welfare of others.
V/e

should act not just to promote our own welfare, but the

welfare of others as well.

The basic psychological motive that

promotes these acts is love.
This value orientation is ideally suited for adoption as the

values content, or agenda, of values education.

Although few

contemporary teachers are willing to impose a set of values
upon their students. Mutuality is compatible with this desire.
One of the fimdamental objectives of environmental education
and environmental studies is that of preparing people who vzill

be able to work toward the solution of our environmental problems.

Fostering Mutuality is central to the solution of these problems.
These approaches to education should embrace education for Mutuality
as one of their objectives.

Much of their existing teaching

methods and materials can readily be adapted to this end.
foundations
This dissertation contributes to the philosophical
studies; particularly
of environmental education and environmental

education.
in the area of envirorjnental ethics and values

It

environmental Mutuality
provides the most thorough examination of
for values education; a
to date; a specific values content
social sciences, humanities
rationale for including the natural and

xii

arts, and religion in environmental education programs; and a

conceptual structure viithin v/hich this can be done.

/
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CHAPTER

I

THE NATURE OF RELATEDNESS

once met a woman who found a petrified potato and regained

I

her sight.
office.

She sat nervously in a worn chair in a corner of my

Beside her sat a friend who had come to provide trans-

portation and moral support.
of the office

— glass

They looked around at the trappings

cases of rocks, fossils and mounted birds,

the shelves of books, the microscope to one side of a cluttered

desk

— and

half-heartedly asked a

fev;

questions about the specimens.

How old were they; when did they die; where did they come from?
Eventually they turned to the object she had mentioned on the
She drew the stone from her purse, removed its protective

phone.

wrapping of tissues, and placed it hesitantly in my hand.
Several years earlier, as the

It was a very special stone.

result of an accident, she had become blind.

But, she explained,

her faith had been strong and she had prayed to Saint Peter for a
miracle.

She had been praying on that day when, while working in

the darkness of her kitchen, she reached into a sack of potatoes

and graspea the rock.

Her vision returned a couple of weeks later.

She wanted me to tell her whether the rock was a pet,rified potato
and whether her discovery was unique,

uf it was, the m.iracle of her

that had
sight would be compounded by the nature of the object

mediated between her and uhe saint.
She revealed her story slowly and hesitantly,

I

was young,

that might ridicule
less than half her age, and of a generation
1

2

her faith.

But

I

also represented a large museum and science.

The

sightless forms of the extinct birds staring at us from their shelves

represented something to which she responded with a mixture of awe
and apprehension.

She came seexing the trutn; sure

yet afraid to ask for fear that

I

oi

vhat it

would not understand and see simply

a pebble.

It was not a petrified potato.

It was a rounded lump of quartz,

the size and shape of a potato, which had been stained brown by the

soil in which it had lain until found by the mechanical diggers,

I

had seen similar rocks, which machines and work-weary sorters had

mistaken for potatoes and bagged, and were later found by puzzled
cooks.

One of them was locked away in one of the storage cabinets

outside of my office.

It was neatly marked with a catalog number

and labeled, "Pseudofossil

— Petrified

Potato."

Pseudofossils are oddly shaped and textured stones, which look
The life, though,

as if they were once part of something alive.

originates in the mind of the observer, not in the history of the
stone.

Some people have a tremendous ability to give life to a

piece of clay or quartz.

The more that they want it to have been

alive, the more lifelike it becomes.

their belief in what they have found.

It is very difficult to shake

Often

I

had to produce before

find to be.
their eyes an actual specimen of what they thought their

dinosaur footprint,
In the face of the distinct outlines of a real
cling to the belief that
for example, it became difficult for them to
also.
the vague depression in their rock was one

It was generally

3

disheartening for them to discover that their find
was not special.
Often, too, they felt foolish in the face of their
mistake.

I

would

then take them to the pseudofossil collection and show
them specimens
sniuxlar to their own;

specimens vtiich bore witness to the fact that

they were not alone in their mistake.

They were not fools, just

mistaken, and they shared their mistake with many others.
This woman's petrified potato, though, was special.

sociated with a miracle.
fell outside of the

lav;s

It was as-

To her it was part of a divine event which

of nature.

That rock was part of a pattern

which linked her with a universe which cared about her fate, which

heard and answered her prayers.
world.
v;ere a

She was not alone in an uncaring

The divine plan, of which the creation, fall, and redemption
part, included her.

She was not powerless in an impersonal

nature, because she had prayer.
I

too, recognized a miracle.

But it was one of a different sort.

Richard Jefferies once wrote, "I can see nothing astonishing in
what are called miracles.

Only those who are mesmerized by matter

can find a difficulty in such events."^

I

was mesmerized by matter,

and saw the miracle as a vronderful and unexpected turn of events in
the material

recovery?

blindness?

’-rorld,

VJas

it an unexpected coincidence of rock and

Did the rock trigger her recovery from a psychosomatic
In either case, I viev;ed the miracle as an event of

significance
deep psychological meaning to her, and there lay its real

h

In honesty
eye.

I

had to tell her what her stone was
to the geological

Yet, it would have been cruel to undermine
her faith in the

ever.i,.

My route of escape lay in emphasizing my
qualifications to

speak to the geological problem, and my inability
to address the

logical one.

tlieo-

It certainly seemed possible for the saint to
use a

natural object a- a part of his miracle,
consult an expert on such matters.

I

I

told her, but she should

could be of no help.

I

passed

the buck,
A year later she reappeared, requesting a letter for the church

file.

She had begun the long, difficult process of obtaining official

certification of her miracle,

I

placed in writing the description

I

had told her the year before, being careful to note the limits of

my qualifications.

She felt much more comfortable with what

to say than she had previously.
a petrified potato,

I

had

She told me that if it really was not

then perhaps it was not really a part of the miracle.

In that event. Saint Peter must have acted directly, without the stone

as an intermediary.

She seemed to be happier with it this way.

The woman and her stone have been alive in my mind for many years
now.

There is a tension in the memory, which

to quiet.

have found difficult

Part of the reason may lie in the fact that

dismiss her as a superstitious old woman,
I

I

I

believe, felt something of its significance

I

did not just

listened to her story and
Id

her.

I

realized that

her view of the world, of the way in which it is structured and
operates, was very different from mine.

Although we sat chatting with

each other we lived in very different worlds, which operated according

5
"bo

very different, sets of rules.

Hers was a world of good and evil,

saints and sinners, heaven and hell, Christ and forgiveness.

The

power she had to change the world rested in faith and prayer.

Mine

was a world of matter and energy, cuuse and effect, ecology and

evolution.

Power lay in knowledge and technology.

She listened

to my words and placed their meaning into a framework of miracles

and divine love,

I

listened, and placed her words into a framework

of physical processes, glacial geology, and hnjnan psychology.

Which world was more real?

Hers did not help her to understand

and deal directly with the chemical pollutants which filled the air
she was breathing, the missiles poised a finger away from holocaust,
or the insatiable hunger for food and resources of the pressing

population of the world.
in darkness.

But she had been a lonely old woman living

When science and medicine failed, she placed her faith

in prayers to Peter, the Lord's Rock, and in an oddly shaped stone.

And in some way they were associated with the return of her sight.
In what sense it

important.

v.^as,

or was not, a miracle is not particularly

What is important is that the reality in which she

lived was different from mine.

She played a purposeful, significant

and meaningful role in a cosmos that cared for, and was influenced
by, her.
that
This belief that we are a pivotal point in the universe and
the Tragic
what we do affects it is what Joseph Wood Krutch has called

Fallacy.
assiunpthe Tragic Fallacy depends ultimately upon the
his
outside
tion which nan so readily makes that something
or
Nature,
own being, some ‘spirit not himself— be it God,

6

that still vaguer thing called Moral
Order-Joins him in the
emphasis which he places upon this or that and
confirms him
in his feeling that his passions and his
opinions are
important,^

The tragic character is a person who has done
something which is

not permitted, which violates the moral order^ of the
universe, or is
contrary to the will of God or nature.
of the universe, and he is struck down.

This act shakes the very fiber
The blow, however, reaffirms

his stature, because he was struck by a god or a universe v;hich

directed its attention to him.

His acts were of cosmic consequence.

In the face of extreme adversity, the tragic character triumphs by

asserting his confidence in the dignity and worth of himself and
humanity.

Thus, ’’tragedy is essentially an expression, not of

despair, but of the triumph over despair and of confidence in the

value of human life,”^
The Tragic Fallacy, Krutch pointed out, is the result of an act
of faith, rather than of intellect.
the spirit of humanity.

are without dignity.

view behind it.

Upon it is built our sense of

Without it our lives seem pointless and we

It supports not only tragedy, but the religious

Without it exultation turns to despair.

It is not necessary to believe in the importance of man.

It is

interesting to note the decline and death of tragic literature in the

modern world.

No longer focusing on great people and powerful emotions,

the literature of our day tends to emphasize people and feelings v;hich

are small and common.
beco»iie

This, Krutch believed, ”is not because we have

interested in commonplace souls and their unglamorous adventures

but because we have come, willy-nilly, to see the soul of man as
commonplace and its emotions as mean.

7

Compare, as extremes, the Greek tragedy, Oedipus Rex
and Samuel
,

Beckett's, VJaiting for Godot .
and became a great king.

Oedipus solved the riddle of the Sphinx

Unknowingly, though, he committed the unfor-

givable acts of patricide and incest.

VJhen

the truth

discovered

his mother hangs herself, and an anguished and horrified Oedipus
tears
at his eyes with her brooch pin.

OEDIPUS: Apollo it was, Apollo, friends
Wlio brought to pass these evil, evil woes of mine.
The hand of no one struck my eyes but wretched me.
For v;hy should I see.
When nothing sweet there is to see with sight?

What more is there for me to see.
My friends, what to love.
What joy to hear a greeting?
Lead me away, friends, wretched as
Accursed, and hated most
Of mortals to the gods.

I am.

I would not have come to murder my father.
Nor have been called among men
The bridegroom of her from whom I was born.
But as it is I am godlesss, child of unholiness.
Wretched sire in common with my father.
And if there is any evil older than evil left.

It is the lot of Oedipus.

The clarity of Oedipus's position in the moral order of the universe, and the significance and magnitude of his acts stand in the at

contrast to the amorphous, meaningless world in whica Beckett's
chai’acters find themselves.

Wandering on a plain vjhich is barren
vfhy,

for

arrive.
someone wnum they neither have met, nor are sure will

It

except for a gaunt, dead tree, tney wait without knowing

birth astride of a grave.
is a life without significance: "They give

8

the light gleams an instant, then it's night
once more. "7

At the

'=‘nd,

weary of waiting, Valdamir and Estragon contemplate
suicide, but lack
a rope long enough, or strong enough for the job;
so they go on.

will return tomorrow, perhaps

vzitb a

They

proper rope.

In contrast to Oedipus, Beckett's characters live in a world
which
is indifferent to their existence.

Tragedy is impossible in such a

universe, because it lacks an inherent moral order which would meaning-

fully bond them to each other and to their world.
alienated, meaningless lives.

Instead, they live

Their lives symbolize those of millions

of people living in modern VJestem society.

The woman with the petrified potato lives in a world which is

shaped by the Christian understanding of its nature.
v;hich there can be tragedy.

It is a world in

However, with the weakening of the Chris-

tian viev; of the world, in association with the rise of empiricism,

materialism, and individualism, many people have lost their sense of

connectedness with a larger moral order.

The world seems to be

burning around us, and we can not find our way out of the conflagration,

The old formulas do not work.

We find ourselves on our own;

small children with delusions of grandeur in a large and frightening

universe.

There seems to be no place outside of ourselves to which

we can turn for guidance.

Me are beginning to realize, however, that we are a part of

a

lives
larger order in which our lives are embedded, and upon which our

depend.

the
This is the ecological and evolutionary order which is

very substance of our biological identities.

If we wish to live, then

9

we must take care not to disrupt the fabric of
the ecological and

evolutionary systems which support our lives.

This order is

indifferent to our hopes and aspirations, but it is strongly
ini^ae.iced by our actions.

Since ue are an

ir

tegral part of this

order, our influence upon it is likely to lead to an impact
upon

ourselves.

In this view of the world, we once again have signi-

ficance, and we can suffer grave consequences if we grossly violate
its order,
V/illiam Holtz has suggested that once the ecological view

of the world becomes integrated into our culture, a new sense of

tragedy may emerge.

What we arc on the verge of realizing in our own time
is that the whole order is one life, all parts mutually
interdependent within which we, from our privileged
position, can offend and offend and offend.
In such a universe now a fact, rather than a metaphysical conception our own modern version of tragedy
becomes possible,^
.

—

.

.

—

This dissertation represents an attempt to clarify this emerging

world-view, to identify some of its moral implications, and to ex-

plore the role that education can play in fostering its development.

The Domination Ethos

A distinction must be made between two elements, ethos and world

view, which have been interwoven in the prior comments.

Clifford

Geertz has cogently stated tliese v'oncepts as follows
(and
In recent anthropological discussion, the moral
evaluative
aesthetic) aspects of a given culture, the

10

elements, have commonly been summed up in the term
"ethos," while the cognitive, existential aspects
have been designated by the term "world-view."
A people’s ethos is the tone, character and quality
of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and
mood; it is the underlying attitude toward themselves and the'.>.r woi’ld ohac. life reflects. Their
world viev; is their picture of the v;ay things in
sheer actuality are, their concept of nature, of
self, of society.
It contains their most comprehensive ideas of order. Religious belief and
ritual confront and mutually confirm one another;
the ethos is made intellectually reasonable by
being shox^m to represent a way of life implied
by the actual state of affairs which the worldview describes, and the world-viev; is made
emotionally acceptable by being presented as an
image of an actual state of affairs of which such
a way of life in an authentic expression.
In other words, it is the reciprocal relationship between ethos

and world-view which makes life meaningful. A breakdown in this

relationship leads to alienation; there is no longer a connection

between our moral and aesthetic lives and our understanding of our
place in the universe.

It is this kind of a relational disintegration

v/hich leads to the decline of tragic literature.

In order to understand the impact that a particular world-view

and ethos can have upon an environment, we must include an additional
element, technology.

It is through our technology that we are able

to act to change our environment and the nature of our actions
is
is partially shaped by the nature of the technolog-y which

available to us.
has
The role of technology in relation to ethos and world-view
the Judeo-Christian
been at the focus of the debate about the impact of

tradition upon our environment.

Lynn White, Jr., placed the blame

lap of that tradition.
for our environmental crisis squarely in the

11

He was not the first to make this suggestion,

but he fleshed it

out and popularized it in his widely read and
highly influential
article, "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic
Crisis,
VJhite noted that in the vrorl.i-view of ancient
cultures each

place, tree, or animal was imbued with a spirit, or under
the

protection of a deity which resided in that place.

The ethos of

these cultures required that one placate the spirit of each tree

before it could be cut, and of each animal before it could be
killed,

A similar approach to the world is found in contemporary

traditional cultures.

The connection between people and their

environment was a spiritual one, and the relationship was reciprocal.

Their fate depended upon the manner in

v;hich they interacted with

the spirit in nature (see figure 1).^^

The Judeo-Christian v;orld-view is quite different.
outside of the v;orld in a supernatural realm.
found on earth only in human beings.

God exists

Spirit, or soul, is

At the creation we

"dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the

v:ere

given

fov/1 of the air,

and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every

creeping thing that creepeth over the earth. "^3

To Wiite, this

meant that we no longer had any reciprocal responsibility to the
objects in nature.

VJith the

removal of spirit from nature to

supernature, the creatures of the earth lost their protection from

unbridled acts of man.

Reciprocity lay only between humanity and

God, as symbolized in Michelangelo*

s

painting. The Creation of Adam ,

by the hands of Adam and God reaching toward each other (see figure
2 ).

1?

V
Non-human Objects

J
Humans

Figure 1. ANIMISTIC WORLD-VIEW. All objects are recognized to
possess a soul or spirit. Both humans and non-humans are able to
(The asterisks indicate the presence of soul
influence each other.
or spirit. The double headed arrows indicate reciprocal relationships.

)
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JUDEO-CKRISTIAN V;ORLD-VIE’.7, The universe is divided into
The source of
the. natural and the supernatural, earth and heaven.
soul or spirit is God, who rests outside of the natural world, Hunans
are set apart from nature and are spiritually connected v,’ith God.
(The asterisks indicate
iiatural objects are devoid of spirit or soul.
The double-headed arrow indicates a
'ihe presence of spirit or soul.
reciprocal spiritual relationship. The single-headed arrow indicates
a non-reciprocal relationship.)
FigiJre 2.

Yet, in the thousands of years spanned
by the Judeo-Christian

tradition, not until the period of the fifteenth
through the seven-

teenth century, A.D., did the idea that we are
controllers of nature

begin to crystallize,^^

This seems extraordinary in light of the

argument that this view is an integral part of the
tradition.

Glacken notes that this crystallization appears to have been
associated with three technological events.

One was the popu-

larity of draining lakes and swamps, rerouting rivers, and other
forms of land reclaimation projects,

building large bridges and canals.

A second was the success in

Finally, the joining of science

(traditionally an abstract and scholarly activity) with technology
as a means of gaining power over nature.

In other words, the idea

of controlling nature did not become important until

v;e

had the

power to make a visibly significant impact upon it.

White’s thesis can be summarized as follows:

1)

the Judeo-

Christian tradition created a split between humanity and nature, and

placed us in the role of masters over nature;

2)

this led to the

development of an increasingly powerful technological control over
nature; and

3)

bas led to environmental degradation.

added qualifications.

But White

He remarked, for example, that the idea of

humanity as controller is particularly characteristic of the
V/estem, Latin Church,

It did not arise under Greek Christianity.^^

In Genesis , 1:28, we read,

"...

and God said unto them. Be

fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it

.

.

.

There is an obvious concept of stewardship in the phrase, "replenish

."
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the earth."

VJhite suggests that for some
reason Latin Christianity

deemphasized this theme.

It is, nevertheless, present.

This is

probably most obvious in the person
of St. Francis of Assisi, whom
recommends as the patron saint of
ecologists.

White provides a more subtle summary
of his

owri

thesis;

Men commit their lives to what they consider
good.
Because Western Christianity developed strong
moral
approval of technological innovation, more men
of
talent in the V/est put more resources, energy
and
imagination into the advancement of technology than
was the case among Greek Christians or indeed
in any
other society, including the Chinese. The result
was
an unpi'ecendented technological dynamism of which
our
present technological movement (with its attendant
consequences) is the unbroken extension. There may
have been other factors contributing to this advance,
but the novel Western medieval value structure is
central and essential to our understanding of it. 17
V/hite’s thesis was enthusiastically accepted by a great many

people, and his article

v/as

^and continues to be) vridely anthologized.

Chrisxopher Derrick, hov;ever, has pointed to the one-sided criticism
that the Judeo-Christian tradition has received.

If it is to be

blamed for the negative impacts of technology, should it not also
be praised for its positive benefits?^®

It is interesting to note the

eagerness with which many people have placed blame upon their religious
origins.

Indeed, Genesis , 1:28, is often mistakenly quoted as, "Be

fruitful, multiply, and subdue the earth," completely omitting the

stewardship theme.

The one-sided zeal of the popular attack would

be a fruitful topic for psychological and sociological study.
A number of V/hite's critics have pointed to positive elements in

the tradition, which they feel he had underemphasized.
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Ian Barbour

16

points to the affimative attitude
toward nature that can be found in
the Bible. One of these is the view
that we are the stewards of God's
creation.
in

..v^nuer

Another is that nature, as God's creation,
is to be viewed
and with praise.

we should strive to recover.

He beHeves that tnese are attitudes which

Derrick, also, points

x.o

positive

elements.

The idea of man's dominion over Nature is certainly
present
in Christianity.
But it does not exist there in isolation:
is modified and controlled by other ideas— —the overlordship of God, his immanence in creation (x^hich does not
exclude his transcendence of it), the goodness of all being,
the wickedness of all arrogance and self-will, our perennial need for restraint and humility and obedience. ^0

Others focus upon the additional factors which must have contri-

buted to the rise of modern technology, placing less of an emphasis

upon the role of the Judeo-Christian tradition.

Santmire,^! for

example, feels that the real problems began with the rise of modern

natural science, the formulation of Kant's mechanistic philosophy
of nature, and the development of

modem industrialism.

Similar

arguments have also been made against Descartes and his philosophy.

Writing in more political and economic terms, Moncreif has argued
that there are a multitude of variables involved.

These include

economic, political, sociological and population factors.

Ex-

panding upon bliite’s three-step progression from the religious
tradition, to technology, to the environmental crisis, he constructs
the following four-step model.
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I

—

17

D>

Judeo-Christian
tradition

O

1)
2)

II

l)Capitalisin (with
the attendant

3)

development of
science and
teehnoloT’’’
?) Democratization

111

Urbanization
Increased
wealth
Increased

[;>

IV

Environmental
degradation

p jpulation
I4

)

Individual
resource
ownership

Probably the most sophisticated critique,
reformulation, and
expansion of

Vfliite’s

thesis appears in William Leiss’ book. The

Domination of Nature .

He begins with White’s thesis, but finds

that, while it locates the tradition in which the idea of
domination

may have first been formulated, it does not adequately explain how
it achieved its present form.

Leiss’ thesis is that;

The vision of the human domination of nature becomes a
fundamental idealogy in a social system (or of a phase
in the development of human society considered as a
whole) which consciously undertakes a radical break with
the past, v;hich strenuously seeks to demolish all
’‘naturalistic” modes of thought and behavior, and which
sets itself as a primary task the development of productive forces for the satisfaction of human material
wants.2U

These tendancies, he argues, are first found in Western capitalism.

Although each precapitalist society had its own distinctive

characteristics, all of them sensed a moral order in the universe.

Nature hau an enduring order, which one must act to preserve.
This included prescribed social roles of political power, class
standing, and occupaoion.

The existing social order was accepted as

the natural social order.

It is in this sense that Leiss refers

to them as being naturalistic.
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In traditional cultures, God was found
in nature.

This rein-

forced the naturalistic notion that the existing
state of nature
vjas

toc-K

good and should be preserved.

Judeo-Ghristian theology, however,

Cod out of natui-e and placed him elsewhe.-e.

The universe became

split; there was God, there was nature, and man stood
in between

the two.

Prescriptive statements of what was right and wrong came

from God, not from nature.

Thus, nature becaine something that

^ould change, and be changed as God willed it.
as a privilege shared with God.

Man dominated nature

The fact of domination was something

shared by all people, because they were all part of the creation and

received the ability to dominate as a gift of God.

This philosophy

was essentially anti-naturalistic, but many naturalistic elements

remained

vrith it;

for example, the naturalistic social structure of

feudalism.

Leiss further argues that as the naturalistic social structure

broke down in the seventeenth century, and the idea of

humn

equality arose, people recognized the potential to improve their

material lives.

The idea of dominating nature became linked to the

struggle for social and material progess,

Francis Bacon strongly

advocated the value of science in this effort.
laws that govern nature, he argued,

\ie

By understanding the

would be able to control

nature and use it toward h\imanly desired ends.

The laws that we

had to operate under became technical, material laws, rather than

moral laws.

Bacon felt that the power thus gained would be used

wisely, under the guidance of reason and religion.

But he failed
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to recognize the faultering
nature of the religion of his time.

Religion

now

plays a very small role in shaping
our individual

behavior and public policies.
iurthcrraore.

Bacon failed to distinguish between
uhe two

meanings of "nature.*’

The scientist, writes Leiss, tries to

distinguish the reality that lies behind
appearances.

This is

what they mean when they speak of nature,
and it is over this
nature that they are trying to achieve mastery.

But

\ifith

the

decline of religion, people ceased to be joined by a
common

spiritual bond in the exercise of mastery.

The desire for mastery

became linked to the desire for social and economic progress as
desired by each individual.

In a world of limited resources this

desire for individual progress necessitates a competition for, and

conflict over these resources.

It is this reality, the reality as

conceived by people in conflict and not that of the scientist, to
which the products of science are applied in the technological quest
for mastery (see figure 3),

Leiss argues that in our time the quest

for the mastery of nature has become integrally linked to the mastery
of human beings,

"Domination over nature is wrongly represented as

an achievement that will bind together a bitterly divided species;

conversely, the abstract idea of man (in the phrase 'man's

conquest

of nature*) hides the fact that the actual agents in this process are
pcf

individuals and societies in violent conflict among themselves,"
The domination of nature, then, involves both the domination of
the bio-physical world in order to satisfy material wants, and the
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Figure 3. KODERN KiATERIALISTIC WORLD- VIE’.-/. This view was shaped by
the Judeo-Christian tradition, but does not retain its spiritual
elements, Kamans are still set apart from nature, because they have
minds (rather than because they have souls). Their relationship
(The ”+" indicates the
with natural objects is non-reciprocal.
presence of mind. The single-headed arrows indicate a non-reciprocal relationship.)
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domination of people (human nature)
in order to compete successfully
for the material wealth that is
required to satisfy these wants.
Weapons technology and behavior control
are as much a product of
the aominaLion theme as are strip
mining and air polluoion.

T.el..3

fears that this will remain so until there
is an equal distribution
of resources and a socialist society.

He does not believe that the present approach
to domination
can continue, because of what he calls the ”revolt
of nature,”

This term can be understood in two ways.

In one sense it refers to

the developing revolt of human nature against the oppression that

has resulted from the quest for mastery of people.

The revolt of

nature, also, refers to the breakdown of our ecosystem in the face

of irrational exploitation, vjhich threatens our biological survival.
Leiss fears that if there is a major social rebellion, it may
be of an irrational sort, which will turn against and reject science
and technology.

But this would mean the loss of the vital strengths

of science and technology, as well as their drawbacks.

VJhat he

feels needs to be done is to change the role of science and techno-

logy in our society.
The idea of the mastery of nature must be reinterpreted
in such a way that its principal focus is ethical or
moral development rather than scientific and technological innovation. In this perspective progress in
the mastery of nature will be at the same time progress
The task of
in the liberation of nature
as a matter of
understood
mastering nature ought to be
destructive
and
bringing under control the irrational
aspects of human desires , , . ,

....

Again a caveat: ethical progress and scientific
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tectaolopcal progress are not simple
opposiLes.
IS

V/hat
value in each depends in some
measure on the
accomplishments ol the other. The
development of
scientific rationality, as I sugges.ea
earlier, is one
^cial presuposition of any ethical advance,
in that
It colters the human propensity
to project irrational
structrre into external nature ana
to be tyrPimized
by those projections.

01

He concludes that our understanding
of the mastery of nature must

become "one in which mastery of nature
is understood as an advanced
stage in human consciousness wherein
intelligence is able to

regulate its relationship to nature (internal
and external) in such
a way as to minimize the self-destructive
aspects of human desires.

Only in this way can mastery of nature be accomplished
as a means of

achieving positive human goals.
The very idea that our attitudes toward both people and nature
are somehow connected seems absurd to many people.

That we have so

much difficulty in recognizing the connection between the two may

point to the sharp dichotomy between the two which characterizes our
culture.

Nevertheless, the attitudinal connection has been made

before, although generally in a vague, intuitive manner.

Thomas

Merton, for example, has noted that:

The ecological conscience is also essentially a peace-making
conscience. A country that seems to be more and more oriented
to permanent hot or cold war-making does not give much
promise of developing either one. But perhaps the very
character of the v;ar in Vietnam v;ith crop poisoning, the
defoilation of forest trees, the incineration of villages
and their inhabitants with napaLm presents a start enough
example to remind us of this most urgent moral need. ^

—

—

Examples of the connection between the domination of both nature
and people are numerous.

Manufacturers who pollute a town's air and

water have threatened to close their plants and move elsewhere if they
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were required to clean up their
effluents.

If the manufacturer is

a major employer in the town,
the threat amounts to economic
black-

mail.

Feeling that they have the right, or
necessity to pollute

(domination of nature) and, thus, pass the
cost of waste disposal
on to the townspeople in the form of health
hazards and increased

maintenance costs (domination of people), they
threaten their
employees and their town with severe economic hardship
if required
to stop (domination of people).

The green revolution provides another example.

This method of

agriculture provides high yields through the combined use of largescale, mono-crop planting, hybrid seed, and the intensive use of

fertilizers, irrigation, and machinei^.

Exporting this technology

to the Third World involves a radical disruption of the traditional

agriculture, society, economy, and power structure.

Yet little or

no effort is made to help the people to understand the wider

implications of the new methods, or to give them any voice in making
the decisions of whether or not, or how, to employ it.

Modern warfare, as Merton suggested, provides some terrifying
examples of the connection between the two forms of domination.

In

Vietnam, defoliants were widely used in order to deprive the enemy

of cover beneath the forest canopy.

Large areas of forest were

defoliated without regard for the possible impact upon the local
ecology, the national economy, or the health hazard to the local

populace.

In addition, a massive program of crop destruction by

the use of herbicides was instituted in order to deprive the enemy

2h

of food.

This imposed a greater deprivation
upon the local peasants,

leading to starvation, and contributing
to their forced urbanization.

The ultimate synthesis lies in the potential
for thermonuclear
war.

In

this situation all distxncc-ion between
people and Ipnd-

scape, social institutions and ecosystems,
combatants and noncom-

batants, warring nations and neutrals disappears.

The relatively

small number of people directly involved in the dispute
employ a

tecnnology which has the potential essentially to destroy

everything on the earth.

At this point, domination becomes indis-

tinguishable from insanity.
Alternatives to Domination
As our power to influence nature has increased, we have been

forced to realize in very pragmatic terms that
we strive increasingly to dominate nature,

dominate our fellow human beings.

destroy ourselves as well.
is breaking down.

v;e

are nature

.

As

must increasingly

If we destroy nature, we will

The old dichotomy between man and nature

In our present cultural context we possess

enormous powers to shape the world and control people.

These powers,

such as nuclear, information processing, and behavior control tech-

nologies, are greater than anything that could be conceived only a

century ago.

They have been developed in a matter of just a few

decades; almost instantaneously in the perspective of the history of
V/estern civilization.

While the technique has changed, though, our

social, political, and economic institutions have not changed apace.

Before we had the power to destroy both humanity and nature, it
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aid not really matter whether
we viewed our role as that of
domination.
Ethos and behavior, although
connected, are not identical. The
recent

changes in our technology have led
to a radical change in our

behavior, even though the ethos of
domination may not have changed
in recent decades.

life for ourselves.

But the object of domination is to create
a good
In the present context, however, this
ethos is

not leading to the good life.

Instead, it is leading to overpopu-

lation, starvation, pollution, totalitarianism,
exhaustion of our

resources, degradation of the ecosystem, and nuclear
holocaust.
The increased power that has come to us through our
new technologies
has led to the obsolescence of the domination ethos.

By continuing

to adhere to it, we threaten to lose whatever chance we may have
to live healthy, meaningful, smd reasonably secure lives.

But what are the alternatives to domination?

natives have been proposed.

A number of alter-

Many authors have suggested that the

Vest adopt one of the religions of the East, or of one of the traditional cultures.

Lynn White, Jr., has argued that, "religious

problem is to find a viable equivalent to animism. "30

paul Shepard

believes that we must revive the hunter-gatherer traditions of our

ancient forebearers.

And there has been a great deal of popular

experimentation with various life-styles and religions, and a
revival of interest in m.agic and witchcraft.
Two Eastern religions which are often cited as particularly
goo'^,

ecologically responsible models for the West are Taoism, and

Buddhism (particularly Zen).

Both teach that humanity and nature
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are an integral part of each other
and that our authentic selves can

be found only by living within the
spontaneous, harmonious rhythms
of nature.

When we act self-consciously, when we
try to impose our

wjll upon the woi-la, we split ourselves
from the world, and from Ihr
true nature of our being.

In so doing, we create a false reality

and live incomplete, benumbed lives.

They maintain that in order

to shed ourselves of this false, debilitating
way of life, we must

shed ourselves of our self-consciousness and live
spontaneously in

accordance with the rhythm of the true way, which lies within
us
and the rest of the universe.

Success comes only by v;orking with

the world, not by imposing our egos upon it.

There are those who will conquer the world
And make of it (what they conceive or desire).
I see that they will not succeed.
(For) the vrarld is God's own Vessel
It cannot be made (by human interference).
He who makes it spoils it.
He who holds it loses it. 32

This approach to the world is often symbolized by water, which

although it is capable of eventually overcoming and wearing away any

obstacle is fluid and yields to the contour of the land and whatever
impedes its progress.

It is also symbolized in the grass which, by

bending before the wind, is able to survive storms which topple trees.
A number of Eastern martial arts embody this principle in their

technique of yielding before an opponent's attack, and turning his

momentam against him.

This stands in marked contrast to the Western

approach of meeting an adversity head-on, and countering force
force.

v/ith
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The impact of Taoist and Zen
philosophies upon human interaction

with nature can be seen in the
horticultural arts.

The following

description of a Taoist hermitage in China
of the 1930 's illustrates
the

v<ay in

which the gardeners worked within the
context of the

natural forms of the location, rather than
attempting to wholly
impose their will upon the landscape.
The steep path crawling up [the mountain'
western
s|
face followed the convolutions of a torrent
winding
through a series of dark chasms. Not far from where
the hermitage clung to the steep rock-face, these
miniature cataracts were fed by a high fall; a long
slim column of opal-coloured water thundered into a
churning pool obscured by rainbov;-tinted spray. Here,
where the path took a sharp turn towards a stone
stairv/ay leading to the main gate, it could be seen
that the recluses* love of unspoiled beauty had not
deterred them from lending nature a helping hand.
The immediate environs of the Valley Spirit
Hermitage gave the impression of a series of rocks
and caverns, overhung by ferns and luxuriant plants,
which just happened to emerge from the undergrowth
in this vicinity, adding enormously to its picturesqueness, What aroused my suspicion was that no
other section of the mountain, apart from the chasms
and waterfall, looked so exacly like the original
of a Taoist painting. There was, of course, no
obvious symmetry, but yet a sense of \inderlying
harmony that was just a shade too pronounced to
be altogether natural. Whoever had been responsible for making the 'guided wildness* of the approach
to the hermitage even lovelier than nature's untouched
handiwork has surely been a master of subtlety, for
there was not an object within sight of the stairway
of v/hich one could confidently affirm it had been
tampered with. 33

This scene is quite different from the ornamental gardens of the

European tradition.

The Taoist and Zen Buddhist gardeners view their

role as that of drawing out the potentials which are already inherent
in the landscape and plants.

They continually prune and plant, but

?8

their intention is to act as if they
are agents of nature itself,

This is not to say that the garden can
not be an artificial creation.

Every stone and plant in a tea garden, for
example, may have been
trrinsporbed to tie site.

The effect, of the garden, howe/er, is to

create, in a very small space, the impression of a
rustic retreat

from the rest of the world.

The landscaping and all of the materials,

from stepping stones, to lanterns, to bamboo fences, are
designed to
give a sense of being natural to the place.

Even a very formal,

abstract garden consisting of moss-covered boulders on a field of
raked sand is based upon organic, flowing forms, which reflect
nature.

But not all is well in Eden,

In his. The Book of Tea, Okakura

Kakuzo recoimts the following story.
In the sixteenth century the morning-glory was as yet a
rare plant with us, Rikiu had an entire garden planted
with it, which he cultivated with assiduous care. The
fame of his convolvuli reached the ear of the Taiko, and
he expressed a desire to see them, in consequence of
which Rikiu invited him to a morning tea at his house.
On the appointed day the Taiko walked through the garden,
but nowhere could he see any vestige of the convolvulus.
The ground had been leveled and strewn with fine pebbles
and sand. VJith sullen anger the despot entered the tearoom, but a sight waited him there which completely
restored his humour. On the tokonoma, in a rare bronze
of Sung workir.anship, lay a single morning-glory the
queen of the whole garden! 35

—

Kakuzo tells the story with great appreciation, and speaks of the act
as a "Flower Sacrifice,"

To me, however, it sounds like the plants

were destroyed for the sake of a sense of aesthetic taste which had

lost touch with its religious and philosophical roots.
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Proponents of Eastern philosophies as solutions to
our environ-

mental problems often lose sight of the fact that one's
behavior
need not be in keeping with one's idealogy, and that this
is no less
true of the East than it is of the West.

The fact that some Eastern

religious and philosophical texts stress harmony with nature does
not

necessarily mean that Eastern societies live in harmony

v/ith

nature;

nor does the fact that the New Testament stresses brotherly love
mean that the West is replete with brotherly love.
are dealing with ideals--not with actuality.

In both cases we

In a similar vein,

the gardens of a social elite are not necessarily representative of

the manner in which the majority of the people tend their gardens,

Yi-Fu Tuan has pointed out that, "A culture's publicized ethos
about its environment seldom covers more than a fraction of the total
range of its attitudes and practices pertaining to that enviroriment.
In the play of forces that govern the world, esthetic and religious

ideals rarely have a major role. "3^

The early Christians, for

example, did not produce any great changes in their environment,

compared to those made by the Romans.

The Romans had a centralized

administration, which permitted them to conduct large scale projects,
such as the construction of aqueducts and road systems.

So too,

despite Taoist and Buddhist attitudes of harmony with nature, China
suffered a great deal of environmental damage over the past

tv;o

thousand years.
rested on
The Taoist hermitage described so glowingly by Blofeld
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the side of a „.ountain which
had previously been completely
deforested.
This was only one example of a
large pattern of deforestation
described
by Tuan. He argues that there
had been considerable deforestation
as

earry as 800-:,00, B.G.

There

eve., aj.pears to

have been professional

conservation officials working in the
service of the rulers.

People

were allowed to out trees only at certain
times of the year, in an

apparent effort to control the nimber of
trees cut.

This suggests

that there was considerable concern about the
rate of deforestation.
It also argues that an attitude of harmony
v;ith nature was not

sufficient in itself; it had to be enforced through
regulations.

From the fourth century, B.C., onward, the peasants made
a
practice of burning over forest areas in order to destroy
the habitat
of dangerous animals.

Around 960-1279, A.D., the charcoal demand of

the country exceeded its timber resources.

In the period spanning

the tenth century through the fourteenth century, the Buddhists

introduced the practice of cremation, which led to timber shortages
in the southern coastal provinces.

The extensive use of v;ood in

the construction (and reconstru.ction, after fire and battle) of their

cities placed heavy additional demands upon their forests.

Finally,

Tuan writes that the Buddhists have been blamed for seven-tenths of

forest consumption during the seventeenth century.
this, he suggests,

”v;as

One reason for

that instead of living in 'grass hermitages'

they built themselves huge halls and temples. "37
He points out that China was an empire supported by a vast

bureaucracy.

It is not surprising that the approach of domination
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was found alongside that
of harmony with nature.

This is not to deny
the value of Chinese philosophy,
rather it is an attempt to
place it
in perspective.

It may well be that the
presence of the idea that

humanity and nature are a harmonious
whole helped to direct th-m, away
from the extreme of domination
which characterises the West.
On the
other hand, China's impact upon its
environment was no loss than that
of the West prior to the development
of modern Western technology.

We are not likely to solve many of our
problems, if any, by
trying to transplant Taoism or Buddhism
to the West.
v/ith

The rapidity

which Japan industrialized, and the concomitant
degradation of

of its environment only support this notion.

In addition, these

philosophies are not rooted in our cultural heritage
and, thus,
are not likely to become integrated into our culture
without conside-

rable modification.

value to us.

Nevertheless, these philosophies can be of great

First, they represent meaningful and significant options

for those who wish to adopt them as models for their own lives.

The

fact that they can not be adopted on a large social scale does not
reduce their value to individuals.

Even in the East, few people fully

commit themselves to the religious life.

To most, it provides the

backdrop, rather than the focus of thei^' daily lives.
On the larger social level, Taoism and Buddhism are of great

potential value, because they provide an alternative to domination,
which can be examined and adapted to our cultural context.

The idea

of harmony with nature is not new to the VJest, but it is subordinant
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to that of domination.

The East provides a richer variety
of models

of harmonious relationships with nature.

These may be of help as

guides as we try to f .)rge a new pattern
of interaction with our
etrn ronment
V/e

must, however, create our o\m patterns.

are all on a vision quest.

In a real sense, we

We are seeking a new vision of our world

and our place in it, vjhich we can hold before us as
a guide.

It is

very tempting to grasp hold of the vision of another
people, but
this will not work.

Barring a holocaust, we can not go completely

back to a previous pattern of living.
ways of doing things are working,

V/e

Neither the old, nor the new

must save what is valuable of

our past and our present, and create a new way of doing things
world-viev7, and a new ethos.

v/hat

we are trying to build.

emergence and evolution.

new

The process, though, is not wholly (or

even largely) one of conscious planning and design.

exactly

—a

Vie

do not know

The process is more one of

The acts and visions of each of us

contribute to the larger, organic process.
A number of authors have suggested alternatives to the ethos of

domination.

Their conclusions are surprisingly similar, and bear

some resemblance to the Taoist view.

G. Tyler Miller, Jr.,^® argues

that our hunter-gatherer ancestors lived, as do contemporary huntergatherers, in a state of ”man in nature.”

In this state, people are

essentially powerless in the face of natural events.

With the develop'

mert of agriculture and, later, industry we gained power to shape
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our environBient to meet our
needs.

No longer were people emersed
in

nature, rather they strove to
control it.
"man vs. nature.”
vs. nature

Miller calls this stage,

Non, however, we are discovering
that the man

relaV onship has

seveiv^ drawbacks.

At the

we do not wish to return to the man
in nature stage.

sa.ne

tLme,

He suggests

that we, instead, develop a "man and
nature" relationship.

In this

stage we would recognize that the world
is too complex to control

and that: "Everything is connected to everything
and our job is to

preserve stability, ambiguity, diversity, and
human dignity and

freedom by harmonious cooperation with nature.

Because we can

never know how everything or even most things are
interconnected,
[we must act withj restraint and humility. "39
Looking back across our history, E. A. Gutkind^O found a some-

what similar pattern.

He believes that there are two fundamental

ways in which hum.an beings can be in relationship with their

environment.

Borrowing Martin Buber’s terminology, he calls them

I-Thou, and I-It.

nature.

V/e

Originally people lived in close contact with

were dependent upon the natural v;orld and its

vicissitudes.

V/e

subtle changes.

were in close touch with it and responded to its
In this I-Thou relationship, everything

nature had meaning to us.

v;e

saw in

As our technology and analytical methods

developed, however, we became increasingly distant from nature.

In

the past few centuries we have become isolated from nature and the

human conimunity.

Gutkind believes that this has happened in large

3i4

part because the cycle of our
existence has become centered
around
mechanically regulated activities,
(such as work regulated by clock
time), rather than around the natural
cycles of sun, seasons, animal
ana plant activities, and our owt.
biology.
^'Today the transfo notion

from the hesitant and whispered dialogue
between man and nature to
the aggressive and loud exploitation of
nature and from closely

knit communities to atomized societies is
complete.
our fellow human beings have become alienated
from

Nature and

us— things

with

which we exist in an I-It relationship.
In addition to these two relational patterns, Gutkind
has

identified four attitudinal approaches to the world, each
of which

characterizes a different stage in our historical development.

The

first stage, ’’fear and security,” was characterized by a fear of
the unpredictable, mysterious forces in both nature and people, and

by a desire to protect oneself from them.

Nevertheless, people

lived in a direct I-Thou relationship with nature.

V/ith the

develop-

ment of agriculture and the techniques of terrace farming and
irrigation, we entered a stage of ’’confidence and adjustment.”

There was a greater degree of planning and a more rational shaping
of the environment.

Adjustment to environmental changes, though,

was immediate and reciprocal.

In the third stage, ’’agressiveness

and disintegration,” adjustment turned into exploitation as our

power to change the environment increased.
become both diverse and disjointed.

Our objectives have

For the first time an I-It
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relationship has become prominent, and
society has acquired its modem
characteristically domination-oriented
approach.

Looking toward the future, Gutkind sees
the rise of a new attitude of "responsibility

-ind

urlfloation ," which will reestablish an

I-Thou relationship.
Ej^ansive ruthlessness is gradually merging into
a careful
adjustment to environmental conditions and new
possibilities. Man begins to be aware of his real
responsibilities
and of the limitations which the closing
frontiers of the
v/orld impose upon him.
The objectives are gaining in
precision, foresight, and co-ordination. Unity in
diversity and unification are emerging as the main tasks
in the next stage of development in which man must
act
as a co-ordinator, guided by social awareness and insight
into the v/orkings of nature,

Along with the coming change in relationship and attitude, he
also sees an emerging change in the scale of our projects.

This,

again, is part of a larger historical pattern of development.

geocentric world-view

v;as

quite bounded,

arid

taken by the people who dwelled within it

With the rise of the heliocentric

vieif,

The

the projects under-

v.'ere

generally small.

Gutkind notes that there

was an accompanying development of greater expansiveness in
architectui-e and cities, and a scattering of colonial possessions.

The unbounded nature of our present cosmology has brought on great

expansion and grovrth as we continually push at the frontiers of
the world.

Now, hovrever, our frontiers and resources are running

out and we must recognize the finiteness of our earth.
is not necessarily goodness,

Bigness

He argues that we must reestablish

a realistic and human scale in our enterprises.

Both Miller and Gutkind reach
similar conclusions.

Both argue
that we must give up our attitude
of domination, and develop one

favoring reciprocity and cooperation.
step of stating

Gutkind takes the further

>hat this attitude must guide
not only cur inter

actions with nature, but with people as well.

Jonas Salk, too, has

arrived at this conclusion, although he argues
it in a different
v;ay.

If human life is to express as much harmony, constructiveness, and creativity as are possible for fulfilling
the purpose of life, as "required" by llature, and the
purposes iri life, as "chosen" by Man, an attitude v/ill
be needed, not of Man "against" Nature, but of Man
"inclusive with" Nature. A more reasonable attitude
V7ould be for Man to "serve Nature" in order to serve
himself, rather than to "serve himself" v/ithout
regard for, or at the expense of Nature and others.

Salk believes that the recent centuries of increasing growth in

population, resource consumption, environmental degradation, and

violence are characterized by social attitudes based upon exclusion.
Either one idea, thing, or person is correct, or acceptable, or

another is.

Each excludes the other in a combative struggle for

domination over the other.

In order to reduce the growth rate and

head-off a major social and environmental catastrophy, we must
change our attitude from one of "either/or" to one of "and,"
The "and" attitude is inclusive.

It accepts conflicting, but

complimentary values in a state of dynamic tension.

This attitude

even allows for the presence of either/or attitudes when they are
app'^opriate.
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One way to determine which attitude
underlies a particular action
IS to ask the question, «who wins?"

Under the attitude of domination

(either/or) there are clear winners and
losers.

attitude there are generally not clear
losers.

Under the inclusive
Rather, an efTcr:

is made to meet the needs of all parties
involved.

Instead of a

win- lose attitude, there is one of double-v:in.

Salk beljeves that

once we develop an attitude of inclusiveness

will be able to play

*

v;e

the game of life for v/hat can be given to and received
from it,

nuch can be taken and how little can be given.
This applies to our interactions with both our social and our bio-

physical environments.
Mutuality
Florence Kluckhohn^^ has developed an anthropological theory
which

v/ill he].p

to clarify the viev;s that

I

have been reviewing.

She believes that within each culture there are three fundamental

value orientations^*^ governing human interaction with nature; "Subjugation-to-Nature, "

Nature."

" Harmony- v;ith-N a tur e, "

and "Mastery-over-

These options are similar to Miller's stages of Man in

Nature, Man and Nature, and Man vs. Nature, respectively.

Her

statement of the concept, however, is far more sophisticated than
is his.

She argues that this range of values is al’ways present in

all cultures.

No culture can be viewed as being governed by only

one of the value orientations.

What characterizes a particular

culture is the emphasis placed upon each orientation.

Kluckhohn

and Strodtbeck conducted comparative field studies of Zuni, Navaho,

Spanish-taerlcan, Mo™an, and
Texan con^nities, which
her theory.

aeon, to

aopport

It IS, then, a gross
oversimplification to state that
the
tac.lcan ethos is simply one
of I-'astery-over-hatnre, or
that the

traditional Japanese ethos is that
of Harmony-with-Nature.

Rather,
we must recognize that, although
these may be the dominating
value
orientations, the alternative
orientations are still present in
each
culture. This is encouraging, because
it means that if we wish to

change the dominant value orientation
of our culture we do not have
to introduce a totally new set of
values.

There appears, then, to

be a greater likelihood of bringing about
such a change.
Leiss, Gutkind, and Salk have pointed out
that the change in

our ethos must include a change in the way in
v;hich we interact
with people, as well as with nature,

value orientations associated

different category.

v;ith

Kluckhohn, however, places the

interpersonal relations under a

These orientations are; Lineality,” "Collatera-

liby,” and ’’Individualism,”

Lineality involves an hierarchical

relationship between people.

The higher one’s position in the

hierarchy, the greater one’s pov/er and authority.

This is charac-

teristic o^ military and corporate organization, as well as of

traditional societies in v:hich one turns to the elders when decisions

must be made.

Collaterality involves an interest in the welfare of

a group of people who share in a lateral (as opposed to hierarchical)

relationship.

’’Biologically, sibling relationships are the prototype
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or the Collateral relationship.

"'>8

v^en decisions are made, they
are

made with the Interests of the
entire group in mind.

Individualism,

on the other hand, emphasizes
the welfare of the particular
individual
who IS making the decision.
Vft.en group decisions
must be made,
rather than reaching a consensus
in a collateral mode, they
are

reached by a vote.

The majority rules, regardless
of the desires or

needs of those who lost the vote.

Again, she points out that all

three relational value orientations are
present in each culture,

and that each is characterized by vrhich
orientations are particularly
emphasized,
I

feel that the split between the man-nature and
the relational

values in Kluckhohn's scheme is a product of a
cultural bias.
I

It is,

believe, a product of the human nature dichotomy of
the Judeo-

Christian tradition,

I

propose to combine the

tv;o

sets of value

orientations under the terms; "Submission," "Mutuality," and
"Domination,"

Under the Submission orientation, one senses oneself as

being powerless before the forces of nature, or human authority.

Mutuality involves a concern for the welfare of all parties involved
in a situation, be they hujnan or non-human.

Domination emphasizes

the welfare of the individual at the expense of nature or other

people.

In this view, her two categories involve the same

relational stnicture, but differ in terms of what parties are
involved in the relationship; human-hiiman in one, and human-nature
in the other (see figure

ii).

ilO
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Submission

Figure U
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Mutuality

THE THREE REUTIONAL '^ALUE ORIENTATIONS

Domination

hi
This IS not to say that any
culture in which domination of

people IS emphasized will also emphasize
the domination of nature.
Indeed, Kluckhohn’s and Strodtbeck's
results suggest that the
Spafiish-American community that they studied
emphasizes Indivi-

dualism (Domination) in human relations, and
Subjugation-to-Nature
(Submission) in man-nature relations.

V/hat I

am arguing is that

the relationship between self and other in both
cases are

structurally sim.ilar and, thus, should be referred to with
similar
terminology.

However, one’s relations to people, and to nature

may be governed by different value orientations under different
circumstances.
It is interesting to note the similarity between Domination

and Submission.

The difference betv/een the two seems to lie

primarily in x^here power is believed to lie, not in the
which power is applied.

v;ay in

That is, they differ primarily in

what is seen as dominant, and

v;ho

v;ho

or

or what is seen as in submission.

The two are opposite sides of the same coin.

Only the Mutuality

orientation involves a fundamentally different relational structure.
V/ith the

rather

th-'n

exception of Kluckhohn (who has taken a descriptive,

an adversary’’ role) all of the authors reviewed have

argued that we must move from an orientation of Domination to one
of Mutuality.

It is this task v/hich I believe is at the root of

the environmental movement.

It is a social as well as an ecolo-

gical challenge, because our cur^^ent patterns of interaction with

U2

our non-human environment are
Integrally entwined with our
interactions
with other individuals, institutions,
and nations.
The ethos which is characteristic
of a predominantly mutualistic

value orientation is a logical

ar.i

necessary extension of the emerging

world-view in which we are all interconnected
with, and dependent
upon the ecology and peoples of the world.

Our science and technology

have brought us to the point at which the
old ethos which emphasizes

Domination has lost survival value.
liftiat

we are dealing with is Mutuality as both a world-view
and

an ethos.

The former involves an image of a world in which we each

exist in a reciprocal, interdependent relationship vdth both
people
and nature.

The latter involves an ethic based upon a mutualistic

reciprocity, requiring that we work for double-win, rather than

win-lose solutions.

Each, the world-view and the ethos, is in

harmony with the other.

This points to the emergence of a

nev;

moral order, which is implicit in the dynamics of the mutualistic
universe.

Once this happens, if it happens, we will once again

recognize ourselves as occupying a position of significance in the

universe and Holtz’ new sense of the tragic can emerge.
This can not happen, though, until the mutualistic world-view
and ethos become a predominant part of our culture.

begun.

The process has

Take, for example, the problem encountered v;hen a river

floods and destroys homes in its valley.
the problem

v.'ould

A submissive approach to

be to say, "these things happen and there is

13

nothing

I

can do about it,” and rebuild at the
same location.

A

dominating approach would be than of saying,
"Damn it, this flooding
has got to be stopped,” and build flood
control dams upstream.

mutualistic appr )ach would involve the realization
that it is

The
tr

nature of a river to flood its flood plain— that the
flood plain
is a part of the river, although it most often
occupies a narrow

channel.

The solution to the problem, then, would be not to build

homes in the river; that is, in the flood plain.

This kind of land

vjould better, and more safely, be used for agriculture and

recreation.

Such an approach is increasingly being taken and

instituted in the form of zoning regulations and flood insurance
rate schedules.

Our social, political, legal, and economic institutions are

likely to become increasingly mutualistic as
vn.th

v;e

are forced to deal

international tensions and environmental degradation.

The

process needs to be helped along, though, through the clear articulation of a mutualistic philosophy and the development of a body
of people who are consciously committed to this approach.

In

addition. Mutuality must become an integral part of education.

One’s ethos and v/orld-view are not inherited genetically.
are learned.

They

It is through education, in the broadest sense of the

term, that a new ethos and world-view

vri.ll

be spread.

It is

important to realise that a society's formal educational institut'^ons probably play a relatively small role in this overall

process.

Nevertheless, they can help to preserve
the genninal ideas

until the society is ready to accept them.

And they can play a part

in helping to crystallize the general
mutualistic orientation that

students are likely to learn as their social
environment becomes

increasingly mutualistic.
The major task of environmental education is, as

foster a mutualistic v;orld~view and ethos.

I see it,

to

Most environmental

educators have viewed their role through a very narrow window
and,
thus, the role of environmental education has been narrow.

However,

the perspective that I have presented joins it with humanistic

education, international education, and others, in a common task.
I

wish to focus upon the role that environmental education can

play in promoting a mutualistic value orientation.
I

In particular,

will deal vdth mutualistic interactions with our bio-physical

environment.

Nevertheless, since our attitudes toward both people

and nature are interconnected, I must deal
as well.

Before dealing specifically

v/ith

^idth

social mutualism

education, we must

take a closer look at the characteristics of social and environ-

mental mutualism.
differ?

To v/hat extent are they similar, and how do they
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CHAPTER

II

LIFE, ETHICS, AND INTRINSIC VALUE

The distinction between Mutuality
and Domination value orientao^.ons is subtle, lying in the
values which nnderly an act,

rather than in the act itself.

In order for people to engage in

a genuinely mutualistic interaction,
each must grant the others

autonomy and regard them as having something cf
genuine value to
contribute.

Although different people may not all make contri-

butions of equal quality, they are, nevertheless,
granted an
equal right to participate.

However, a number of authors have

suggested solutions to our environmental problems which lack
this important element of Mutuality.
In his essay,

"The Human Prospect," Robert Heilbroner found

himself compelled to vn'ite that, although he dislikes dictatorships, ".

.

.

our analysis forces us to consider the possibility

that the passage through the gantlet ahead may be possible only

under governments capable of rallying obedience far more effectively than v/ould be possible in a democratic setting."^

not alone in reaching this conclusion.

He is

Others, too have argued

that in order to solve our global social and environmental problems
we must first establish a global government with enormous,

perhaps dictatorial powers.

This is an extreme example of a

general approach to solving environmental problems which, although
widespread, does not seem to have been clearly labelled; this is,

li9

solving environmental problems
through the domination of people.
Another example of this method is
the recommendation that the

United States foreign aid, particularly
food aid, be sent only
to countries x.ni.h have instituted
a strong policy of population

control.

This is, essentially, a policy of
starving countries

into submission to our solution to their
problems.

Their

population problems eventually have an impact
upon the United
States and, thus, become our problems as well;
but this does

not make the policy any more attractive to me.

Keeping in mind

the question of who is it that wins, and who loses,
it is

interesting to notice that the people who must be dominated
almost

invariably are members of a group other than the one to which the
person proposing the policy belongs.
If, indeed, ecological problems are in part the product of

an attitude of domination of nature, which in turn is connected
to that of domination of people, can the problems be solved through

further domination?

There seems to be some evidence to the contrary.

A number of Third V/orld nations, for example, have viev;ed our

population policy recommendations with great suspicion.

They have

been repeatedly exploited in the past and it is easy to understand
why they would hesitate to trust us

nov/.

It makes no difference

whether or not a policy theoretically can work, if it is not
accepted (or is violently rejected).

The attempt to establish a

population policy through nutritional blackmail is liable to lead

SI

only to further hostility.
In addition, the attempt to solve
problems through domination

actua]ly reduces the likelihood of
finding a solution.
approaches the ,problem

vrith

The dominator

arrogant certainty of the solution,

but

the problems we face are so novel and
complex that no one can really

be certain of any solution until it has
been tried.

By denying the

others the right to full participation in the
process both of

identifying and solving the problems, the dominator
limits his access
to important information and advice.

Each country, each part of a

country, differs in landsacpe, people, and social institutions.

These unique qualities are often of great importance in determining

whether or not a given policy will work, and it is the people who
live in these areas who are generally the best qualified to identify
and deal v/ith them.
In his seminal article, "Living on a Lifeboat," Garrett Hardin

has argued that Kenneth Boulding's "spaceship earth" metaphor is

not an appropriate description of our situation.^

The earth can be

viewed as a spaceship only if it has a captain making decisions
and allocating the limited resources of the vessel.

In the absence

of such a centralized authority, Hardin proposes that the metaphor

of a lifeboat is more accurate.

limited space for passengers.

Each coimtry is a lifeboat

The poor of the world are those

who have fallen out of their country’s boat, and
crying to the large wealthy

vjith

boats for help.

novi

they are

But if the wealthy

were to help, the additional burden of people would narrow their

own margin of safety, or even swamp
their boat.

Thus, we find our-

selves in the classical ethical dilemmaj
how do we decide who to let

into the lifeboat, and who to leave in
the water to drown?

Under normal conditions,

vrho..

ine population of a country ex-

ceeds that country's ability to produce food,
the population falls

back down to a lower level.

Hardin points out, however, that the

proposed World Food Bank would just keep increasing
the population
level by pumping additional food into the country each
time it

exceeded its resources.

When the inevitable crash finally comes,

it would be disastrous.

He argues that under programs such as the

Bank, "wealth can be steadily moved in one direction only, from the

slow-breeding rich to the rapidly-breeding poor, the process

finally coming to a halt only when all

miserably poor."^

coijintries are

equally and

The end result, then, would be both mass

starvation and universal poverty.

Hardin believes that rights and responsibilities go hand in
hand. "VJhen human survival is at stake, the acceptance of respon-

sibility is a precondition to the acceptance of rights, if the
cannot be introduced simultaneously."^

tv;o

The right to food entails

the responsibility to curb population growth.

If a country requests

food, but refuses to institute strong population control measures,

the normal population cycle should be allowed to take its course,

because a comparatively few deaths now is preferable to a great

many in the future.

He concludes by pointing out that:

No v/orkable ansv:ers can be found if we ignore population
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problems.

And— if

the argument of this essay is
correct—
government to conl^or
ILlT/
reproduction everywhere it is impossible
to survive in
di^ity If we are to be guided by spaceshio
ethics.
Without a world government that is
sovereign in reoroductive matters mankind lives, in fact,
on a number of
sovereign lifeboats,
’^he foreseeable future
survival demands that we govern our
actions by the
ethics of a lifeboat. Posterity will be
ill served if
we do not.^

Hardin's thesis has been the subject of a
good deal of controversy.

Basically, although coarsely put, he is saying,
"If they

don't shape up, let them starve."

This is a disturbing recommendation

which many people have been unable to accept, in part
because it runs
counter to their basic sense of what is ethically proper.
reason the critiques

For this

of his lifeboat ethic tends to be clouded by

unexamined assumptions and a high level of emotionality.
personally, hope that he is wrong in his conclusions.

I,

Nevertheless,

his argument deserves careful consideration.
The argument that continuing to provide food to a nation which
is unable to control its population vrill only lead to a larger

disaster, is persuasive.

It is based upon the concept of the "tragedy

of the commons," which Hardin had developed in an earlier paper.

Any communally owned resource is a commons if the profits derived
from its use go to the individual users.

Under these circumstances

an individual can make a profit even though his actions may lead
to the eventual destruction of the commons, because the expense of

his exploitation is borne by the entire community, rather than by

himself alone.

This led to the destruction of the English comnions

a= individual, increaaed thoir
herd size in order to maximize
their
short-terra profits at the expense
of overgrazing. Hardin argues
that
the World Food Bank would turn the
world's food resources into a
cobu.ions.

Agr^co/Lturally poor ccvn^ories would be
able to increci:>e

their populations at the expense of the
v;orld community, which

would share the burden of feeding the
additional mouths.

Since

the poor nations would not bear the burden
of the expense of their

actions, they v/ould not be motivated to restrain
their rate of

reproduction.

This argument v/orks if the food supply is the only significant
-factor that might lead to the self regulation of the
population

size.

Others, however, have argued that as a country’s standard

of living increases, its rate of population growth decreases.

If

this is true, then a redistribution of v/ealth may not lead to a
w'orld in

which

v;e

are all "equally and miserably poor,"

At this

point, though, we do not have sufficient information to know which

theory is correct,

Daniel Callahan believes that in the absence

of hard evidence that the situation is as bad as Hardin paints it
to be, "It is thus a perfectly moral course to act as

every country can be saved, and

minor steps

to

ccujitries) . "7

help Lbem

(in

^^

vre

cooperation

^ each

and

can take at least some
v;ith

other developed

At this point the debate seems to be based upon

optimism and pessjmism, rather than on hard data.
If

v;e

accept Hardin’s main thesis, we are still confronted by

seme difficulties in his approach to the problem.

These are
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particularly gennane to the
discussion of Domination and
Mutuality
value orientations. The first
lies in the nature of his
analogy.
He IS equating each country's
good resources with the passenger
rating of a lifeboat. The rating
of the lifeboat is oetormir-.c
In
terms of how many people it caii
hold without capsizing, not by the

quantity of its provisions.

Food resources, then are being

converted into spacial measurements; each
passenger occuping so

much space, and each lifeboat having
so much space for so many
people.

But Hardin does not address the fact that
each lifeboat

in his discussion is rated by a different
system.

Since the per

capita production and consumption of the rich
nations (such as
the United States) is very large, their lifeboats
are rated to

provide a great deal of space (quality of life) for each
person.
The poor nations, on the other hand, are in lifeboats which
have

been rated to provide a maximum passenger capacity.

The decision

of v/hether or not the rich should let the poor into their life-

boats is initially based upon the level of the comfort of their
accomodations, not upon simple survival.

The survival decisions

must be made only after many survivors have been brought aboard
and the vessel is packed to its true safety limit.

His failure

to really deal irith this issue of unequal distribution of the
v/orld's wealth contributes to an underlying miserly tone in Hardinb

paper.
A second problem is that Hardin’s picture of the v;orld is one
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of separate nations, which exist
in isolation from each other.

The

food wealth of the rich, however,
depends a great deal upon the

resources of the poor.

For example, the production of fertilizer

places a heavy dt.aand upon petroleum resources,
and a large part of
the huge anchovy catch of protein- starved
Peru ends up as cattle

feed in the United States,

He does recognize that the rich have

exploited the poor in the past, but writes that:
We are all the descendants of thieves, and the
vrorld's resources are inequitably distributed,
but V7e must begin the journey to tomorrow from
the point where we are today. We cannot remake
the past, V/e cannot, without violent disorder
and suffering, give land and resources back to
the '’original” owners— who are dead anyway,^
In rebuttal, Callahan vrrites that the issue is not that of

paying retribution for old injustices, but of ceasing to continue

perpetrating injustice.

Writing in terms

v/hich echo Puritanism,

Hardin condemns the poor for being poor and not doing anything
about it, without substantively addressing the issues of how it
was that they became and continue to be poor.

It may well be that

the rich have enlarged their lifeboats by ripping planks from the

boats of the poor.

In any event, under our present style of

living, the rich are not passengers in self-sufficient lifeboats;

they are enmeshed in a complex network of trade with the nations
of the v7orld.°
Hardin, also, seems to picture the poor nations as povjerless

pawns which the rich can push around as they please without

reprecussions.

The oil producing countries of the Middle East
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have demonstrated this to be a
false assumption.

They have discovered

that by controlling the price and
flow of their oil they can have a
great economic and political impact
upon the rest of the world.

Other nations which have resource,
that the rich want are lihely tc
discover that they have similar power.
Those which do not have

valuable resources can still resort to
terrorism and, eventually,
nuclear blackmail.

We are no longer in a world in which Hardin's

starvation policy can be expected to work.

The poor nations are

aware of the wealth of the rich and they are
bound to band

together and demand a piece of the pie, vxhether
or not they undertake the population policies that Hardin recognizes
as vital to

everyone's long-term well being.
Leiss has argued that domination of people and of nature are
linked.

We have found domination of people in Hardin's thesis,

but what of nature?

It turns out that he portrays nature only as

resources v;hich can be used to satisfy human needs; that is, as

something to dominate.

Leiss' rationale for linking the two was

that in a world of limited resources, people can successfully

dominate nature only by successfully competing with and dominating
other people.

This, too, is the structure of Hardin's argument.

In a v/orld of limited resources, the rich can remain rich only if

the poor either accept population controls, or starve.

Hardin's approach of, "you do it my way, or else," is reflective
of an underlying orientation of Domination.

He views the problem

as that of the "haves"
defending themselves from the
irresponsibility
of the "have nots." As a
member of the "haves" his view
of the
situation is ethnocentric. The
"have nots" can equally blame
the
haves for squandering the
world's resources, thus precipitating
the crisis before a proper
solution to the long-term problems
can be
found. In either case one group
is trying to pin the blame on

another.
A Mutuality approach would be,
"Look, we have some problems in

common which neither of us can solve without
the help of the other."
In this case both accept responsibility
for the problem (or at

least do not go out of their way to place blame)
and recognize that
each can make a contribution toward its solution.

Rather than being

two separate groups, they are two groups united in a
common task.
It is a prerequisite of mutualistic relationships that one
sense

oneself and the others as joined together as part of a larger group.

That we are all part of a larger group is inherent in the
concepts of the world community, and humankind.

It is this view

of the world which underlies mutualistic international policy.
to what group do we belong if we are to establish a mutualistic

relationship with nature?

But

Albert Schweitzer

When the First World War
broke ont, Albert Schwoltser
felt
himself forced to confront
and attempt to explain the
decay of
Western civilization. At first
he intended to write a
crUiqne
of civilization, but his work
evolved into a philosophy which
he
felt would lead to its restoration.
His thoughts were built upon
the fundamental assumption
that civilization is based
upon ethical
ideals.

y
essential element in civilization the
ethical perfecting of the individual
and of society as
weii,^ But at the same time, every
spiritual and every
material step
advance has a significance for civilization. The will uo civilization is
then the universal will to progress which is conscious
of the
ethical as the highest value for all.
In spite of the
great importance we attach to the triumphs
of knov.'ledge
and achievement, it is nevertheless obvious
that only
a humanity which is striving after
ethical ends can in
full measure share in the blessings brought by
material
progress and become master of the dangers v/hich
accompany it. To the generation which had adopted
a belief in an immanent power of progress
realizing
itself, in some mea.sure, naturally and automatically,
^d which thought that it no longer needed any ethical
ideals but could advance to its goal by means of
knowledge and achievement alone, terrible proof was
being given by its present position of the error
into which it had sunk.^^

m

Before he could make any headway on his philosophy of civilization, he had to identify the fundamental ethical idea upon which

civilization was based.

He worked on the problem for months, but

with no success, until one day in 1915.

V/hile traveling to see a

patient, his boat passed through a herd of hippopotami and there

flashed into his mind, the phrase, ’’Reverence for Life.”^^

He

recognized that it is progress toward the full realization of this
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ideal which marks the genuine
progress of civilization.
In Schweitzer -s view, social
progress was initially measured
in
terms of the promotion of human
solidarity.
In antiquity the idea

of a brotherhood of man played

cr.ly

a small part in the shaping
of

human conduct, because the concept
of

‘.man-

was narrowly defined.

Each group or tribe defined itself
as being more human than the
others, which meant that one need
not act in the same way to other

groups as one would to members of one's
own group.

Ethical progress

has consisted of widening the definition
of the group with which
one feels a sense of solidarity and, thus,
to which one feels a

sense of responsibility and duty.

Even today, though, this sense

of one's group tends to stop at racial and national
boundaries.

Person-t>person relations, however, do not encompass the
sphere of ethical concern.

v/hole

In reality, it is a subset of a sphere

which includes the question of right conduct in the entire world,
and toward all life in it.

Schweitzer rejected Descartes' formu-

lation of the beginning sentence of thought,

"

cogito , ergo sum,"

which he believed led only to an ever-increasing abstraction from
the fundainental experience of being alive.

Instead, he focused

upon the ever-present will-to-live, which he believed we all

experience and share

v/ith

all other life.

The elemental fact, present in our consciousness
moment of our existences, is: I am life that
wills to live, in the midst of life that wills to
live.
The mysterious fact of my will to live is
that I feel a mandate to behave with sympathetic
concern toward all the wills to live which exist
side by side with my own. The essence of Goodness
is: Preserve life, promote life, help life to achieve
ever^'’
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The essence of Evil is; Destroy
le, harm life, hamper the
development of life.
The fundam.ental principle of
ethics, then, is
reverence for life. All the goodness
one displays
toward a living organism is, at
bottom, helping it
to preserve arJ further its

existence.

The ethic of reverence for life is
the product of a long process
of ethical evolution, which has been
powered and guided by will-tolive.

At present, our civilization has not
reached this stage, but

Schweitzer believed that it inevitably will,
in a great
renaissance of the human spirit.

by our own hands.

The alternative is our destruction

The person-to-person ethic of the present, although

active and profound, is incomplete in that it can
contain only a

fragment of the human experience of living, and can deal with
only
a portion of the dilemma which confronts us,

Schweitzer found the world to be "a ghastly drama of will-to-live

divided against itself. »T3

gach animal, each life, exists by feeding

and inflicting suffering upon others, without self-conscious recog-

nition of the will-to-live in others.

Only in people do we find

this consciousness, and only people are capable of developing

reverence for life.

Once we have gained this consciousness of

other wills to live our ethical course is absolute; all life, every

plant and animal, must be preserved,

’whenever we kill or cause

suffering to other lives, even if it is done out of inexcapable
necessity, we incur a burden of guilt.

Even the recognition that

we must eat in order to live carnot relieve us of the responsibility

for our acts.

Thus, we must zake great care to do as little harm as
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is possible.

In order to atone for our guilt
we must devote

humanitarian attention to the world's
suffering creatures.

Only

the act or relieving others of
their distress will help to relieve

ourselves of a portion of our buracn.
Since reverence for life extends to all
life, it includes

reverence for human life; our own, as well
as that of others.

Schweitzer wrote that the ethics of reverence
for life,
forbid me to still my conscience with the reflection
that, as the more efficient man, by quite
legitimate
means I am advancing myself at the cost of one v;ho
than I,
In what the law and public
opinion allow me, they set a problem before me. They
bid me think of others, and make me ponder vrhether
I
can allow myself the inward right to pluck all the
fruit that my hand can reach. Thus it may happen that,
in obedience to consideration for the existence of
others, I do what seems to ordinary opinion to be
folly. lU

Albert Schweitzer was a Christian theologian (as well as an
accomplished musicologist, musician, philosopher, and physician)
and his thinking is rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition.

He

did not, however, write in the dom.inant Latin theological tradition

symbolized by St. Thomas of Aquinas, who taught that only man of
all the creatures on earth has a soul.

Instead, he wrote more in

the tradition of St. Francis of Assisi who taught that all things
on earth are united in spirit.

To Schweitzer, all life is united

in the common experience of a universal will-to-live.

His is a

mystical philosophy which claims that the fundamental ethicizing
tinjth lies

within each of us.

He believed that civilization has

deteriorated, because people have become m.esmerized by matter and

have devoted their energies to the
understanding and control of the

material world.

This effort, however, is of little value
to ethical

progress, because ethics strives to create
something that is not
axroav.y in this world.

Although ine will-to-live is u^iiversal,

the ability to revere life is uniquely human and
not yet fully

realized.

He asserted that civilization vail advance only after

we place the quest for moral progress ahead of our quest
for

material progress.
This philosophy is mutualistic in nature.

It requires that

our actions be judged in terms of the degree to v;hich we give aid
to others, rather than by how much

v;e

gain for ourse?-ves.

It also

provides a mutualistic link between humanity and nature, all being
joined by the common phenomenon of will-to-live.

Had Garrett Hardin

been guided by this philosophy, he might have recommended a

different solution to the world population problem, although his
perception of the nature of the dilemma might have remained the same
Schweitzer’s ethic, however, has its limitations.

His work

v;as

done in the early part of this century, long before the fledgling
science of ecology became widely knovm.

He wrote from the perspec-

tive of a dedicated physician and humanitarian, who had devoted his

life to saving individual lives; not from the perspective of a

person who was aware of ecological processes or population dynamics,
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is not an ecology ethic, but a life ethic.

It is concerned viith

the promotion of life on an individual basis; each and every life

is of intrinsic value.

His ecological limitations are
demonstrated in

tv;o

ways.

First

he viewed the non-humvji world as one
of a savage conflict between
sepaTo.te wills t>

This seems to reflect the nineteenth

..ive.

century conception of nature as "red in tooth
and claw," in which
all creatures lived by the Law of the Jungle—
"kill or be killed."

Since he was not aware of the complex patterns
of ecological

relationships which link all living organisms, it was
relatively
easy for him to project unknowingly his image of immoral
man upon
the entire living world.

Schweitzer’s second limitation is a bit more ambiguous.

When

he wrote that the essence of goodness is to promote life, he

failed to define "promote."

If he meant by this that we must do

everything possible to increase life, his ethic can lead us into

very serious trouble.

Under such an interpretation, his desire

to "help life to achieve its highest destiny" comes dangerously

close to a position that might substitute density for destiny.

Alternatively, what we are to promote may be the quality of each

individual life.

This interpretation is less likely to enhance

our population problems.

But how would Schweitzer deal with the dilemma with which
Hardin confronts us?

— that

by feeding people who are starving we

allow them to reproduce, and thus, increase the misery and degradation of human life.

His works fail to provide clear guidance

in dealing with this problem (one of the most profoundly tragic
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elements in our world today).

Certainly, he would have hesitated

to condemn the starving to
starvation, and would have been
less

miserly in his approach, but it
is difficult to guess what
he would
do in this situation, since it
wa- something which he never had
to
confront.
A

nmber

of hmanitarians refuse to grant
anyone the right to

take a life through either action or
inaction .15

in practice this

refers to our interactions with animals,
rather than plants.

Schweitzer, however, wrote that we must act with
reverence for all
life, but recognized that it is impossible to
live without taking

some life and, thus, assuming some guilt.

His philosophy, then,

does not ban killing or causing suffering, instead
it mandates
1

esponsibility.

It is, thus, conceivable that a policy-maker

v;ho

j-ollowed Schweitzer *s ethic could come to the same conclusion as

did Hardin, although the resulting anguish v/ould be overwhelming.

Aldo Leopold

Aide Leopold brought to ethics the ecological understanding
v/hich Albert Schweitzer lacked.

one of the founders of

modem

He was a forester, ecologist, and

game management.

Although his background

and ethical language v;ere very different from those of Schweitzer, a

number of their conclusions are similar.

Leopold’s thinking,

though, was in terms of ecological units, rather than in terms of

suffering individuals.
In Leopold's view, ethics can be approached from both an

ecological and a philosophical perspective.

In both cases, the

concern of ethics is that interdependent groups and individuals
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cooperate with each other.

Philosophically, this involves
defining

the limits of what is and what
is not proper social behavior.

Ecologically, this is defined in terms
of what kind of behavior
IS or is not allowable in the
st.,-ggle for biological existence.

Until recently the ecological concept
was not a practical ethical
concern, because our impact upon our
environment was limited

technology and population.

Now, however, we have the ability to

radically alter our environment and we must give
careful thought
to the problem of what kinds of alterations are
allovjable.

The fundamental premise of all ethics, as Leopold saw it,
is

that we all are members of a community.

Originally, ethics in-

volved only interpersonal relationships, but as the human population increased and complex social patterns evolved, ethical
systems became more complex.

They had to evolve to provide a

mechanism for integrating individual and social behavior.
result of this evolution

The

was an expansion of the definition of

the realm of ethical concern from one of simply individuals to

one which included society.

V/ith the

more recent increase in

population and technology, and our resulting ability to alter
greatly the ecological pattern of the earth, we are faced with the
need to expand further the realm of ethical concern.

No longer

is it sufficient to confine ethics to questions of proper social

conduct.

We must also deal with the question of what is proper

human conduct with respect to land. However, the ethics which

would legitimately include such a question has yet to evolve.
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The new -land ethic" will rest on the
same premise that we are members
of a community.

What Leopold proposed, though, is that we
change

our definition of community, enlarging
the concept "to include
soils, waters, plants, and animals, or
collectively; the land."^^

Ihis does not mean that we must cease viewing
the land as a
resource.

To do so would be impossible, since it provides
the food

and materials v/hich support our lives,

^ihat it

does imply

is that

we must value the land not only as a resource, but as
something
of intrinsic value; something which can be valued on its

o\^m

merits,

rather than in terms of some other value, such as economic V7orth,
"In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo saoiens from

conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it.
It implies respect for his fellovi-members, and also, respect for
the community as such. "^7
In human communities we accept the existence of communal obli-

gations v/hich extend beyond simple self-interest.

For example,

taxpayers are expected to pay for schools, road, and other public
services, regardless of whether the individual taxpayer will use
them all.

The criterion is that of the public good, not just the

self-intei 3st of the individual.

If our concept of community

expands to include the biotic community, then the definition of
the public good must also expand.

It must include the welfare

of the land, our fellow-member of the community.

Under the land

ethic, the co’onterpart of social cooperation is conservation.
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But consei'vation means different
things to different people.
Leopold pointed out that there was
a major division between the
conservationists who regard the land as
something of extrinsic
va]--. ^valued as a means to some
other end,

those who regard
in itself).

it as

soch as wealth), an^

being of intrinsic value (valued as an
end

He called this split, the A-B cleavage
in conversation.

The A-B cleavage is of more than academic
interest, because the

tension between the

tv;o

views underlies the history of American

conservation, and helps to explain a great deal of the
controversy

associated

v/ith

contemporary environmental issues.

If land is viewed as being of extrinsic value, as a means,

to some other end, whatever 1 do to the land can be justified

only in terms of that other end.

If, for example, I consider land

to be of value only as a means to gain economic wealth, I can

justify conserving it only if in so doing
(or, at least, do not suffer a loss).

I

increase my wealth

If land is viewed as being

of intrinsic value there is no need to justify conserving it,

because the act of conservation

conser\’'es

that value.

If I v;ish

to alter the land, the burden falls upon me to demonstrate that

whatever

I

do will not threaten that value.

The conservationists of Group A,

vrho

see land as being of

extrinsic value, are the ones who have held the greatest influence

and power in the conser'/ation agencies of our government,

Gifford

Pinchot, for example, was one of the strongest forces for conser-

vation in the United States
during the first decades of the
twentieth
century.
In his capacity as the
country's Chief Forester, and
with
the strong support of Theodore
Roosevelt he publicised the need
to
conserve o'lr natural resources
in the face of massive, destnicti-e
exploitation by private monopolies.

His policies played an

important part in changing the pattern
of national resource usage
from one of rapacious consumption
to one of management for sustained
use.

The idea that conservation consists of
managing resources in

order to satisfy continuing national
economic need, was central to
Pinchot’s philosophy.

Conservation stands for the same kind of practical
common— sense management of this country by the
people that every business man stands for in the
handling of his ovm business. It believes in
prudence and foresight instead of reckless blindnessj it holds that resources now public property
should not become the basis for oppressive private
monopoD.yj and it demands the complete and orderly
development of all our resources for the benefit
oP all the people instead of the partial exploitation of them for the benefit of a few. .
Conservation has much to do with ^he welfare of
the average man of today.
It proposes to secure
a continuous and abundant supply of the
necessaries of life, which means a reasonable
cost of living and business stability. It
advocates fairness in the distribution of the
benefits which flow from the natural resources.^®
.

.

From this perspective people have ethical responsibilities
toward each other, but not toward the land itself.

instrumental value, a means to an economic end.

Land is an

The ethical goal

is that of insuring uhe democratic distribution of the wealth of

resources to all of the nation's citizens, both now and in the
future.

Pinchot asserted:

duty, and that

protect
themselves against the uncontrolled
monoooly of the
natural resources which yield the
necessities of life
We are beginning to realise that the
Conservation
question IS a question of right and
wrong, as any question ira r.t be vjhich may involve the
differencer beUv^en
prosperity and poverty, health and sickness,
ignorance
and education, well-being and misery,
to hundreds of
thousands of families. Seen from the point
of view of
hum^ welfare and human progress, questions which
begin as purely economic often end as moral
issues.
Oonservation is a moral issue because if involves
the rights and the duties of our people— their
rights to prosperity and happiness, and their duties
to themselves, to their descendants, and to
the
whole future progress and welfare of this Nation. 19

Pinchot was not without his opponents, perhaps the most vocal
of which was John Muir,

Muir and Pinchot met in the Summer of I896

when they began touring the Western forest as members of the

Forestry Commission of the National Academy of Science,

They

became close friends and discovered that they both shared a common
love of the forest.

Over the course of the following year, though,

Muir realized that they differed in their understanding of what
the role of conservation,

Muir's, preservation .

Pinchot'

s

v.^as

emphasized economic use, and

This realization crystallized during the

debate over the purposes of the forest reserves v/hich were being

created at that time.

Although he continued to support the

establishment of reserves, Muir fought a losing battle to win the
country to his preservationist views.

Muir felt the wilderness to be of tremendous spiritual and
aesthetic significance, which should be treated with reverence, awe
and humility.

In his view, morality lay in preserving the things

which are wild, and preventing their desecration,

Trr.s

did not

mean that the forest resources could not be used, but
he refused
to allow their quality of wildness to be destroyed in the
process.

Thus, he became symbolic of Group B, those

v/ho viev/ed

land as some-

thing of intrinsic value.

Aldo Leopold realized that as a result of the prevailing
economic definition of the good, it is very difficult to justify
the preservation of anything that is not of immediate economic

value.

In order to preserve things of dubious economic v/orth

we must invent methods of economic justification.

An important

argument used to justify the preservation of song birds, for
example, was based upon their role in keeping dovm the population

of insects pests.

Sometimes these arguments may become tenuous as

the economic importance of the birds, or plants, or insects are

blown out of proportion, because Group B is trj^ing to fabricate
a justification for preservation which is congruent with the values

of Group A.

What Group B really values, though, is the integrity

of the biotic community, hut it is nearly impossible to argue for
its preservation without getting into what would sound to Group

A as idealistic abstractions.

As a result, many organisms are

lost, or defined as not worthy of consideration.
of
Similarly, it is difficult to justify the preservation

specific biotic communities.

Those which are not of obvious

are not
economic worth (such as bogs, swamps, and dune areas)

considered worth presei-ving.

Some of these are preserved by

economic value, as
searching for less immediately recognizable
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was done when wetland preservation
was argued on the basis of their
importance in providing water supply and
flood control.

In order

to conserve others, we define them as
parks, arguing that they have
soi.ie

vaguely defined cultural val.e.

Their integrity, though, is

continuously in danger unless they are further
justified in terms
of tourism, watershed, and timber crop values.

The value of parks in preserving important biotic
communities,
though, is limited, because they are of greatest value in
preserving

large tracts of land.

But most of the areas that are still worth

maintaining in their unaltered state are mixed in with economically
valuable land and cannot be easily preserved.

If private land

owners regarded the land as being of intrinsic value they v;ould be

proud to act as trustees of these unique and beautiful spots.

In

general, though, they do not and the job of insuring their their

preservation must be done by the government, if it is done at all.
In the long term, Leopold vrrote, this may not be the kind of control

over our land which we would

v/ant the

government to exercise, but

the task has been forced upon it by the private citizen's failure
to practice conservation on a volunteer basis.

Roderick Nash has pointed out that, "For all his love of the
woods, Pinchot’s ultimate loyalty

v/as

to civilization and forestry;

Muir's to wilderness and preservation."^^

This seems to have been

generally true of Group A and Group B, respectively,

Paul Santraire

has argued that this split between nature-oriented and civilization-

oriented people became obsessive in the nineteenth century and has
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led to the present “cult of the simple rustic
life," and "cult of

compulsive manipulation. "^2

recent years, hovjever, we have come

to recognize that the natural resources upon
v/hich we depend are

enmeshed in a complex system of tv,ological and geological
process.

We are beginning to realize that in order to make use of our
resources we must be sure to sustain the systems of vxhich they are
a part.

This perception may lead to a synthesisj our economic

well being is dependent upon the well being of the larger system.
It is vital, then, that we change the basic concept of v/hat

should be conserved; individual resources, or the larger system.
Also,

v;e

must do

av/ay vfith

economic self-interest as the sole, or

even primary criterion for conservation, and substitute a land
ethic.

This involves developing a new public concept of what is

the land, and vjhat should be our relationship with it.

Leopold

suggested that the master image v/hich should be employed in con-

servation education is that of the biotic pycamid.

He argued that

this image can be more dynamic and personally meaningful than that of
the "balance of nature."

The image of the biotic pyramid portrays

land not just as soil, but as a layered grouping of organisms.

At the bottom is the soil, then the producer organisms (plants),
then the animals in their ranks of primary and secondary consumers.

Linking all of these layers is a "fountain of energy" flowing along
the intricate paths of the food web.

At the top of the heap sits

man, receiving life-support from the multitude of organisms in the

lower layers.

The nature of the flow of energy between these layers
When a

is dependent upon the structure of the biotic community.

change is made in one part of the energy oircuxt,

^

^

J-

'

VV

7h

also affected as they adjust to
the change.
in the biotic pyraiaid affects us.

Any change that

v,e

ma'.e

We must, then, treat the land with

great respect and with as little violence
as is possible.
The concept of the biotic pyramid
provides a rat j oral fovr.dpfion

for a form of conservation which is not
based upon economic arguments.
It links the general human welfare with
that of the entire biotic

community.

Each affects the other.

The role of conservation

becomes that of promoting the general health and
welfare of the
enlarged community of both man and land.

Leopold defines health

of the land as "the capacity of land for self-renewal . "23

with

this concept of biotic health in mind, Leopold offers the following

definition of right action with respect to the land: "A thing is
right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty
of the biotic community.

It is wrong when it tends otherwise.

Leopold once wrote, "One of the penalties of an ecological

education is that one lives alone in a world of wounds,

In

the face of such a world, he believed that ecologists had the choice

of either hardening themselves, or becoming healers.

be a healer.

He chose to

In his role as a forester and a founder of profes-

sional game management, he tried to bridge the worlds of the
exploiters, and of those who rejected civilization in favor of

wilderness.

Central to his work was the notion that when one is

managing a forest, or wildlife, one is dealing with
organisms, not with just a single species.

a

community of

Beginning vdth a solid
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foundation in ecology, he
attempted to unite the ethical
and aesthetic
perception of John Muir with
Gifford Pinchofs desire to use
natural
resources to meet humc.n needs. 26
Aldo Leopolc wrote his essay,
-The Land Ethic," shortly het.re
death in 19l;8.27 since it v;as
written over tv;enty years before
the development of a widespread
recognition of environmental

deterioration it reflects great vision,
but lacks the breadth of

perspective which we might wish for today.

Its perspective is

limited, also, by the focus of Leopold’s
interests.

Nevertheless,

the depth of his insight and the
sensitivity of his witing have

made this one of today's most widely-read
essays on environmental
ethics.

The key concept in his ethic is that of expanding
our sense of

community to include the land.
v;hat

he means by this, and

It is important to determine just

vj’hether it is

possible to do.

Are the

two concepts of community (biotic and human) compatible and,
if
so, can they be joined in practice?

At times he seems to use his

concept of land and the concept of biotic community as if they are
synonymous.
clear.

They are not, but he does not make the distinction

Odum defines "biotic community" as follows;
A biotic community is any assemblage of populations in a
prescribed area or physical habitat; it is an organized
unit to the extent that it has characteristics additional to its individual and population components .
.
and functions as a unit through coupled metabolic
.

transformations . 28
A biotic community, then, includes only populations of living

organisms.
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But Leopold defines "lend” as
"soil, vaters, plants, and

aniir.als."

Since this includes non-living
components, it is a different concept.
It IS clear that he intends to deal
with an ecological concept,

and the ecologic

.1

unit which

sce„.s to

come closest tc ris d»fi,dtJon

of land is "ecosystem,'*

Any unit that includes all of the organisms
(i.e., the
"community") in a given area interacting with
the
physical envirorunent so that a flow of energy
leads
to clearly defined trophic sti'ucture, biotic*
diversity, and material cycles (i.e., exchange of
materials between living and nonliving parts) within
the system is an ecological system or ecosystem
.
Since he wrote that our sense of community should be extended
to

include the land, I must assume that he meant that it be extended
to
include the ecosystem.

What does it mean to extend our concept of community to include
the ecosystem?

trom a sociological perspective, "community" has been

defined as:
A community is an inclusive group with two chief
characteristics: (l) within it the individual
can have mosx, of the experiences and conduct most
of the activities that are important to him; (2)
it is bound together by a shared sense of belonging and by the feeling among its members that
the group defines for them their distinctive
identity. 30
Im.plicit in the sociological definition is the assumption that the

group is composed solely of hiunan beings.

Before Leopold's concept

can be developed, the group must be redefined in terms of hiiman beings
and their ecosystem.

This expanded definition of group would not

alter the first sociological characteristic; the events which are

important in the

Hfe

of the individual would, indeed, take place in
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this setting.

The second characteristic, that of a shared
sense of identity

with the gro-up, presents more of a problem.

People can share a

sense of identity among themselvc^ and vdth their
environment,

b’’t

the non-h\iman components of their ecosystem are
unconscious (in the

normal sense of the term) and mute.

On the other hand, although

they cannot consciously experience a sense of identity

vn.th the

human components of the group, this does not mean that they do not
participate in the creation of the identity of the larger community.

Humanity and its environment comprise a unit within which each
influences the development of the other in a complex feedback
relationship.

As a result of this process, the distinctive identity

of both is defined.

The new concept of community, then, would alter the sociological

definition in

tv/o

ways.

include the ecosystem.

First, the groups v/ould be redefined to

Second, the latter characteristic of

community v;ould be redefined to include both the shared feeling of
identity by the human members, and the shared participation of all

members in creating the distinctive communal identity.
But there are many ecosystems,

V/hat is the

particular ecosystem

that Leopold v;ished to include in his expanded definition?

Tradi-

tionally, human communities are located v/ithin specific geographical
areas.

It seems reasonable to assume that the community would

embrace the ecosystem of its particular area.

High technology
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conmmities, though, present a problem.

Their human members, trade

routes, communications systems,
and pollutants circle the globe.

They are no longer confined within
narrow geographical bounds.
Under these circ unstances the ecosystem
of the communit: is the.
entire ecosphere.
The pragmatic problem of feeling a communal
bond with the

ecosphere seems akin to that of feeling a communal
bond with all
of humankind.

The unit with which we are dealing is so large
that

io is an abstraction, something intangible and
outside of personal

experience.

Pnotographs of the earth taken from space have

provided an important graphic representation of our community,
but
this is not enough.

Perhaps our larger community will always

remain an abstraction.

Perhaps we should devote particular attention

to our local cornmiinity; the plants and animals, ponds and streams,

rocks and weather, people and institutions, which have an immediate

impact upon our senses and lives.

On a personal, psychological

level, the values and attitudes which develop through this local

interaction may become generalised on a larger scale.
On a larger social level,

v;e

must alter our legal, political,

and economic institutions in such a

value to our ecosystem.

v/ay

as to grant intrinsic

A simple change in our individual environ-

mental consciousness is not sufficient to solve our problems,
because our institutions exert a great deal of control over our
lives.

In an article which originally appeared in the Southern

California Law Review, Christopher Stone argued that natural objects
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should be granted legal rights,
including the right to sue for

damages in court.

This appears to be a way of introducing
Leopold's

Ideas into our legal system.

Stone suggested that since natural

objects are not capable of speaking in their
behalf, they should

be treated as the court would treat any
other legal incompetent.
People should be able to apply to the court for
the creation of a

guardianship of the species, ecosystem, river basin,
or other

natural object in question.

The appointed guardian would then be

allowed to argue his ward's case in court, or sue on its
behalf.
The whole idea of granting legal rights to non-humans may

sound absurd to many people.

The process, though, is very similar

to that which occurred as women and racial minorities, who previously

were not granted any legal right, were granted rights before the
law.

It was only in I 87 U that a substantial movement began to

grant rights to children,

v;ho

property of their parents. 31

had previously been considered the
This finally led to the creation of

laws which made cruelty to children a crime.

Inanimate objects,

such as ships and corporations, have also been given standing in
court.

The fact is, that each time there is a movement to
confer rights onto some new "entity," the proposal
is bound to sound odd or frightening or laughable.
This is partly because until a rightless thing
receives its rights, v;e cannot see it as anything
but a thing for the use of "us" those v.'ho are
Such is the way
holding rights at the time.
.
.
the slave South looked upon the Blacks. There is
something of a seamless web involved: there vri.ll be
resistance to giving the thing "rights" until it
can be seen and valued for itself; yet, it is hard

—

.

to see it and value it for itself
until we can brine
ourselves to give it "rights'*— which
is almost
inevitably going to sound inconceivable
to a laree
^
group of peor)le.32

The importance of granting rights to
natural objects lies in the

fact that at present a person can sue
for damages only if that

individual can demonstrate a personal loss.

This means that one

can sue a company that is polluting a river
only if one can demonstrate that one has suffered a loss (generally an
economic loss) as
a result of the pollution.

The effect of the pollutants upon the

health of the river ecosystem cannot,
for suit.

in itself, provide a basis

Once natural objects receive rights, however, a person

could petition the court for guardianship of the river, or

drainage basin, and then file suit in the name of the riverine
ecosystem.

It would then be left to the court to resolve the

conflicts between the rights of the polluter and the river.
The act of granting rights to natural objects does not require

that they be given the same rights as human beings.

Stone argues

that an object has received rights when three criteria have been
met: "first, that the thing can institute legal actions

^ its

beh est; second that in determining the granting of legal relief,
tlie

court must take injur;/ to it into account; and, third, that

relief must run to the benefit of it. "33

What he is essentially

saying is that a thing receives rights when it is granted intrinsic
value,

Although Stone is addressing legal issues, and Leopold was
concerned

v;ith

forestry and game management, both seem to be arguing

the same general point; when we make
decisions which involve our

environment, we should be concerned about
its interests as well as

about our own.

Neither is arguing that we should live in
subju-

gaoion to nature and do nothing

t'.at

would alter our environment.

Our environment is a dynamic system, which has
undergone a great

deal of change in the past, and will continue to
do so.

Instead,

they are pointing to a new, mutualistic, decision
making process.

Whereas Schweitzer's philosophy dealt solely with the
individual life, Leopold's is grounded in the concept of the ecosystem within which the individual is embedded.

Although most

of his essays display a great deal of sensitive av/areness of

individual lives, his land ethic does not address the issue of
individual significance at all.

The two men sj’Tnbolize the two

sides of the perennial conflict between the welfare of the

individual and the welfare of the group; the love of individual
lives in particular, and of life in general.

Each person, each

society is caught in this tension, which it must resolve in its
own characteristic manner.

The two men also differ in their conception of the bond that

exists between people and other lives.

P'or

Schweitzer this bond

is spiritual and is expressed through reverence.

In Leopold's

view we are all joined in a great pattern of ecological
processes, the integrity of which must be loved and respected.

emotional expressions of their philosophies, however, are very
similar.

The

I

suspect that Aide Leopold would appreciate
Garrett Hardin's

lifeboat ethic much more readily than
would Albert Schweitzer.

Leopold was a biologist and understood
population dynamics.
J.a’^.2uage

Hardin-

and mode of thought woulH, for the most
part, have been

familiar to him.

However, he was working witn the issues of
an

earlier period in our history, and did not address
the issues of

population and world hunger.

I

will speculate, though, that if he

were to address the issue, he would have approached it
as one of

world ecosystem dynamics.

He placed great value upon the beauty

and diversity of ecosystems and,

I

suspect, would have turned a

cold eye upon the role of the United States in reducing the biotic,
cultural, and economic diversity of the world.

He is likely, also,

to have written more harshly of our excessive consumption of the

world's resources.
The substance of Hardin's point, though, is that population

cannot increase indefinitely, and whatever

v/e

do to permit further

increase will only enlarge the magnitude of the inevitable crash.
I

am sure that neither Schweitzer, nor Leopold would disagree with

this point.

They v;ould, however, be less willing to quickly agree

to his proposed solution.

Unlike the Domination orientation.

Mutuality forces one to first attempt a solution which meets the
needs of all parties involved.

Once these avenues have been

exhausted, however', rautualistic decision makers might find themselves forced to accept Hardin's conclusions as a last resort.

Mutuality does not preclude decisions such as those proposed by
Hardin, but it does make one resistant to quickly accepting them.
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If they had to be implemented,
it would be

dor-e in a

manner which

would promote the greatest welfare of
the global community.
statements, on the other hand, tend

to be

Hardin’s

nationalistic-failing to

intrinsic value 1o the peer of the world.
Rene Dubos
It has been strongly argued that people
shape their environment,

but in what ways does their environment shape
people?

This kind of

question has been of particular importance to Rene Dubos.

In his

attempt to arrive at an answer he has articulated a far
more subtle
and complex view of the ways in which people and cultures
interact

with their environmeno than did either Schweitzer or Leopold.
Habos recognizes that as our environment changes, we are able
to adapt to it.

But in this process of adaptation, he fears that

we will lose the qualities that he feels make life meaningful and

worth living.
Man can learn to tolerate treeless avenues, starless
skies, tasteless food, a monotonous succession of
holidays which have bcccme spiritless and meaningless because they are no longer holy days, a life
without the fragrance of flowers, the song of biros,
the joyous intoxication of spring, or tne melanchoI.y
of autiziin.
Loss of the amenities of life may have
no obvious detriraental effect on nan’s physical
>:ell-being or on his ability to perforn effectively
as part of the economic ci- to^isnsiogica} machine. 35

But the quality of our lives is measured in more than simple physical
well-being.

He fears that our great adaptability v.l]l lead to an

adjustment to iinproverished, regimented environments which are devoid
of the traditionally human values of our past.

"Tnere will be no

place for sensitive literature, intensely personal

aj t,

or unorthodox

61,

science In the hiunan ant hill
of the future; not even room
for
primitive Christianity. What
meaning can the parables and
poetry
of the past retain if there
are no lilies in the field?
We must
hope that there ,111 still be
rebels to champion freedor..v36
In a sense Dubos is calling
for a new concept of ecology which

integrates the traditional biological
conception of the term with
an understanding of the dynamics
of human culture and the need
to maintain continuity with the
best features of our past.

Idea of continuity is very important
to him.

The

He does not argue

that either our ecosystem, or our society
should remain unchanged.

Both are dynamic systems which are in a
continual state of change.

What he does argue is that the change must be
harmonious, without
major ecological, social, or psychological dislocations.
In Dubos* view, the predominant orientation of
scientific

technology is magical; it focuses upon the application of power
to specific problems, without reference to the larger structure

of human needs and aspirations. In his fine book, A

M

Withi n,

he argues that science should become more theological in nature

and emphasize the underlying processes which integrate

with the larger world.

h\ur.ar.ity

He does so with the conviction that our

environmental problems are the product of a piecemeal, magical
exercise of our powers.

The alternative that he proposes is

that we exercise our power with the full realization of our place
and role in the ecosphere.
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without a respect for the spirit of the place can result in unanticipated, perhaps disastrous, impacts upon ourselves.

In this

sense, we reflect the environments which we create for ourselves.

At the moment,,

vie

do not know how to make a recognition of the

spirit of place a part of our technological process, but

must

v;e

learn quickly.

Respect for the spirit of place cannot result in a passive
relationship with our environment.
environment, people included.

All organisms alter their

Dubos rejects Lynn V/hite, Jr.'s,

suggestion that St. Francis become the patron saint of ecologists,

because Francis provides too strong a model of a passive acceptance of one's fate.
role.

Instead, he suggests St, Benedict for the

The Benedictine monastic rules empnasized that the monks had

to work with their hands and that the monastaries had to be

self-sufficient.

This led to the

of land management and development,

evolution of a practical system
Ths most infiuencial of the monks

following Benedict's rules were of the Cistercian Order.

They

generally built their monasteries in lowlands, which they had to
drain and transform into fertile land,

Kcw, hundreds o± years

later, these lands are still fertile and productive.

Dubos recog-

rapport
nizes that Francis is an important siTnbol of mystical

provide a model upon which
with nature, but argues that he cannot
to base culture.

upon
Benedict can, however, because his emphasis

ecological concepts be
self-sufficiency makes it imperative that
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adopted in order to allow the land to replenish itself continually.
Dubos argues that we should not be afraid of altering and

humanizing the earth, 38

There are, however, constraints within

wh^cb we must work if we are to

'^^uoceed

at creative intervention.

The first is that inherent in the concept of spirit of place.

When we alter the biophysical parameters of our environment, we
also alter the cultural parameters.
to vrhich we want to alter both.

VJe

must determine the limit

The second constraint is that

which comes with the recognition that there is a limit to how

much a place can be modified and still maintain ecological
stability,

Dubos recognizes that each location has an ecolo-

gically limited number of possible "vocations;" alternative biotic

communities which might be valued by man.

Some, such as arctic

areas, are severely limited in what can be done with them.
can be adapted to a number of possibilities.

Others

For example, different

areas in the Northern hemisphere which had similar primeval forests
have been converted to agricultural land

— each

unique agricultural style and crop specialty.

with its ovm
On the otlier hand,

some areas, such as the Mediterranean region, have not responded

favorably to the agricultural practices that have been employed.
This is not to say that the whole world must fall under che
plow, or some other form of intensive human use.

Some areas, such

a different
as the arctic tundra, may never be adaptable to

vocation, and other areas which might have other vocational

potentials may be left in a wilderness state
for moral, aesthetic,
and biological reasons.

In practice, though, it is impossible
to

achieve complete preservation, because of the
pressures of human

needs and the ubiquitous nature

pollutants.

Given that there

are environmental problems which touch all
ecosystems, our problem
is that of determining how to improve them all.

Variety, however,

must be maintained for reasons of ecological stability,
cultural
diversity, and personal taste.

Different people find value in different landscapes.

Some

find beauty in topographic and climatic peculiarities that provide
a magical splendor and magnitude (e.g., the arctic. Grand Canyon,

and Painted Desert).

Others find beauty in a close, intimate

relationship betv;een themselves and nature.

In both cases, there

is a sense of fitness between the people and their environment.

Host, however, find that the greatest fitness lies in the

intimate relationship.

Dubos points out that, "The ecological

crisis will continue to increase in severity if we do not develop

positive values integrating human nature and external nature. "39
This involves integrating the needs of our ecosystem with those of
our psychological and physiological being.
D'abes’

philosophy is anthropocentric in nature, but of a kind

much broader than the anthropocentrism characteristic of our day.
"An enlightened anthropocentrism acknowledges that, in the long
run, the world's good alv/ays coincides with man's

ov;n

most meani
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good.

Man can manipxilate nature to his best
interests only if he

first loves her for her own sake."^^0

it is a mutualistic philosophy.

Leopold called for an expansion of our concept
of community to
include the ecosystem within which it is set.

He was motivated by the

recognition that this is vital to the continuing stability
of our
ecosystem and, thus, to the continuing availability of
natural
resources for human use.

IMbos’ concept of the spirit of place,

though, goes still deeper.

He recognizes that the human environment

interaction is a lundajmentai element in the development of human

communities and culture.

He suggests that the quality of this

?-nteraction has much to do with the development of the human condition.

Neither seems to argue that we must create a wholly
relationship between people and their land.

ne\j

Rather, they argue

that

v/e

must recognize the bond that is already there.

that

v;e

already share a vague recognition of this bond, which is

Dubos adds

expressed in the idea that a place has its own spirit, or genius.
Ho asks that
that

v;e

vje

become more consciously av;are of this spirit, and

examine and respect its dynamics.

At one point, though, Dubos is critical of Leopold.

cut

thiat,

'’Conservati(.-ri,

He points

according to Leopold, teaches what a land

can be, v/hat it should be, v/hat it ought to be.

Although this

aphorism has much appeal, it is misleading because it implies a

questionable philosophy of ecological determinism and of man’s
relation to nature.

These words echo David Hume’s comment in

90

his A
or

^^atise on Human Nature

^ not

(1738) that statements about v;hat is

often lead into statements of what ought or
ought not.

assumption here is that an analysis of

The

will reveal v;hat

wha-.

ought to be.

Hume argued that one cannot leap directly from an is

to an ought .

Schweitzer was making a similar statement when he

argued that the decline of civilization is associated with the

attempt of the V/est to find moral guidance in the external physical
world
One cannot discover fundamental ethical principles solely

by studying the world external to ourselves.
choices between conflicting values.

Ethics involves conscious

The non-human world is what

it is, and what happens there happens because it is in the nature

of things so to do.

The closest thing to valuing that appears in

the biotic v/orld is natural selection, and that does not occur

by choice in the ethical sense, but by circumstance.

Ethics is

characteristic of that subset of nature called Homo sapiens .

Just as transistor radios, automobiles, and books are human
creations which are

nev;

to the vjorld, so too are ethical systems.

This is important to recognize, because iu is very easy to project

unconsciously an existing ethic upon the world and then
that ethic through the lens of our ethos.

''discovei-"

The effect is that

v/e

vdttingly discover only ourselves, and use that discovery to
reinforce our ethos.

The result is a distorted viev7 of the

world and a mistaken belief in the source of our ethic.

It is

of the
a comforting mistake, though, because it relieves us

un-
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responsibility for our ethic.

But, the ethic we discover is
actually

a reflection of our own unexamined
desires and beliefs.

It is not very surprising that the
social Darwinists
dxscc-.ered that they were members uf the
most highly evolved

Their notion of survival of the fittest also
gave sanction to
the policies of empirialism and the business
practices of robber-

baron industrialists,

Peter Kropotkin objected to this view

of evolution, arguing instead that mutual aid and
assistance

was also present in nature, and that the history of
humanity has

been one of an expansion of mutual aid, which will eventually
bond all of the people of the earth. ^2

^he ethic which he based

upon this viev; of evolution was particularly congruent with his

political commitment to anarchist-communism.
In addition to the problem of unconsciously creating the

world in one's own image, the attempt to derive an ethic from
an understanding of ecological or evolutionary processes tends

to lead to a very conservative ethic, which supports the status

quo and projects today's trend as tomorrow's destiny.

This is

quite understandable, since the ethic is based upon an analysis
of what exists at present.

The following quotation provides a

fine contemporary example of this approach.

At present a system of power and social control seems
to have emerged in which anonymous bands of specialists
detemine the priority of questions of social policy
It is
and the best means of implementing policy.
on the
alienation
of
feeling
the
easy to understand
Nevertheless,
left.
part of humanists and the radical
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the new industrial state, like the old
agricultural
state, has functional and adaptive value
for the
reason that it makes possible the solution of
problems that involve man's relation to his total
environment, problems that can be solved in no
other way. The nostalgic appeal of participatory
democr acy is regressive in the curx'ent redefinition
of the locus of power and responsibility.
If the
great problems that concern the Quality of human
existence are ever to be dealt with, it will be
through Galbraith's technostructure rather than
by the contemporary Thoreau's who reject any
system that curtails individualistic freedoms.
In the Cenozoic, the thing to be v;as a mammal
rather than a reptile. Today, freedom and
responsibility are realized through the emergent
organization, or not at all. New opportunities
for creativity and responsibility exact a heavy
toll in moral suffering and frustration. And
this is the sum and total of the consolation
offered by the evolutionist in the face of the
problem of evil. ^3

Such an approach to the problems of our day has the ring of a

failure of imagination, and of nerve.
is saying,

be."

Unknowingly, the author

"Dominators we have been, and dominators we shall always

He represents humanity as being completely powerless, in a

deterministic world which is without options.

V.'e

must go vdiere we

are taken,
A nujnber of other authors, though, have tried to employ ecology

and evolution in their search of guiding principles which will be
of help to us in selecting from the behavioral and policy options that

are available to us.

Such principles tend to be very broad and vague;

telling us, for example, that we must act to maintain maximum

diversity within the limits of stability.

These principles are

often called evolutionary, ecological, or
environmental ethics.
I do

not, however, consider them to be ethical statements.

Rather

than being ethical statements of what ought to be,
they are

descriptions of the implications oi biological processes.

Tips

knowledge, hovrever, is important.

Once

develop an ethic and consciously take responsibility

v;e

for it, we must determine what conditions the world imposes

upon our efforts to act upon it.

Once

I

decide to move,

rather than sit still, I must negotiate the terrain.
decide that

I v;ish to

And once

I

have decided that

wish to live a life of a certain kind and quality,

determine v/hat

I

I

live, rather than die, I must meet

the biological conditions of life.
I

Once

I

must

must do in order to realize that ideal.

An

ethic helps us to select which of our enormous variety of

potentials we ought to try to actualize,

A scientific analysis

of ecological and evolutionary processes can help us to determine

what we can and carnot do in order to realize our goal.

It may

even demonstrate that our goal cannot be achieved, given the

realities of our world.

A major element leading to our environ-

mental crisis seems to be the fact that cur tacit cultural goals
are unrealistic within the constraints defined by our ecosystem.

The task of environmental analysis is to lay dcvm the framevzork

within which

v/e

can reformulate our goals before either our

cultural or biophysical systems alter disastrously.
hov/ever,

It cannot,

select our goals for us; it can only offer alternatives.

9h
In the past and in the present, our
goals have been selected in

accordance with a tacit value orientation which
has been predominantly
one of Domination.

I

contend that we should strive to reshape our

value orientation to emphasize Mutuality.

Schweitzer, Leopold, and

Dubos have provided glimpses of what kind of a
relationship with our

environment may emerge through such an orientation.

Schweitzer

would enlarge our definition of the group to v;hich we belong,
to
include

cxll

lives,

Leopold enlarged the boundaries of our community

to include our ecosystem.

Dubos, although not vjriting in specifi-

cally ethical terms, enlarges the concept of human welfare to
include the welfare of the earth.

The important effect of these ex-

pansions is that land, life, and the earth are granted intrinsic
value.

Mo longer, if one accepts these approaches, is it neces-

sary to justify their preservation solely in terms of human, self-

centered values, such as economic profit and loss.
is changed from,

The question

”can we justify preserving them,*' to, "can

\-ie

jus-

tify endangering them?"
In order to deal with our environment as something vjhich is

valued as an end in itself, we must overcome our self-centeredness and

develop a strong, positive emotional response to it.

Dubos has

pointed out that we "cannot effectively manipulate nature without
loving riature for her ovm sake."

Leopold vrrote that, "It is incon-

ceivable to me that an ethical relation to the land can exist
v/ithout love,

for its value.

respect, and admiration for land, and a high regard

Years earlier, Albert Schweitzer anticipated

these views when he made his humanitarian call
for reverence for
life.

These affective values rest at the foundation of the
subjective,

personal experience of nature which is truly mutualistic.

Thi"!

new, outreaching response to life must motivate the
manner in
v/hich we

undertake ecological research and employ our technology.

It must inform a new vision of what our goals ought to be.
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CHAPTER III
FOUR APPROACHES TO SOCIAL MUTUALISM
A rock rests in my hand as

write these words.

I

It has an

ancient history, and reflects the long gone life, of
which it is now
a mere ghost.

This piece of petrified wood embodies the structure

of a tree so well that, with a magnifying glass, I can see the
shape
of cells despite the fact that nothing remains of its living

substance.

Minerals filled its pores and, atom by atom, molecule

by molecule, the wood itself

v;as

replaced by silicon and oxygen.

Here, halfv/ay between its center and bark, is a knot; the remains
of a branch that died in the tree's youth and was surrounded and

engulfed by living, growing tissues.

Kovj,

thousands of years

later, its life and all of the remnants of its organic substance

are gone.

But the record remains in stone, in colors of rich

browns and tan, and in concentric bands that tell of each year of
its grov/th through dry seasons and wet.
I love this stone;
I

its color, texture, patterns, and history.

have held it, fondled it, and contemplated it for ho\irs

it into poetry, paintings, and sculpture.

— turning

But this love is not

the same as that which I feel for a friend or lover.

This rock

cannot protest my probing, nor can it complain at being left

unnoticed and forgotten in a box.

It does not place demands upon

my ]ife, or appreciate my joys and sorrows.
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It is incapable of
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sharing the experience of waking to a room filled

v;ith

the gold of

an early sun, and the warmth of skin against skin.

Rocks and people are not identical there are obvious and
j

profound differe. \ces between the uwo,

I can

empathize

communicate with another person far more easily than

I

fjid

can v/ith

other animals, and more readily with animals than with plants
and inanimate objects,

I

am able to share pleasure and pain,

hope and despair, friendship, suspicion, and fear, with other

people.

But what can

I

share with a rock, tree, mountain, or

drainage basin?
I

must draw a distinction between social mutualism and

environmental mutualism.

Both are based upon the value orien-

tation of Mutuality, but the former involves our attempt to

understand and interact with other people, while the latter
applies to our attempt to understand and interact with our nonhuman environment.

In many ways this distinction is an arbi-

trary one, because the two areas overlap; for example, when
v/e

compete

v;ith

other people for the use of limited resources.

The distinction is based primarily upon the presence or absence
of the potential for conscious reciprocal communication.

In

some people this potential is quite limited, as in the severely

retarded.

In others it is absent, as in chronically catatonic or

camatose patients.

On the other hand, some animals demonstrate a

with us;
rel'^tively high potential for conscious communication

chimpanzees, for example, and perhaps dolphins.

Although the
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distinction is somewhat arbitrary, it is
useful, because the demarcation between human and non-human generally
distinguishes between
those who can and that which cannot engage
in this quality of
commuiiication.

People are generally quick to react to the manner
in which we
treat them.

They tell us whether or not they appreciate our

actions, often in ways vjhich are not very subtle.

Since we

receive rapid responses in forms which we readily understand, we
interact with people in a reciprocal manner; each notices the

responses of others, and adjusts his actions accordingly.

The

idea of mutuality appears most often in discussions p.bout

interpersonal relationships, because they are so obviously reciprocal
in nature.

The literature of social Mutuality is very large, that of
environrriental Mutuality is extraordinarily small.

Perhaps we can

learn more about the nature of Mutuality by examining its application
to social interaction.

What we learn of this kind of Mutuality may

be of some use in our attempt to understand the nature of environ-

mental Mutuality.
V/e

do not live in a simple social world; one of clearly

defined issues and universal agreement.
of complexity and ambiguity.

Rather, we live in a v/orld

It is difficult for individuals,

much less groups of people, to arrive at mutual agreement about
the nature of a problem, its relevant elements, and the actions

which v;ill lead to its resolution.

Yet, it is often very important
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bhat p^oplG

coiTiG

"bo

a coimnon rGsolubion of bhsir problornDj and many

of our activibies require cooperabion, which requires some sorb or

consensus aboub objectives and mebhodology.

We are social beings

and agreernenb is one of bhe elemenbs which binds our socieby.

We can, and do, respond bo bhe social problems which confronb
us from bhe perspecbive of each of bhe bhree value orienbabions.
VJe

can be submissive, acb powerless, and hope bhab everybhing will

bake care of ibself.

We can each formulabe our solubions and

sbrive bo impose bhem upon obhers bhrough dominabion.

work bogebher bo reach a mubually valued resolubion.

And we can
The roubualis-

bic approach is ofben described in berms of dialogue, because ib

involves reciprocal communicabion bebween bhe parbies involved.

The Dominabion approach can be described as analogous bo a monologue,

because each parby believes bhab he has possession of bhe brubh, which
cannob be quesbioned.

Thus, albhough bwo people may be balking bo

each obher, bhey do nob lisben bo each obher and are acbually

conducbing simulbaneous monologues.

Submission is analogous bo

silence.

The philosophies and mebhods of E. A, Burbb, Martin Buber,
our
Mohandas Gandhi, and Paulo Freire provide fertile ground for

attempt to further understand bhe mutualistic, or dialogical,
approach to understanding and interacting

v;ibh

other people.

the problem
Each of these men provides a unique perspecbive on

background and concerns;
whi' h is characteristic of his special
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those of a philosopher, theologian, social activist,
and radical
educator, respectively.

Edwin A. Burtt

As a philosopher, Edwin A. Burtt was interested in promoting
the progress of our philosophical understanding of ourselves and

our world. 1

He noticed that although there are methods for pro-

posing truths about ourselves and our universe, there is no uni-

versal agreement among thoughtful people upon the validity of
the proposed truths.

Philosophers disagree with each other at

any single point in time.

They also disagree historically,

as can be recognized v/hen we see the continual change in the

balance of philosophical views over the years.

VJlriat

Burtt set out

to do was to identify the factors which inhibited agreement, and
to discover an approach which might enhance our search for a

common understanding.
Over the history of VJestern thought, three major methods
have evolved which help to verify and correct common sense

knowledge.

Each, hov/ever, has its limitations.

intuitionism, is the most limited.

The first,

Historically, no single

intuitive understanding has developed, oecause the source of
intuitive knowledge lies in each individua]., and intuitionism does

not provide a means of reconciling the conflicting intuitions
of different people.

Rationalism sought to eliminate these

conflicts by linking truths within a web of logical thought,

ihe
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goal was to develop a logically
infallable system of truth.

The

problem, however, was that although a
statement may be logically
true, it does not necessarily correspond
with the world external
to uhe thinker.
is a man.

The statement that, "All men ^re dogs.

Socrates

Therefore, Socrates is a dog," is logically
valid.

The

error of the statement becomes evident only when
we check to see

whether all men actually are dogs.

Rationalism, however, does

not include a mechanism for checking factual truth.
The third method, empiricism, corrected this by employing

systematic observation and experimentation.

Modern empirical

science is the most povrerful method known for achieving agreement

about tne world outside of the observer.

But when examined his-

torically, even empirical truths are seen to be in a constant
state of flux.

The changing nature of scientific understanaing

is the product of one of the great strengths of empiricism; its
dynairdc ability to grow by permitting tne refinement and revision

of

oux‘

view of the world as we gather

theories.

new’

data and propose new

Never uneless, this frustrates us in

oui-

universal agreement about the nature of the world.

search for
VJe

are faced

with the realization tnat today's facts are tomorrow's fictions
and, thus, we can accept nothing ’with certainty.

In his effort to understand the nature of philosophical progress,

Burtt studied the history of several recent philosophical movements.

This led to his discovery that such
movements appear to evolve throngh
three developmental stages.
In the first stage the champions of a
new philosophy,
confident of its soundness, toss out bold
assertions
of the position they adapted without
realizing its
limitations or embarassments. ...
In the second stage the proponents of the new
vievT^oint
begin to be troubled by [outsiders* criticisms, but
J
believe that any difficulties can be met by drawing
a fev; distinctions. . . .

In the third stage, champions of the new way of
thinking are forced by continued criticism to face
the question of whether these distinctions and
reinterpretations are consistent with what they had
asserted in the beginning, and to reformulate that
original doctrine so as to reconcile it vzith them. .

.

.2

This process can be understood, in part, when one is aware of
the nature of philosophical presuppositions.

supposition as, "a hidden or tacit premis
or piece of reasoning. "3

Burtt defined a pre-

underlying any statement

One can do science, for example, only

if one accepts three major presuppositions: that the external v/orld

exists, that some part of it is ordered, and that we are capable
of understanding some part of that order.

The scientist is not

necessarily cognisant of these presuppositions, but they are implicit in the enterprise of science.
One's presuppositions prefigure one's understanding of the
world.

Burtt argued that disagreements often arise as a result of

the fundajTientally different presuppositions upon which different

philosophies are based.

A capitalist and a communist, for example,

may talk together at great length without reaching agreement.
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because each is speaking from a different presuppositional base.
For this reason, the same words (e.g.; worker, labor, and history)

may have very different meanings to each.
different languages even though

They are, then, speaking

are using the same v/ord-roniids.

tne'^

In order to establish some sort of positive communication between

each other, they must establish a common base of presuppositions

from which to begin.

The three stages in the development of philosophical movements

appear to be associated with the establishment, shoring up, and

reexamination of the movement’s presuppositions,

Burtt noticed

that the process seems to take about thirty years to complete a
cycle, and was curious about why it
time.

v;as

that it took this much

Why does not a m.ovement quickly respond to criticism by

reexamining its assertions, thereby omitting the second step of
the cycle?

He suggested that there are

tv;o

reasons for this.

The

first is a product of the mechanics of the process of doing

philosophy.

It takes time to formulate and publicize a philosophy,

for others to criticize it, to gather and examine the criticism,

and then to reformulate the philosophy.
poirit

There is probably a

beyond which this process can not be hurried.
There is, hov/ever, a second reason for the delay; one which

Burtt found particularly intriguing.

It appears that the members

to the fundaof a movement share a pov/erful emotional attachment

mental presuppositions of their m.ovement.

As a result, it takes a
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long period of criticism and controversy to challenge
and loosen

their attachment,^

These philosophers may be umdlling to face the

humiliation of publicly recognizing that they were wrong.
ei

Perhaps

.ven greater importance is the possibility that the
philosophy

may have reflected unconscious motives of the philosophers; its
presuppositions morroring the philosophers* unconscious needs and
convictions.

In this situation a criticism of the philosophy

would be unconsciously perceived as a criticism of the philosophers.
In Burtt’s view, the second stage in the developmental cycle is one

of defensive reaction on the part of the philosophers.

In order

to enhance philosophical progress, then, we must reduce the level

of second stage defensiveness.

The phenomenon of projection has been well established by

psychologists.

People’s fears, desires, and expectations strongly

influence their perceptions. Under pathological extremes, these
factors can completely dominate a person’s mind, rendering him

unable to perceive anything else,

Burtt pointed out that:

In the psychoanalytic era every thinker must ask, in his
ovm case as in that of others, v/hether an ultimate
presupposition is not in essence an emotionally
buttressed and molded conviction that, while it
dominat.es a person’s thinking, is but half-conscious
at best; only when he suspects that it is inadequate
and begins to envision alternatives is it likely to

be clearly recognized.
The decisive consequence of this realisation is that
v;here such a presupposition is concerned the existentialists are right; our conscious intellect, however
sincerely truth-seeking, cannot alone fill the role
that philosophers have expected it to fill.^

108

The challenge faced by philosophers
is that of dealing with this
issue. Although presuppositions may
be the product of unconscious

motivations, they may still be cognitively
adequate.

The

philosopher, however, must take g.-eaL pains to
see beyond his

unconscious blinders and determine whether or
not the presupposition
is indeed adequate to the philosophical task
at hand.

argued that once

w-e

Burtt has

become aware of this issue we are enabled to

adopt motives which do not conflict with our conscious
committment
to truthfulness.

The implication of this view is that, "a crucial

part of the philosophic quest— indeed the foundation of every
other

part— is

the quest for truth about oneself. "6

This means that philosophers must confront and clarify their
motives, and if necessary adopt

consistent with truthfulness.

nev/

motives which are more

This is not an easy task.

involves a deep, searching personal analysis.

It

Burtt has suggested

that Eastern meditative techniques and the developing methods
of Western psychoanalysis may help foster this confrontation with
self.

It is impossible to commit ourselves to a consistent course

of thought v/ithout committing ourselves to some presuppositions.

But there are two veiy different

'ways

of making such a commitment;

one of dogma, the other of accepting one's presuppositions as

guides v/hich although adequate at present, are likely to change
in the future.

The latter approach turns disagreement betvjeen

philosophers into a posj.tive opportunity to examine one’s motives
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and philosophical presuppositions and, perhaps,
to formulate new,

more adequate presuppositions which will promote philosophic
progress.
‘ihe

search for truth is a social enterpiise, and the act oi

mutually resolving disagreements is a vital step in this quest.
It is, hov;ever, a step fraught vdth difficulty, because it

necessitates a positive state of communication between the
people involved.

How we speak the truth shapes the truth as it

is heard and understood by others.

In the attempt to communicate

with others it is not enough to just know oneself; one must

communicate one’s self to the other person, and one must

v;ork

to understand the motives and presuppositions of the other.

This is important, because if we view disagreement as an

opportunity, the resolution of which v;ill help us go beyond our

present state of understanding, we have a vested interest in

promoting the fullest communication.

If one is trying to

communicate one’s vision of the truth to another person, it must
be done in such a

v;ay

as to be understandable to that person.

One must be sensitive to the reality experienced by the other.
It

5.T-

not sufficient, however, merely to be open to others.

One must respond to them in a manner which vdll elicit their

fullest positive response and, thus, their fullest attempt toward

tiTthful communication.

The outcome of interpersonal relationships
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very much a self-fulfilling prophecy.

People are influenced

by the way in which others respond to them.

They tend, for example,

to be less communicative and hostile toward those
whom they feel

are hostile towa--d them.

Even a neatral approach is liKely to

be interpreted as hostile; and, in any event, it is not likely
to
foster a full, positive response.

In order to foster the fullest

positive communication with others, we must approach them in the
fullest positive manner.

We must viork to understand each person

with v;hom we are in disagreement, and act to promote his or her
full growth and actualization.
The fundamental psychological motive, or value, which promotes
the fullest positive response to others and, tiius, the fullest

communication, is love.
or romantic sense.

This, however, is not love in the sentimental

As Burtt defined it, "Love is freedom from

self-centeredness, and hence from the demands and limitations
that self-centeredness involves."'^

Love seems to be the dynamic

value that Burtt sought as the foundation of his search for

philosophic understanding.

In approaching an object of study,

be it a person or a philosophy, with love one is able to reach
as far as possible for tinith unobstructed by negative motivation.

Also, love is the value which can bind individual seekers of

truth in a common search.

In this sense it is a creative medium.
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It is also creative in the way it promotes the growth
of the

person who is loved.

Love, v;hen recognized and emoloyed as a

fundamental value underlying the total sphere of human activities,
leads to our progress as a specie^.

It creates a situation which

promotes the maximum of creativity and diversity which is consistent
with social stability in the broadest sense of the term,
Burtt’s book,

brilliant

v7ork

and concepts.

Search of Philosophic Understanding

,

is a

which spans a broad range of philosophy's history
At its core is a model of communication which

accept as an important ideal.
imitualistic in nature.

I

It is a model which is thoroughly

All philosophers, in his view, are

members of a community which is engaged in the pursuit of understanding,

Each person is of intrinsic

in a mutualistic manner.

va?Lue and

must be approached

They interact through dialogue, but

Burtt has extended the concept of dialogue to include non-verbal
communication as well.

He also refined our conception of dialogue

by pointing out the great importance of unconscious psychological
factors.
In order to engage in true dialogue the speaker must be both

free of self-interest, and motivated by a desire to help the other

person realize his or her fullest grovrth and, thus, fullest communication.

Most people are not able to engage in this form of

communication, because of Intervening unconscious motives.

order to dialogue, in the fullest sense of the term,

*<6

In

must

value.
prepare ourselves by internalizing love as a motivating

112

Burtt suggested that this requires some sort
of therapy or meditation.®
In addition, we must strive to become devoid
of dogma.

V/e

must

recognize the changing nature of knowledge, that the
future is
likv^iy to hold a more adequate ccncepticn of the
nature of the «orld

than we now have.

Thus,

knowledge of the present.

v;e

must not bind ourselves to our limited
This implies that we can have no

assurance that we will ever attain knowledge of absolute truth,
V/e

must search for an increasingly adequate understanding, rather

than for truth.

Dialogue is generally thought of as a state of mutual com-

minication between

t\TO

or more people.

In Burtt*s concept, though,

one must assume that the other person is capable of reciprocity

even if this does not happen.

To assume otherwise would be to

percipitate a self-fulfilling prophecy.

For this reason, and by

the nature of the value of love, the speaker must act as though

the other person were capable of dialogue, and bear the burden
of establishing it.

In the best of situations, the state of

mutual dialogue will be established.

The individual act of

dialogue, though, is not dependent upon that statej otherwise
it is not likely to be realized.

At this point it is possible to assemble a partial list of
the characteristics of social Mutualism.

First, it involves

the recognition that the people involved are each a part of a

larger group.

In the case of philosophy, the philosophers must
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recognize that they each depend upon the others,
particularly upon
those who disagree with them, if they are to progress
in philosophic

understanding.
^liaiogue.

With this recognition comes the need for mutual

In addition, in order to engage in a mutualistic

relationship, one must be free of dogma.

This comes from the

recognition that certain knowledge is unattainable.

To assume

that one has possession of certain knowledge is to limit one's

potential to progress in philosophic understanding.

Dogma closes

one to others, and predisposes one to impose the dogma upon others

through domination.
Third, in order to engage in a mutualistic relationship, we

must be free of self-interest.

This requirement is

recognition that unconscious motives can interfere
communication.

bom
v;ith

of the

dialogical

The task of recognizing and transcending our

unconscious motives is a difficult one, and requires special
effort.

We must free ourselves of self-interest, also, as a

precondition to establishing a positive relationship with other
people.

The process of freeing ourselves of self-interest is

closely linked with that of overcoming dogma.
Fina''ly, we must recognize that means and ends are inseparable.

The way in

v.'hich

we interact with other people determines a great

deal of what will be the outcome of that interaction.

This is

implicit in the nature of self-fulfilling prophecies.

We must

realize
approach others in the fullest positive manner if we wish to
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the fullest positive mutual communication.

This and freedom from

self-interest are jointly associated with the value of
love.

Although Burtt’s analysis

v;as

directed to philosophical

activities, these characteristics can be generalized to apply
to dialogical activity of all kinds, as we shall see.

Martin B uber

Martin Buber's concerns were different from Burtt's.

He wrote

from the perspective of a philosopher and theologian who was
interested in the religious significance of human relationships.

Although he wrote of dialogue, it was a dialogue which was more of a
spiritual, than of a linguistic, significance.

As a Jevdsh

theologian he was embedded in the Judaic tradition, v;hich recog-

nized that people

v;ere

bonded together by their commonly shared

spiritual relationship with God.

Buber's thought and language

was quite abstract and require effort to \inderstand, but they are

both of great significance.
Buber believed that there are two fundamentally different
v/ays

of approaching the v;orld, including other persons. One way

is embodied in the basic word "I-It," the other in the basic v/ord

"I-You,"^^

They designate two states of being.

In the I-It

approach to the world, the I stands apart from the It.

The It

is confined by borders and can be set in order and classified.

The I can possess the It.

separate from the I.

The

I

experiences the It as something

The word I-It, then, establishes the world
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VJhat

Buber was saying

v;as

that in the I-It approach

to things (people, rocks, trees, etc.), the thing with which I come
in contact is defined as an object; something separate from me,
v/hich I can phys-.'cally or cogniti\ely manipulate and dominate.

In so doing, I also divide myself, because it is impossible to

enter such an experience with my full being.
In contrast, an I-You approach involves my whole being.
In this situation, the You has no borders and the I does not have

possession of the You.

The I stands in relation to the You.

establishes the world of relationship.

The I does not experience

the You, because it is not isolated from the You.

subject, not an object.

The You is a

The You cannot be set in order, because

to do so would be to limit its possibilities.

Experience is

characterized by limits, relationship by reciprocity.

my being,

I

VJhen, viith

say You to another being, that person ceases to be one

of many Hes or Shes, but fills the universe.

he blinds

I-You

This does not mean that

me to everything else, but that everything else shares

of his being.

becomes an It.

As soon as I abstract qualities from the You, he

It is, then, impossible to consciously experience

a You; one relates to a You.

There is no self-consciousness, or

even other-consciousness in I-You, only relationship,

Buber recognized three roles that we can assume
perceive a person.

v/hen

we

One is that of an observer, wno intently

studies a person in order to fix him in mind.

The person is an
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object with traits, which are noted.

The second role is that

of the onlooker who, with unimposing
disinterest, watches to see

what will present itself.

Both of these ways are I-It approaches.

In the third, trat of "becoming a./are,"
the person is not an

object.

He says something to us (verbally or non-verbally)
which

we feel we must answer.

We feel personally addressed.

This is

the relation of I-You.

Our world, then, is split into two aspects.

The first is the

It~v;orld of experiences, borders, order, and patterns.

This is the

aspect about which people can share a common understanding.

The

other is the You-world of unity, wholeness, and uniqueness.

The

v/orld appears eternally

diction,

V/e

new and unique, beyond ordering and pre-

are alone in this v/orldj alone in our individual

relationship with it.

It exists only in the present.

Unlike the

It-world, it does not have a past or future, because in order to

contemplate past or future we must step back from the total
relational I-You of the present, and at that moment the You

becomes It,
Since the You exists only during the time of the full involvement
of our being with that of the You, the moment we respond to the You,
the You becom.es an It.

response only to

a

This is so, because we can direct our

part of the other, nob to his full being.

"The more powerful the response, the more pov/erfully it ties

the You and as by a spell binds it into an object.

dovrni

Only silence
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toward the You

.

.

.

leaves the You free.

the You into the It-world.

...

All response binds

That is the melancholy of man, and
that

is his greatness, ”12

For these reasons, the
fleeting.

VJe

I-Ycr.

relationship is doomed to be

are doomed to return to, and spend most of
our lives

in the It-world, because direct relationship
cannot last forever.

Love, Buber believed, can only exist in the relationship
between
I and You,

Thus, it too cannot last,

VJhen we

return to the It-

world, though, we are charged with a new knowledge which cannot

be explained in psychological terms--it has been received.

It is

a presence and a strength which is devoid of content and, thus,

cannot be communicated.

Nevertheless, it gives our lives meaning

and confirms meaning in everything.

The proof of this meaning is

found in the actions, which are unique to each person that grow from
it.

These actions are vital, because only through them can the

You-world of relation become embodied in the It-v:orld of experience,
Buber believed that the relation we encounter

v;hen

we enter

the You-world is a glimpse of a more fundamental, eternal You

—God.

All relationship exists through the Being of God and it is through
our brief I-You encounters that we have knov;ledge of Him.

It

is only through this encoiinter that we can begin to address other

persons as anything other than objects.

The reciprocal I-You

relationship between people, and between them and Goa is a precondition to the realization of human community.
The moments of I-You relationship so^uid much like moments of
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mystical experience.

Buber, however, did not want this to be

equated with mysticism.

He distinguished between two kinds of

events in the mystical experience.

The first is that of the

creation of inner unity, or who]e’"5Ss.

This occurs vnthin the

i

person, not in a relationship with God.

Buber accepted this

element of mysticism, and believed it to be a necessary prerequisite for establishing an I-You relation.

The second event

is that of union between the person and the other, v/ith the

lose of personal identity as the two become fused.

Buber

v;as

opposed to the ideal of mystical union, or annihilation of the
self, because it emphasizes the relationship to the exclusion of

its members.

This devalues, deactualizes, the members

in relation.

When one returns to the It-vjorld, there is a sense

of lose of being; the relational Being of God is split.

v:ho

are

Buber

will accept mystical union only if it allows the members to
retain their identity while they are in relation.

In lived

actuality the relationship and its members are of equal importance.
The whole self is involved, not a destruction of self.

Devaluing

the members in favor of the relationship is an It-act.

People who have an It as the focus of their life goals, cannot
be brought to God by telling them to focus on God,
then try to possess God by making Him an It.

They would

It is not just the

goal, but the method of reaching it that is important.

The motive

and method of possession must be changed to that of relation.
In Buber’s theology, our relationship vrith the eternal You,
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God, is what, enables all that, is timely human.

Out of life with nature we take the "physical” world,
that of consistency; out of life viith men, the
"psychical" world, that of affectability; out of
life with spiritual beings, the "noetic" world,
that of valiu'&y,
[Wi'^uoat the one Presence
shining through each world, they ] become usable
and murky, and remain murky even if v/e endov;
[themj with shining names: cosmos, eros, logos.
For in truth there is a cosmos for man' only when
the universe becomes a home for him with a holy
hearth where he sacraflces; and there is eros
for him only beings become for him images of the
eternal, and community with them becomes revelation; and there is logos for him only when he
addresses the mystery viith works and service of
the spirit, 13
In my attempt to understand Buber, I fear that I fall victim
of what he called the "psychological delusion."

This is the

attempt to understand my relationship with the v/orld in psychological, rather than spiritual terms.

Buber believed such an

attempt to be meaningless.
The man who steps out of the essential act of pure
relation has something More in his being, something
nev/ has grown there of vihich he did not know before
and for whose origins he lacks any suitable words.
Whereever the scientific world orientation in its
legitimate desire for a causal chain without gaps
may place the origin of vmat is new here: for us
being concerned v/^ith the actual contemplation of
the actual, no subconscious and no other psychic
apparatus will do. Actually, we received what we
did not have before, in sucn a. manner that v^e know:
it has been given to us.lU
I

am not sure whether

point, largely because

I

I

agree or disagree with him on this

am not sure what is his point.

statement can be read in two ways.

psychological explanations, we

^

His

One is that regardless of

receive something from outside
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of the world

and scientific explanations are
not capable of ex-

plaining Its origin.

The other reading is that regardless
of the

psychological explanation, we have the feeling
of having received
something from outside the v/orld— and scientific
explanations

cannot embody, or do justice to the personally
felt meaning of
this knowledge.

This distinction is important.

The first interpretation means

that God stands outside of the world and that we receive
gratuitous
knowledge when we come into relation with Him.

This knowledge is

certain knov/ledge, even though it is devoid of content.

If this

is Buber’s meaning, and his philosophy rests upon this understanding,
I

feel that

I

must either reject his ideas, or reinterpret them in

light of the second possible reading of his statement.

I

argue

this, because my presuppositions are based upon a recognition of

the fallibility of human knov;ledge.

I agree

with Blaise Pascal,

who wrote that, "Every religion that does not say that God is
concealed is not true

.

.

.

Psychological explanations do not devalue religious experience,
if one takes care not to confuse the explanation with the experience.

Once we make this mistake explanation bpcomes knov;ledge alienated,

which can be used to debunk, or "explain away" the experience.

But a knowledge of the physical processes which creates a rainbov;,
or of the psychological processes underlying a mother's love does

not devalue the sight of a rainbow, or the expression of love.
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Explanations are based upon abstract, generalized
models which do

not include the individual, feeling person who stands
in relation
Mlth what is being explained.
In the psychological, interpretation of Eiber’s statement.

Goo does exist in the reality of the person who returns from the
I— Thou encounter.

This reality, though, is the world as perceived

and made real by man.

not outside of it.

In this view, God lies within the vrorld,

We are able to discover Him in the world if

we address it in the proper manner.

But whether God exists in

the Reality we assume to exist behind the world as

i^re

know it, is

a question beyond our ability to ever answer with certainty.

Psychologically speaking, the question of whether or not
God exists is secondary to the fact that the felt relationship
fosters psychological integration with the world; the v/orld

becomes meaningful.

Religiously speaking, whether or not the

psychological explanation is correct is secondary to the felt
relationship with God.

Together, both approaches merge as a

larger whole, rather than conflict.

To accept this view, one

must be free of dogmatic certainty of one’s present knowledge of
God, and ^f abstract explanations.

It requires great courage in

order to embrace this kind of freedom; both to face the uncertainty of the world that this view creates, and in the face of
truth
this uncertainty to hold on to one’s faith as a tentative
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which can guide one’s actions in the world.
Buber’s theology provides a meaningful, positive
image of the

nature of the world, within which we can act.

It is positive in

thy^ i+ promotes growth in relation with a larger
whole.

concept of love is one

x^rhich,

Buber’s

by definition, requires that we en-

counter the full nature of other persons; both their good and
their bad.

Love, by its very nature, cannot be blind.

An I in

love has a clear av;areness of, and feels responsibility to a You.
The idea of responsibility is to be brought back from
the province of specialized ethics, of an "ought"
that svnngs free in the air into that of living life.
Genuine responsibility exists only when there is
real responding.

Responding to what?
To vj’nat happens to one, to what is to be seen and
heard and felt.l^

This value of love appears to be very similar to that of Burtt.

Both require that one be free of influences that might block or

misshape one’s perceptions of the other person.

The value Buber

saw in the mystic’s act of achieving inner wholeness may be

related to the value that Burtt placed upon dealing with one’s

unconscious motives and achieving freedom from self-interest.

Both

Buber and Burtt i-equired that one have a positive interest in the
fate of the other.

To Buber, love and I-You encounters are to be

valued, because of the very nature of our v:orld; a v;orld in which
cosmos, eros, (md logos are inextricably entoined.

For Burtt,

love, which promotes a relationship akin to I-You, is a value
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necessary for progress toward philosophic understanding and
the
promotion of human growth.
The I-You relationship is a relationship of dialogue.

Dialogue

cannot take place in the kind of mystical uni in of which Buber

disapproved, because the members lose their identity in the union.
In the I-You relationship both the I and the You maintain their

separate identities while they engage in a relationship which
involves their whole selves in the present, the here-and-now.

Rather than joining in a self-destroying union, they participate
in communion.

What is communicated in Buber’s dialogical relationship is
being, not information in discrete units.

Knowledge of You is,

then, the fullest kind of knowledge, because it is not interpreted,

Similarly, Burtt argued that

categorized, or reshaped in any way.

knowledge of persons is the most concrete form of knowledge,

because each individual is full of surprises and does not fit
into any abstracted pattern.

He believed that such knowledge is

Buber, however, carried his analysis of

the richest in content.

relationship still further, asserting that a complete relationship
is devoid of content.

Any time the

I

attempts to achieve a goal

other than then relationship as an end in itself, the You becomes
an It.

This is true of any goal, be it philosophical, psychoana-

lytical, or educational.

But we live in a world in which we must
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deal with content if we are to survive and, thus, true dialogue
must
always be fleeting.

Buber’s views provide us with an image of

social mutualism at its extreme.
Buber's theology and philosophy is intuit ionistic in natuie, as
V7as

Schweitzer’s.

He asserted that we each have access to personally

revealed knov/ledge.
intuitionism.

But there are serious problems inherent in

Historically, it has not led to widespread agreement

among people, and one’s intuitions need not correspond with the
v/orld at large.

Burtt has suggested a cluster of values which

may help lead us out of these difficulties.
implicit, also, in Buber’s viork.

These values are

The nature of these values makes

them safeguards against the dogmatic imposition of one's intuitions

upon others.

Buber's interests were not directed toward pragmatic

activity in the It-world, and he did not examine it in great
detail.

Mohandas Gandhi, on the other hand, provides an example

of a man

v;ho

used these values to guide action on a massive social

scale.

Mohandas Gandhi

Tn complete silence the Gandhi men drew up and halted
a hundred yards from the stockade, A picked column
advariced from the crowd, waded the ditches, and
approached the barbed-v/ire stockade. . . .
Suddenly at a v/ord of command, scores of native
policemen rushed upon the advancing marchers and
rained blows on their heads with their steel-shod
lathis. Hot one of the marchers even raised an am
They went down like ten-pins.
to fend off the blows.
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From where I stood I heard the sickening vrhack
of the
clubs on unprotected sl<ulis. The ^^raiting crowd
of
marchers groaned and sucked in their breath in
sympathetic pain at every blow. Those struck down
fell sprawling, unconscious or writing with
fractured
skulls or broken shoulders. ... The survivors,
without breaking ranks, silently an ^ doggedly marched
on until struck dovm. . . .Although everyone knew
that within a few minutes he would be beaten dovm,
perhaps killed, I could detect no signs of wavering
or fear. They marched steadily, with heads up,
without the encouragement of music or cheering or
any possibility that they might escape serious
injury or death. The police rushed out and methodically and mechanically beat dovm the second
column. There vras no fight, no struggle; the marchers simply walked foi’ward till struck dovm. 17
This journalistic account of one of Mohandas Gandhi’s nonviolent

resistance campaigns against the British in 1920 stands in stark

contrast to the glowing abstractions of Burtt and Buber.

Beneath

the p\iblic surface, though, Gandhi’s philosophy was very similar
to theirs.

Iiis

approach to social action was mutualistic; indeed,

it was dialogical communication on a massive political and social

scale.

Mis political action, interpersonal relations, and inner

religious quest v;ere all facets of the same thing.

In order to

discover what this was, we must look beneath the surface of his

political activity, v;hich was designed to free India of British
rule, and exaraime its guiding philosophy.
In the introduction to his autobiography, Gandhi told of his
j.ppoT'vatlops about v/riting such a book.

why he wanted to write an autobiography

A friend had asked him
(v;hich is in the Western,

rather than Eastern literary tradition) and cautioned that
although his views may change after the book

v;as

written others
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might still accept the authority of those which
he had solidified
in writing.

Gandhi replied, "I simply want to tell the story of

my numerous experiments with truth, and as my life consists
of
nothing but tnose experiments, iL is true that the story will
taxe
the shape of an autobiography.

His world, politics, personal

life, and religion were intricately interwoven.

was a religious quest

— aseries

His entire life

of experiments through which he

hoped to find ’’truth," which he believed to be synonymous with
•’God."

These experiments were conducted in the form of social action,

but their importance to him lay only in the spiritual search,
of which the political activity was simply a reflection.

It was

through the spiritual quest that he derived the pov/er to engage
in politics.

—

What I want to achieve, what I have been striving and
pining to achieve these thirty years, self-realization,
to see God face to face, to attain Moksh a [ freedom
from the cycle of birth and death]. 1 live and move
and have my being in pursuit of this goal. All that I
do by way of speaking and writing, and all my ventures
in the political field, are directed to this same end.
Lut as I have all along believed that what is possible
for one is possible for all, my experiments have not
been conducted in the closet, but in the open; and I
do not think that this fact detracts from their
spiritual value. There are some things which are
known only to oneself and one’s Maker. These are
clearly incommunicable. The experiments I am about to
relate are not such. But they are spiriUial, or
rather moral. for the essence of religion is
morality. 19

—

:

To Gandhi, Truth was God (rather than, God was Truth).

It was
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one of God's many faces.

In order to see the face of God he had
to

find Truth, but he could not do this
passively.

It required that

he be personally able to speak, act, think,
and embody truthfulness.

Knov/ledge of truth was inseparable from a
truthful life.

He could not distinguish between private and public,
secular and

sacred spheres of activ?..ty--all four blended together.
was not simply private, politics not just secular.

Religion

Although he

felt that a belief in God was a prerequisite to the practice of
his political technique, he was not bound to any established

religious dogma.

He did not feel that anyone had to believe in

the same god as he, because no one could be absolutely certain
of their knowledge of God.

The recognition that we cannot know absolute tmith in our

lives is central to Gandhi's philosophy. He felt that we must

cling to, and continually revise and improve the relative truth
as we know it.

His experiments were his lifelong process of

personal revision and improvement of his own relative truth.

He

referred to his philosophy and political technique as

Satyagraha .

The word sat means "Being," "Truth," or "God."

Satya

refers to the relative truth, which is all that we can know.

"Satyagraha is literally holding on to Truth and it means, therefore, Truth-force,

known as soul-force.

Truth is soul or spirit.

It is, therefore,

It excludes the use of violence because

man is not capable of knowing the absolute truth and, therefore,

not competent to punish.

When one holds on to the truth, one's life
embodies truth and
one must act in a truthful manner.

acuxon are inseparable.

Truth as an idea and as an

V/hen cor fronted

by a situation which is

contrary to the truth, one is compelled to change it.
the motivation behind Gandhi's politics.

know what the truth is.

This was

But it is difficult to

Since we can have no certain knowledge

of truth, we must not act in any way which will harm others.

To do so would be to cause irrevocable injui'y on the authority
of an uncertain truth.

It is vital, then, that Satyagraha be

grounded in ahimsa , nonviolence,

Ahimsa is a prerequisite for

the discovery of truth, and the two are so closely interwoven

that is is difficult to separate them.
is the means; Truth is the end,"^^

"Nevertheless, ahimsa

Satyagraha is the

unwavering pursuit of personal and social truth in a nonviolent
manner.
The satyagrahi (one who practices Stayagraha) is true to

himself and to humanity only when he has tested his relative
truth through action.
death.

This is so even if the test leads to his

Gandhi emphasized that nonviolent resistance

passive resistance.

not

It is not a passive form of resistance

which the weak must employ because they are too weak to succeed
by other methods.

Rather than being submissive, it is an active,

militant approach, which requires great moral strength and
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courage.
The satyagrahi is opposed to evil, not
to the evil-doer.

This

means that he must not think ill of, or do
violence to the evildoer.

The nonviolence of ahimsa.

I’s

not related just to nhysical

violence, but to any kind of violence; including
hatred of, evil

thoughts about, ill will toward, and even lying to a
person.
It requires that one refrain from mental as well as
physical

violence,

Ihis demands a high level of concentration on the

part of the satyagrahi, and that he maintain a clear understanding of what are his innermost motives,

Gandhi felt that the best English translation of ahimsa
is "love,” or "charity."

Since this is the value which guides

Satyagraha, one must love one's opponent, regardless of his acts.
Love of the evil-doer requires that one try to win him away from
evil, even unto one's own death.

Love is reckless in giving away, oblivious to what
it gets in return.
Love wrestles with the world
as with the self and ultimately gains a mastery
over all other feelings. . . .
The law of love will work, just as the law of
gravity vdll work, whether we accept it or not. .
The more I work at this law the more I feel the
delight in the scheme of this universe. It gives
me peace and a meaning of the mysteries of
nature that I have no power to describe. 22

.

,

In order to practice ahimsa, one must undergo an inner self-

purification.

This is a life-long process, which must be con-

tinually practiced.

The object is to achieve utter humility

from every trace of self-interest.

— freedom
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Identification with everything that lives is
impossible
without self-purification; without self-purification
the observance of the law of Ahimsa must remain
an
empty dream; God can never be realized by one who
is
not pure of heart. Self-purification therefore
must
mean purification in all walks of life. 23
In practice this generally involved taking vows
of poverty,

chastity, and abstaining from a variety of things which
Gandhi

lelt either did injury to oneself, or represented submission to
one’s passions.

Vows were very important, sacred acts which were

not to be lightly taken or broken.

Another important element in Satyagraha is suffering.
satyagrahi must be willing to suffer, for three reasons.

suffering is viewed as a purifying act.

The
First,

Also, the nature of

Satyagraha requires that one be prepared to enduring suffering
resulting from the actions of one's opponent.

Since Satyagraha

cannot involve violence, it must rely upon patience and sympathy
in an effort to win over the opponent to one's view of the truth.

In the interim, however, one is likely to suffer at the hand of

one's opponent.

This reverses the usual pattern of confrontation,

which generally involves the attempt to

P(#'.ke

one's opponent suffer.

Finally, suffering is a tactic designed to convince the opponent
of the sincerity of the satyagrahi 's purpose.

Gandhi's position

regarding suffering is similar to that of any leader of militant
action.

The participants, or soldiers, are asked to prepare for

suffering and sacrifice.

In the practice of Satyagraha, however,

the magnitude of the injuries and loss of life that will be
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incurred is likely to be considerably less than
that associated
with violent militancy,

Gandhi believed militant Satyagraha to be a very
powerful tool,

which should be employed only as a last resoru.

When faced with

a social injustice, the satyagrahi must first
employ

avenues of relief.

^

available

Only when he was exhausted all other options

will he resort to civil disobedience, or non-cooperation with an

unjust law or social situation.
law-abiding person,

V/hen a

The satyagrahi is basically a

law must be broken as a very last resort,

the act is done with a clear understanding of the underlying

issues at hand, and with great care to break only the specific

law in question.

Also, the opponent must be informed of one's

plans and motives.

Great care must be taken to prevent the

issue of law-breaking from masking the fundamental issue which
led to the act.

The action must be directed not against the

opponent, but against the situation in which both parties are
caught.

The law of love requires that the satyagrahi continually

strive to reach, with his opponent, a mutually just resolution.

Great care

irnst

be baken to insure that the action not be

taken for 'easons of self-interest.

Also, care must be taken

not to do any vio3.ence to the opponent

— including

taking advantage

of the ooDonent during a moment at which he is particularly weak.

One must not try to make the opponent feel fear or guilt.

Instead,
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the satyagrahi must continually appeal to what is best
in the

opponent, from a co-equal position.

The objective is to win the

opponent to the satyagrahi 's views, not to defeat him.
On March 30, 1919, Ctandhi Caxled a day of national strike.

The strike unified and electrified the Indian People against the
British,

He had intended a one day, symbolic work stoppage during

which the people vjould pray and fast.

In the following v;eeks,

hov/ever, there was rioting, arson, sabotage, and murder

directed against the British,

In one case, the British responded

by firing into a peaceful gathering of 10,000 Indians; injuring
1,500 people, of whom 379 died.

Appalled by what had happened,

Gandhi suspended his campaign against the British on April l8th.^^

What Gandhi called his Himalayan Miscalculation, which led
to this disaster, lay in his assumption that the mass of Indian

people was ready for nonviolent resistance.

He realized that it

could not be, without the preparation necessary to understand the

underlying philosophy and methods of Satyagraha,

The people had

to be prepared to obey the laws, not because of fear of punishment,

but of their own free will.

Only then would they be prepared to

selectively break specific laws in a nonviolent manner.
reinitiated his

carr.paign he

Before he

had to train a corps of volunteers who,

people.
in time, would spread across the country and educate the

peaceful
He found, though, that few people were interested in the

aspects of nonviolence

— particularly

as practiced under his
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rigorous training.

Nevertheless, he eventually built a cadre of

skilled Satyagraha leaders, vjhose activities paved the
way to

freedom from British rule, almost thirty-five years later.

Nearly twenty years after his campaign in South Africa, during
/

which he had first developed Satyagraha, Gandhi met his former
protagonist. General Smuts.

During their conversation. Smuts

remarked
did not give you such a bad time as you gave me.’
did not know that,’ Gandhi replied. The remark
is illuminating.
He was so utterly wedded to his
concepts as not to recognize that there had been
a real fight involving the hurting and humiliation
of an enemy.
He insisted in thinking that the end
was a conversion. Here he was wrong. The prevailir^g
white attitudes [in South Africa J had not altered.
’I
’I

After he left South Africa, the Indian community there lost most,
if not all, of the ground it had gained under Gandhi’s leadership.

This points to a problem in his approach to social change.

There has been a good deal of criticism of both the man and his
technique.

Some have said, as in the passage quoted above, that

he misread his political success as verification of his philosophy.

This may well be the case.

It has often been said, for example,

that his success in India was made possible only by the inherent

selT-restrain of the British authorities, v;hich prevented their

use of extremely oppressive countermeasures.

His critics have

argued that as a result of his pleasant experiences in England as
decency
a young law student, Gandhi tacitly assumed an element of
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on the part of the British and other foreigners.

But the success

of his campaign was not just an historical fluke.

His techniques

have been used in other countries with some success.

Gandhi died believing himself to be a fail^ire.
Satyagraha as a

v;ay

He saw

of living, a way of reaching a mutual truth

with one's opponent.

In his last years, though, he recognized

that he and his method had been used by the Indian politicians
to oust the British, regardless of its moral influence upon them.

It had been used as a means to an end and then, when the end

had been achieved, discarded.

V/hat he

had thought was militant

nonviolence had actually been practiced as passive resistance;
a weapon of the v/eak, who would turn to violence as soon as they

gained the strength.

His failure lay not in a weakness of

Satyagraha, but in the fact that it had never been practiced.
It is perhaps wrong to describe my present state of
mind as depresssion. ... I am not vain enough to
think that the divine purpose can only be fulfilled
through me. It is as likely as not that a fitter
instrum.ent will be used to carry it out and thau I
was good enough to represent a v/eak nation, not a
strong one. May it not be that a man purer, more
courageous, more far-seeing is wanted for the final
purpose? This is all speculation. Mo one has the
capacity to judge God. V/e are drops in that limitless ocean of mercy.
In Gandhi's viev;, success was not to be measured by the fact

that the British quit India, but by whether or not they left out
of a recognition of the moral soundness of his cause.

If they had
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been defeated, rather than converted, then he had done
violence
to them.

In truth, this is probably vjhat happened, and Gandhi

did fail to achieve the mutually shared moral resolution of the
conflict, for which he had devoted his life.

does not devalue Satyagraha.

This, however,

In my view, a unique quality of

Satyagraha is the requirement that one behave as
can be

v/on

the opponent

to the satyagrahi’s view, that one behave as if a

mutual resolution is possible.

This approach reduces the likeli-

hood that violence will erupt, and leaves the possibility open
that a mutual resolution actually

v;ill be

achieved.

To do

otherwise would increase the possibility of violence and severely
limit the likelihood of a mutual resolution, as is the case with

self-fulfilling prophecies.
It is ironic that under the leadership of Indira Gandhi
India has

India has fabricated and tested nuclear explosives.

retreated from Gandhi’s ideals and is now moving in the illusion
that a strong military is of sufficient value to her to merit an

enormous investment of her very limited resources.

Kenneth

Boulding has argued that this is a false belief, which India has
accepted because she has failed to test bhe reality of her sense
of truth.

In his view,

’’the

failure of Gandhism is not the

failure of ahimsa, but a failure of satyagraha.

He suggested

cannoc- rely
that, in a system as complex as the modern v;orld, ve

upon intuition or mysticism as sources of knov/ledge.

Instead, we
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must turn to the social sciences.

He did not place all of his hope

in the social sciences, but recognized them to be one
of many

methods of improving our understanding of truth.
Gandhi used the social sciences in a rudimentary form, as a
part of his efforts to resolve labor-management disputes.

He

often undertook an economic analysis of a situation in order to

determine what v'ould be the most equitable wage agreement.

This

was important, to him, because his goal was to achieve mutually

advantageous settlements, rather than to maximize the profit of
one party over another.

I

am confident that he would agree with

Boulding about the value of the social sciences as a source of

pertinent information.

I do not, however,

believe that he would

place the burden of the search for truth in their lap.

Although

they could provide him with information which would be of great

value in achieving his goals, they could not help him to identify

what those goals should be.

Gandhi recognized the truth and ahimsa

to be joined as opposite faces of a coin.

As we turn to the

sciences for truth, it is all the more important that we cling to
ahisma, the

lav;

of love.

Gand''l never articulated a coherent, consistent philosophy.

This has been the source of much of the difficulty that people have
had in interpreting his thoughts.

He viewed his life as an

and
experiment with truth, and devised his experiments as the need
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opportui-iity arose.

His was a growing philosophy, as was
his truth,

which he did not want to fix into a system.

been to kill and preserve it.
as j.ying not
VJhen the

ix:

To do so v;ould have

He saw the value of his approach

the completed product, but in the emergent
process.

views that he exi^ressed over the years are examined together

they are, for this reason, likely to conflict.

But the image of

truth that he held in his later years was not necessarily the same
as the one he held in his youth.

positive

groiiTth,

He viewed this as a sign of

rather than of inconsistency.

There seem to be four other reasons for the difficulty that

many people have encountered in understanding Gandhi's philosophy. 28
First, one must realize that he did not make a clear distinction
betvxeen ideas and actuality.

He considered his mental, physical,

and spiritual facets to be integrally linked, as were his thoughts
and actions.

Also, he was embedded in the tradition of Hinduism,

and his statements are completely coherent only within the light
of that world-view.

In addition, his ultimate ideal cannot be

obtained on earth; the value of his ideals lies in the direction
that they provide for action, rather than in their actualization.

One cannot be criticized fer not being able to conform perfectly
to the ideal, only for not striving to do so.

The fourth reason

lies in the fact that Gandhi spoke of truth from three perspectives, which he did not alvxays clearly distinguish.
the unrealizable ideal toward

whi'^'h

He spoke of

we should all strive, of
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truth as he had actualized it in his ovm personal struggle
tov;ard
the idea, and of the truth as embodied in the struggle
of the Indian

masses.
brae

brikso.’.

recognized that Satyagraha is based upon

combination of clear insight into our central motives and persuasive
faith in the brotherhood of mankind.

'*29

One of Gandhi's basic

presuppositions was that humanity is not, and must not be divided
into separate camps.
whole.

Rather, he saw us all as parts of a larger

Social conflicts, then, are akin to family squabbles,

v^^hich

must be resolved to the benefit of all members of the family.
It is inconceivable that such a conflict should be resolved by

destroying a member of our family.

Erikson

believed that the

saintliness of Gandhi can be explained through the psychological

observation that "the true saints are those who transfer the
state of householdership to the house of God, becoming father and

mother, brother and sister, son and daughter, to all creatures,

rather than to their own issue. "30
The value that enables this to happen is ahimsa.

This is

probably the closest thing to dogma in Gandhian philosophy.

He

did not, hov;ever, eliminate the possibility of employing violence.
He realized that it takes great personal strength in order to

strength
employ Satyagraha, and that some people may not find such

within themselves.

In such a case, when the only choice lies

injustice, Gandhi
betu’cen cowardice and violence in the face of
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recommended that one choose vio].cnce.

His hope was that people

would be able to find the strength to recognize and employ
the
third choice, that of love and nonviolence,

Gandhi’s concept of ahiiasa seems very close to Burtt’s
concept of love.

Both involve freedom from self-interest and

a positive interest in promoting the growth of others.

Also,

both require inner preparation as a prerequisite for their
actualization.

Tn psychoanalytic terms, this preparation involves

gaining insight into one’s unconscious motives.
(Hindu) terms, self -purification is required.

In Gandhian
I believe,

though, that the Gandhian approach to self-purification sometimes

conflicted with ahimsa, because of its emphasis upon extremes of
self-suffering.

This, and Gandhi’s extreme dietary practices,

seem like acts of violence directed against the self which are

beyond what is required by ahimsa.

This may be a product of tension

between his love of all life, and Hinduism’s goal of escaping
from the cycle of life.

I,

personally, believe that self -puri-

fication should be understood in psychoanalytic, rather than in

Hindu terms.
Anott'^r important Gandhian presupposition is that means and

ends are synonymous.
ends in Gandhian satyagraha are disting^aishable only temporally. Both means and ends partake
The means precede the end in
of a continuous process.
time, but there can be no question of moral priority.
Truth is inseparable from non-violence, and the method
of achieving and clinging to the truth in non-violence.

Ileans

vii-d

Non-violence becomes both the means and the end, and
the terms become convertible. 31
The Gandhian viev; of the law seems to be that each
law is a

question, rataer than a oommand,

people.

.aiich

has been placed before the

The resolution of the question of 'whether or not it is

a just lav/ ultimately lies in their hands, 32

Satyagraha is a

method of putting the question to them, and enacting an answer.
John Rawls has argued that if the body of people to whom the

dissenter addresses himself does not share his sense of justice,
the dissenter is likely to fail and civil disobedience will not

be an effective technique. 33

The Gandhian philosophy, then,

presupposes a universally shared sense of justice.

The satyagrahi

must cleanse himself of self-interest in order to recognise a
just cause, and to properly address it to the people.
Joan Bondvirant has pointed out that Satyagraha is an approach
to resolving dialectical conflicts between the satyagrahi and

his opponent.

The object is to achieve a synthesis, which does

not do violence to the grovdng truth of either party.
synthesis, then, is not a compromise.

abandon his core of truth.

The

Neither is expected to

The satyagrahi must, however, be

continually attentive to his opponent's argument in order to
determine whose views, his or the opponent's, most nearly embody
truth.

At the same time, he must employ only those political

techniques which help his opponent to become open to his
own under-

standing of truth.

Gandhian dialectics are devoid of any vestige

of determinism, such as the historical determinism of Marx.

To

claim a certain^ knowleage of what the dialectical synthesis
will be, is to claim knowledge of absolute Truth, rather than
to claim a relative truth.

’’The

Gandhian dialectic, v;hich lies at

the heart of satyagraha, is a process to be made explicit by human

action, not to be found as implicit either in the nature of things
or the process of time.

It partakes of prescription, rather than

description.

With the exception of the overt religious elements, Gandhi’s

philosophy appears to be very close to Burtt’s.

The difference is

that Burtt’s approach is from the perspective of resolving

philosophical disagreement, while Gandhi's is from that of resolving
societal conflict.

Gandhism is built upon the same four elements

we identified in our examination of Burtt: membership is a large

group, which includes the opponent; an attempt to transcend dogma;

freedom from self-interest; and the recognition that moans and ends
are united.

The Gandhian method for resolving dialectical conflict

is that of dialogue on a massive socdal scale.

Through his acts

of nonviolent resistance, the satyagrahi attempts to establish a

valued
state of dialogiie with his opponent, and achieve a mutually

synthesis.

From a psychoanalytic point of view, Erikson

sees the process

as one of mutual therapy, the end result of which is a double

conversion of the satyagrahi (therapist) and the opponent (patient).
The Gandian method is in keeping

\-7ith

Eriksctt's psychoanalytic

interpretation of the Golden Rule: "a man should act in such a

way that he actualizes in both himself and in uhe other such forces
as are ready for a heightened mutuality. "35

Gandhi's approach

v/as

one of "giving the opponent the courage to change, "3^ vjhich

required that the satyagrahi have the same courage.

Nonviolent resistance can be viev/ed as a form of symbolic
violence. 37

Through it, one forcefully confronts the opponent

with opposing views, but not in a destructive way.

The object is

to force the opponent to make a conscious choice and, through that

choice process, to examine his behavior and values.

This requires

that the satyagrahi appeal to what is best in the other, and

avoid an emotional polarization that may interfere with the

opponent's ability to make the best decision.

This means that

one should not appeal to a sense of guilt within, or place guilt

upon the opponent.

Guilt is often related to issues other than

the speci- Ic ones at hand.

Since the object is to help the

unrelated
opponent reexamine a specific issue, such indirect or
interfere with
issues would only muddy the situation and, thus,
the purpose of the satyagrahi.

The nature of self-fulfilling prophecies requires
that the

satyagrahi deal

x^rith

his opponent on the basis of good faith.

At

the same time, he must realistically be prepared to suffer
if there
is a breach of tnat faith.

By appealing to what is beso in the

opponent, one helps him to realize the elements of good intent

that he may possess.

This kind of behavior on the part of the

satyagrahi, particularly when he accepts suffering v/illingly and

cheerfully, is likely to be quite contrary to the behavior

expected by the opponent.

Bondurant argued that the result may

be sufficiently shocking to the opponent to break his normal,

stereotyped patterns of thought

— allowing

him to freshly examine

the dissenting views.
on

Throughout, the idea is to hold up a mirror to the opponent.-^

By clinging to ahimsa and, thus, presenting no threat to the
opponent, except to the extent that he projects a threat upon
them, the resisters become the mirror of his acts.

opponent eventually secs

v/hat he is

Wien the

doing to them, he is able

to see himself and confront his truth.

Erik son has suggested that mankind is divided by its

attitudes into many separate groups, or ’’pseudo-species,*' which
define themselves by reference to such things as race, religion,

nationality, and ideaology.39

The members within each group

groups
(define themselves as better than those of the other

they are the center of their universe.

It is, then, permissible

to behave violently toward members of other
groups, but not toward

members of one's own.

He argued that in order to reduce violence

we must widen our identity to include what has previously
been

defined as other pseudo-species.

relationship with his adversaries.
a manner which degraded them.

This is what Ghandi did in
He refused to deal

;d.th

Ills

them in

"He refused, then, to permit that

cumulative aggravation of bad conscience, negative identity, and

hypocritical moralism which characterize the division of men
into pseudo-species."^^

In Boulding's words, he "refused to

exclude even the enemy from his community.

Thomas Merton eloquently summarized Gandhi's philosophy
when he vrrote that;
[GandhianJ non-violence implies a kind of bravery far
different from violence. In the use of force, one
simplifies the situation by assuming that the evil
to be overcome is clear-cut, definite, and irreversible. Hence there remains but one thing: to eliminate it. Any dialogue v;ith the sinner, any
question of the irreversibility of his acts, only
means faltering and failure. Failure to eliminate
evil is itself a defeat. . . .

A violent change |_howeverJ would not have been a
serious change at all. To punish and destroy
the oppressor is merely to initiate a nev; cycle of
violence and oppression. The only real liberation
is that v;hich liberates both the oppressor and the
oppressed at the same timic fre.i the same tyrannical
automatism of the violent process v;hich contains
in itself the curse of irreversibility. ...

True freedom is then inescapable from the inner
strength xjhich can assume the common burden of
evil v;hich ireighs both on oneself and one’s adversary. False freedom is only a manifestation of the
weakness that cannot bear even one's ovm evil unx.il
it is projected xinto the other an.d seen as exclusively

1U5
his. The highest form of spiritual freedom is, as
Gandhi believed, to be sought in the strength of
heart which is capable of liberating the oppressed
and oppressor together. ^2

Paulo Freire

Paulo Freire’

s

concerns have been similar to Gandhi’s.

He,

too, has worked to free the oppressed from oppression, and he has

considered dialogue to be a vital element in this process.

Unlike

Gandhi, he has considered dialogue to be of value primarily in

interactions among the oppressed and those who are working for
liberation, but not of great value in their interactions with their
oppressors.

Also, he has approached the task as a radical educator

steeped in Marxist materialism, as opposed to Ghandi’s social

activism which was based upon a spiritual quest.

Gandhi spoke

in terms of mutual evolution; Freire in terms of Social revolution.

While working in literacy education in Brazil, and for
agrarian reform in Chile, Freire had the opportunity to direct
a great deal of thought and action to the problem of oppression.

He developed an educational method, which he called the pedagogy
of the oppressed, designed to enable oppressed people to

recognize their state of oppression and act to change their
condition,

because
Kis writing is difficult to grasp quickly,

style.
he has developed a personal vocabulary and

In addition,

with Marxian
he assumed that his readers will be familiar

dialectical theory~~a prerequisite to understanding the full
implications of his thinking.
Edwin Burtt summarized the core of Marxism as follows;

E/erjaning in the univei-se is chang.mg; there are no
static realities. But there are laws of change which
can be scientifically grasped, and v/hen they are
grasped, those who understand them are able to guide
the changes tov/ard humanly desirable ends. The
fundamental lav;s are dialectical that is, they
reveal that the universe is a ceaseless process of
generation, interplay, and resolution of antagonisms
between opposing forces, ^3

—

^

This dialectical process is historically determined, inevitable,
and can not be altered from its course.

The person who is aware

of this process, and who can identify the forces v;hich are in

dialectical opposition can work to hasten their resolution.

What is created through the synthesis of the opposing forces is,
in our historical context, necessarily good.

The basic proposition

of Marxism is:

That in every historical epoch the prevailing mode of
economic production and exchange, and the social
organization necessarily follov:ing from it, form
the basis upon which is built up, and from which
alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch; that, consequently,
the whole history of mankind (since the dissolution
of nrimitive tribal society, holding land in common
vwnership) has been a history of class struggles,
contests betv/een exploiting and expMted, ruling and
oppi-essed classes; that the history of these class
struggles forras a series of evolutions in v;hich,
nowadays, a stage has been reached where the
exploited and oppressed class the proletariat
cannot attain its em.ancipation from the sway of
the exploiting and ruling class— the bourgeoisie—
without at the same tim.', and once and for all,
emaj'icipating society at large from all exploitation,^
oppression, class distinctions and class struggles.

—

Freire believes that each period in history is
characterized by
a series of generalized aspirations and values. ^5

in order to

exercise autonomous control over their lives, people
ohe critical ability

reality.

imist

have

to I’ccognize these themes which shape their

However, people can be, and are, diverted from becoming

aware of these themes through advertising, propaganda, and other
forces which foster uncritical thought.

The result is that they

become objects; spectators unable to interact with their times.

During a period of historical change, the old themes lose their
importance and new ones emerge.

These times in particular require

uhat people have a critical understanding of their reality if they
are to play a part in fostering the new values and concerns.

They

must become integrated with their reality.
To be integrated with one's realityr means being able to think

critically.

A person who is capable of critical thinking is able

to recognize the contradictions (dialectical conflicts) in his

Through

life and act to resolve these conflicts in a meaningful way.
this dialectical synthesis he creates a new reality.

Without

critical consciousness, he is a victim of reality and the new
reality

th.'.t

is created by others is an alienated reality.

In

short, he is oppressed,
P'reire recognizes the key theuie of our historical period to be

that of oppression.

The dialectical conflict is between the

oppressor and the oppressed.

The synthesis which will be produced

m
when this conflict is resolved is liberation of both
the oppressor
and the oppressed.

In each country, state, community, and indi-

lifs there are a mu3.titude of other sub— themes.

situation is characterized by its

ox-in

Each

unique assemblage.

The

specific way in v;hich the major conflict will be resolved will

be determined by its interplay with the sub- themes in each
context.

Social action designed to bring about a synthesis which

is not alienating, then, must be designed with reference to the

specific social and individual context in which it is set,

Freire's pedagogy is directed toward this end.
In Freire's view, the world and human consciousness are

integrally linked.

Our consciousness comes into being in response

to the world around us, and as our consciousness changes, so does

our v/orld

— reality

is transformed.

This is not a passive mental

process; "humans, as beings of relationships, are challenged by
nature, which they transform through their work.

The result of

this transformation, which separates itself off from them, is

their world.

This is the world of culture which is prolonged

into the world of history.

One who is able to consciously

participat': in this process is a "subject."
v;hc

One who cannot, one

is acted upon, is an "object."

Animals, including man, can adapt to the realities of their

environment.

Aniir.als,

though, can only adapt and must do so to
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whatever the realities nay be.

People are unique in their ability

to adapt and, through a process of critical choice-making,
transform

that reality,

Aniriials

are called adjusted.

reflex

— man

reflects.

Those who only adapt

Those who critically reoel against their

reality and attempt to transform it are often called maladjusted,
[People] are able to detach themselves from the world
in order to find their place in it and with it.
Only people are capable of this act of "separation"
ixi order to find their place in the vrorld and enter
in a critical way into their own reality.
"To enter
inuo" reality means to look at it objectively, and
apprehend it as one's field of action and reflection.
It means to penetrate it more and more lucidly in
order to discover the true interrelations between
the facts observed.

Freire believes that peasants are often so much a part of their
xvorld,

so merged with it, that they are unable to conceive of

transforming it.

They have no sense of history and, thus, of

the possibility of change.

When people reflect critically they are

aware of their past and future.

For those who do not reflect

critically (all animals, and many people) the v;orld is timeless
and there is no possibility of change.

The educational programs

he developed were designed to help peas-ants grow out of their

"magical," timeless stage of consciouse, into a "critical,"

historical stage.
The importance of critical thinking to the peasants is

illustrated by the
Chile,^^

v/ork he

did to promote agrarian reform in

The government had recognised the need to introduce

nevj,

peasant agriculture.
more productive agricultural tec’nniques into the

1$0

Toward that end, they established an agricultural
extension program.

But Freire objected to the idea of extension, arguing
that the
approach was paternalistic, and that it employed persuasion
and
propaganda, which are cppressi/o in nature.

The extension agent

is considered to be better than the people he is helping.

Since

the farmer is expected merely to accept and employ the agent's
advice, there is no improvement in his critical consciousness.

He is treated as an object,

Freire argued that extension is not

education, but domestication.

He believed that in order to be

effective as an agent for agrarian reform, the agent must be an
educator.

He must work with the farmers to improve their critical

awareness and enable them to transform their agricultural reality
in a manner that is meaningful to them.

The agent's task is

communication, not extension.
The effect of extension is cultural invasion.

The techniques

that are introduced have not been a part of the peasant's culture,
and are likely to alter it tremendously.

Their cultural reality

v;ill

be transformed without their having been involved in making the

decision as to what changes to make, or whether they should be

made at all.

Cultural invasion is an act in which a subject

imposes som.ething upon objects

for them.

— including

doing the thinking

At its root "any cultural invasion presupposes conquest,

manipulation, and messianism on the part of the invader.

It pre-

supposes propaganda v/hich domesticates rather than liberateo.
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Since cultural invasion is an act of conquest per
se, it needs

further conquest to sustain it. '*^9

Historical and cultural continuity are of great importance and
can be maintained only v«hen changes in a society are shaped

forces within the historical and cultural context of that
society.

The alternative is an alienated society.

Crop yields

are not likely to improve when the farmers are alienated from

fanning.

Even if they do increase, the process of alienation is

sure to eat av;ay at other parts of the culture.

In order to

prevent this, the agricultural educator must help the fanners
to the critical stage at which they can examine the proposed

agricultural techniques, and decide whether or not to employ them.
If they do decide to accept the tectiniques, they must be allowed
to fit them within the context of the empirical traditions of

their past.

The process through which the educator must communicate with
the farmers is that of dialogue.

In order to establish effective

communication, Freire believes, the subjects (educators and peasants)

must address ("enter into") the same object, and share the same
linguistic universe during the period cf communication.

This

establishes "intersub jectivityj " the people snare similar realities.
The object of dialogue is to identify the coutraoic cions, or

dialectical conflicts, in their shared reality j they are "naming
the world."

"Dialogiie is the encounter between men, mediated by

"50
the world, in order to name the world.
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The idea of naming the world is complex, and related to

Freire's concept of "praxis.”
of action and reflection.

Praxis is the dialectical synthesis

Action without reflection is activism.

Reflection without action is verbalism.
a humanly meaningful reality.

both.

Alone, neither can create

Critical consciousness requires

Together they transform the world through work.

By

naming the world, we identify the conflicts in our reality,
enables us to transform reality.
are synonymous.

vjhich

Praxis, work, and true word

The true word is the essence of dialogue.

Dialogue in any situation (whether it involves
scientific and technical knowledge , or existencial
knowledge) demands the problematic confrontation
of that very knowledge in its unquestionable
relationship with the concrete reality in which if
is engendered, and on which it acts, in order to
better understand, explain, and transform thau
reality. 51
In addition to the true word, dialogue also requires a number of

other elements.

It requires the humility which will allow the

dialoguers to speak on a co-equal level, and a faith in human

beings and their ability (when they are not misshaped by alienation)
to transform the world in a humanly fulfilling way,

Hope of a

better future is also necessary, as is the ability to think
critically.

Finally, dialogue requires love.

1^3

The naming of the world, which is an act of creation
and recreation, is not possible if it is not infused
with love. Love is at the same time the foundation
of dialogue and dialogue itself. It is necessarily
the task of responsible Subjects and cannot exist
in a relationship of domination.
Tomination reveals
the pathology of love: sadism in the dominator and
masochism in the dominated. ^2
In the process of dialogically transforming the v;orld, one must
>

be extremely careful about what one is transforming.

The object is

to transform the reality that is jointly shared by the dialoguers;

not the people who are in dialogue.

To direct such an effort at

a person would be to treat him as an object.

Dialogue cannot take

place in an oppressive condition, thus, dialogue cannot be used
as an instrument of oppression.

The dialoguers are not out to

dominate each other, but to conquer the world about them in an
effort to bring about their liberation from oppression.
The characteristics of dialogical social action are: 1) There
is a cooperative effort to transform the world; 2) the leaders

work to unite the people;

3)

Social organization is developed

and
around the concept of the leaders working with the people;
U) Cultural synthesis.

In contrast, the characteristics of

antidialogae are just the opposite: 1) Conquest;
3)

Manipulation; and U) Cultural invasion.

2)

Divisiveness;

These points must oe

for critical
kept in mind when one is trying to educate

consciousness.

dialogue;
Such an approach to education requires

antidialogue, or oppression.
it cannot happen in a state of

Freire views most education as a narrative; a one-way extension
of information from the teacher to the student

deposits learning in the student.

—

the teacher

He referred to this approach

as the "banking" concept of educaoion.

The banking approach,

though, is inhibiting and restrictive, as opposed to the dialogical

approach, which promotes freedom and creativity.

Those who are

threatened by the idea of teacher-student dialogue are those who
claim sure knowledge before ignorant students.
is a threat.

To them, dialogue

There is a dialectical conflict in the teacher-student

relationship.

Freire argues that its resolution would place both

parties in the position of teacher and student, each learning

from the other.
In true education, as Freire views it, there is nou a split

between knowing and teaching. Education is not a transference of
knowledge, but joint cognition directed to a problem shared by
the educator and educatee.

The educator does not first gain

knowledge and later transmit it to the educatee.

knowledge in the process of solving problems.

Both discover

If the education

involves learning previously generated knowledge, then it is to
knowing.
be taught in such a way that one recreates the act of
construct.
Any action or reaction occurs within a larger reality

learning within the
In order to educate, one must place the

larger reality.

penetrate
The educator must help the educatee to

pattern, and place the
the structure of reality, understand its
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l6&rning within it.

True education (which always involves

critical thinking) involves the recognition of the dialectical
conflicts in one's reality.

These conflicts require resolution.

Thus, education is a process of recognizing one's i-eality as a

problem which must be solved, or transformed.

The larger

reality to which education must always be related is the dialectic
of oppression.

The educational process must resolve the oppressor-

oppressed conflict; it must be dialogical.

True education, then,

is preparation for, and the practice of, freedom.

True education involves both the recreation of the learned

knowledge and the application of that knowledge to specific life
situations of the learners; it involves praxis.

If education is

to be dialogical it must pose problems, which the educatees

solve within their own existential context.

This requires the

problematization of human beings in the world.

It cannot deal

with persons and the world in isolation from each other.

It is

through an analysis of the objective reality of the world and
the subjective reality the people involved, that the educator
is able to develop the content of his program.

integrate
Freire developed a technique which can be used to
objectives.
these elements with the teacher's other educational
that one have a close
In order to use it effectively, it is vital

world-view.
knowledge of the educatee's aspirations and

With

the students, one
this knowledge, working in dialogue with

ther,

"generative themes," which
identifies the dialectical tensions, the
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are central to the educatees* lives.

become the focus of the curriculum.

It is these themes which

Whatever is taught, bo it

reading skills or agricultural techniques, is taught
with

reference to the themes.

Initially, the burden rests upon the

educators to identify the key generative themes.

Great care

must be taken to insure that they are the people's themes, not
those of the educators unconsciously projected upon the people.
As the educatees develop critical consciousness, though, they

are able to suggest additional themes.

At this point, they are

generating the curriculum in dialogue with the students.

The

image of students and teachers as co-learners and co-teachers is

very important here, because it is a prerequisite to the successful
identification and use of generative themes.
Once the generative themes have been identified, they are

codified into existential situations, which are shared in the
lives of the students.

The codifications are generally visual

images (e.g.; paintings, photographs, posters) in v/hich the

dialectical elements can be found.

The codification must not

be obviously related to what one is trying to teach.

The

educatees decode the situation by discv-^sing the pictures among
themselves and with the educator; that is, they problematize the

world recorded in the images.

Since the image is representative

of a part of their world, they are problematizing their

owti
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world, as well.

Through this process the students enter into

their world and develop critical consciousness.

There are four stages in the development of this kind of an
educational program.

In the first stage, the educator sets out

to decode, or identify the dialectical themes of the group to be

educated.

The overall project is carefully explained to the

group which will be educated, and a request is made for volunteers
who will assist in the first stages of program development.

With the assistance of the volunteers, a team of educators and
social scientists conducts a thorough study of the life of the
group.

This includes living in close contact with the people.

The information that is gathered is then examined and the dialectics
of the group identified.

The themes are then codified for classroom use.

They are

placed in a context that is familiar to the people, but neither
too explicit, nor too enigmatic.

The object is to develop a

codification imagery that can be decoded by the students, but not
so easily that tney do not become deeply involved in the process.

The existential contradictions, or dialectical themes, which are
which
selected ior codification should be related to other themes
culture.
have not been codified, but which are present in the

In

will branch out to
this way, discussion of the generative themes

other themes.
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In the third stage, the generative themes are tested.

Representatives of the social group to be educated are presented
the codifications, which are then decoded through dialogue.

Everything that transpires in this study group is recurded,
and a sociologist and a psychologist are present to study the
session.

In the fourth stage, a systematic, interdisciplinary

study of what went on in the investigation circles is conducted.
A determination is made as to which of the themes tested are the

best for use in the program that is being developed.
are then ordered in a functional sequence.

The themes

Some additional

themes may be introduced by the educators in order to link, or

introduce elements in the program.

The themes are once again

codified and the completed package becomes the center for a mass

educational prograra, which is conducted throughout the area for
which the program was designed.
The Brazilian literacy program that Freire developed in this

way appears to have been quite successful.

In village study

groups, or “culture circles,” all across the co\intry, peasants

were shown the codifications.

In dialogue with their teachers

themes
they decoded them and discussed the rar.lfications of the
in their own lives.

Only after the discussion were they shovm

work, peasant,
the vrritten words for the dialectical themes (e.g.,

land owner).

phonetic
The word was then broken down into its
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elements, which were rearranged by the peasants to form other
words.

The peas.ants' interest in the words was so great that

many were able to read a newspaper after several weeks of study.
Throughout, Freire’s major objective is to enable people
to gain critical control over their lives.

Inevitably, this

process is connected to the major dialectical conflict of our
'time,

that between the oppressor and the oppressed.

definition, ”Any situation in i^hich
’B’

'A’

By his

objectively exploits

or hinders his pursuit of self-affirmation as a responsible

person is one of oppression.

He realizes that any method

which is employed to resolve this conflict must not embody the
conf].ict.

oppressive.

It must, if at all possible, be dialogical, rather than

The true radical, in Freire's view, is a person

who is committed to this in the praxis of his life.

He is

committed to dialogue, and his role is that of a liberator.
But Freire argued that dialogue is impossible between people
who are antagonistic to each other.

Since the oppressor is

likely to respond to the liberation of the oppressed with
antagonism, it may be necessary for the oppressed to reluctantly

resort to violence in order to achieve liberation.

The people

it
will not, however, be responsible for initiating the violence—

was initiated by the act of oppression.

The violence directed

because
against the oppressor, though, is not itself oppressive,
its objective is to liberate the oppressor.

The oppressor has not

160

reached the state of critical consciousness which will
allow him
to recognize and act to resolve the historical theme
of oppression.

Liberation liberates the oppressors as

v;ell as the

oppressed.

Thus,

acts performed by revolutionaries to promote liberation are not

oppressive, including any acts of social control v/hich prevent
the reemergence of oppression.

Consciously or unconsciously, the act of rebellion by
the oppressed (an act which is always, or nearly
always, as violent as the initial violence of the
oppressors) can initiate love. ... As the oppressed,
fighting to be human, take away the oppressor's power
to dominate and supress, they restore to the oppressors
the humanity they had lost in the exercise of oppresion.^°
Paulo Freire's writing communicates his great, loving concern
for the oppressed peoples of the world, and demonstrates his

commitment to helping them achieve liberation.

His dialogical

approach to education as a form of social action appears to provide
a means for achieving social change without creating an alienating

world.

His underlying philosophy is very similar to those of

Burtt and Gandhi.

Freire argued that the educator must

regard

the students as being of intrinsic value, and that the two must share
in a group identity.

Also, he pointed out that the educator must

overcome his own self-interest in order to foster the fullest grov/th
and liberation of his students.

Finally, he realized that means

and ends could not be separated j that the effort to overcome

oppression must not be oppressive.
extended their
However, Gandhi explicitly, and Burtt implicitly,
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sense of group identity to include all people,

Freire, on the

other hand tended to identify with the oppressed in opposition
to the oppressors.

Dialogue is the necessary mode of interaction

with the oppressed, but violence may be directed against the
oppressors.

This does not mean that he totally rejected the

oppressors.

On the contrary, his convictions about the value

of liberation were so great that he was able to view violent

revolution as an act of love tov/ard the oppressors, because they
too would be liberated.

This means that the oppressors and the

oppressed can potentially become members of the same group,

although at the present they are not.
But really now; loving violence?

Perhaps Freire is able to

violently liberate the oppressors for their own good, but can
we expect such altruism in a massive social movement of liberation?
Even Gandhi, who taught that the opponent should be loved, and
should not be treated with violence in any form, found that the

movement he had led

v/as

unable to hold to that ideal.

Can we

expect better of a movement based upon selective, loving violence?
Perhaps a true movement of liberation would not even use the methods
of oppressors

— violence,

A revolution is supposed to be a change that turns
everything around. But the ideology of political
revolution will never change anything except
appearances. There will be violence, and power
will pass from one party to another, but when the
smoke clears and the bodies of all the dead men
essentially
are underground, the situation will oe
a minority
be
v;ill
there
before:
the same as it was
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of strong men in power exploiting all the others for
their own ends. There will be the same greed and
cruelty and lust and ambition and avarice and hypocrisy
as before, 57
Ferxiaps we will never be able to ^ring about major social change

without violence.

But let us not delude ourselves by calling it

Let us at least call it, as Gandhi did, weakness.

love*

The

vjhoie issue of violence occupies only a small portion of Freire's

writing, and it is possible to blow it out of proportion.

It

does, however, point to a still greater problem, that of dogma.

If coercive techniques are justified in the face of an \inresponsive

oppressor, are they not justified in the face of an unresponsive

peasant?

Is Freire not arguing, "I will dialogue with you so long

as you see the v;orld in my way, or can be educated to see it

my way,"

Throughout, Freire has written of helping people gain

critical consciousness of their reality, and helping them to achieve
liberation.

But nowhere does he explicitly address the issue of

empowering them to reject his fundamental political and social
philosophy,
I

have found the arguments of Burtt and Gandhi about the short-

accept this
comings of dogma too persuasive to allow me to quickly

part of Freire *s theory,

’//hat

is the source of his intransigence?

by an interest
Marxist interest in dialectics is motivated primarily
in the evolution of hiiman society.

The historical change that is
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brought about through the resolution of dialectical opposites is
viewed as historically inevitable.

Although Freire is not a Marxist

in the traditional sense, he does seen to accept this view of

historical inevitability.
The motivating interests of Marxists, however, can limit the

range of dialectics which they see as relevant to their interpre-

tation of history and, thus, limit their interpretation of history.
There seem to be three major weaknesses in the Marxist view,^^
First, it gives rise to millenarian expectations of a liberated

society almost entirely devoid of human exploitation.

This can

lead to a tendancy to deny or deemphasize the presence of oppression
in the post-revolutionary society.

Also, Marxism gives rise to

the dogmatic delusion that one is not subject to delusion and,
thus, is best equipped to know vrhat is best for those who are

recognized to be deluded.

Finally, the very intensity of the

Marxist's emotional commitment to his cause predisposes him to

unconsciously make everything fit his social theory.
Edwin Burtt has proposed four presuppositions which, if

yet preserve
adopted, would free Marxism from these weaknesses,
its strengths.

through
There is a dialectic of histoi'y> which works
the
in
lorces
dynamic social forces as well as through
individual recognized by existentialism. . . •
1,

2,
Th© lai'Ts according "to v/hich "those Torces operate
can be mder stood by the human mind, which thus puts
itself in a position to direct them tov/ard desirable
ends.
Indeed, understanding and action are not
separable, as most theories of knov;ledge have
assuraeNi, ... The \mdei'standing thus gained is
alvjays capable of being improved, not only in
details of policy but also in the ultimate philosophical principles. Hence there is always more to learn
from growing experience, from other Marxists, and from
opponents of Marxism.

In the interplay of forces which constitute the
3»
dialectical process, economic forces play a special
role so long as man has to live in a scarce
economy. . . .

The ideal goal toward which this historical
process is moving, and v;hich v;e can help realize
by intelligent action, is a brotherhood of man in
which class distinctions will have disappeared suid
all persons vri.ll recognize by attitude and conduct
that they are members one of another. ... It is
vital to remember that the means to be chosen
in pursuing this goal must be in essential harmony
with that goal, otherv/ise v;hat is actually achieved
will be a different goal. Hence, wherever possible,
nonviolent must replace violent revolution as an
instrument of social change.
U.

Freire subscribes to this last presupposition.

The dialogical

methods he described are designed to achieve nonviolent social
change.

His definition of the revolutionary is deeply embedded in

a recognition of the nature of self-fulfilling prophecies, and

requires that radicalism favor love and dialogue over violence.
he and Gandhi agreed on this point.

Both

They differed, though, in their

understanding of the extent to vjhich nonviolence is possible.
except
Gandhi believed it possible, and necessary, at all times,

when the only alternative is cowardice.

Freire believed that it
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reaches its limit when one is dealing with the oppressor.
case, he supported violence, because he

v/as

In thi*'

certain of the historical

inevitability, and the fundamental goodness of the social change
he envisioned,

Gandhi did not grant truth to the

idea,

that

\ie

can

know such an absolute truth and felt compelled to cling to his
near-dogma of ahimsa, nonviolence.
The Marxist view of history strongly colored Freire's under-

standing of the nature of dialogue.

He taught within the context

of an inevitable social evolution, and his pedagody was designed
to promote progress toward his image of liberation.

His dialogical

approach, then, is designed tc integrate the program content (be
it reading, agrarian reform, or fly tying) within the existential

context of the student.

There were no provisions, though, for

dialogically establishing the fundamental program objectives, because they were not recognized as being open to question.

He developed a pedagogic technique which employs powerful

psychological tools.
world-view, and ethos.

Its tacit objective is to shape the student’s
How, and whether, one uses these tools

should be a question of great moral significance.

What they

and
create will reflect the values which mc-.ivatc their use,

examination and
these values should be the object of continuous

soul-searching.

are
If one views the end to which the tools

though, there is
employed as inevitable and unquestionably good,

no opportunity for mora3. examination.

166

There are two ways in which Freire tacitly avoides
moral

responsibility for his pedagogy of the oppressed.

First, he

believes that as people increase in critical consciousness and
move toward liberation, they are becoming more fully human.

would seem to be a worthy objective.
people

v/ho

This

But this implies that

live in x^hat he calls the magical state of timelessness

are less human

— their

humanity is devalued.

The world-view based

upon a sense of cyclical time is characteristic of primative,
or traditional, cultures.

These peoples exist in a world in which

time is measured in terms of biological, seasonal, and astronomical

cycles.

As a result of the cyclical, rather than linear, nature

of time in their existential reality, they are without history
in the Western sense, and do not emphasize the concept of progressive

change.

The classical civilizations of the Far East also shared

this sense of time.^^

Are members of traditional cultures, and

ancient Chinese philosophers really less human than Freire?
I

am not trying to argue that peasants should not be empov/ered

to influence the political and economic forces which shape their

lives.

Nor am

I tr;,'’ing to

address the question of

Xi/hether

tradi-

tional cultures should be isolated and preserved, or absorbed into
the dominant world culture.

with

w’/iich

Certainly, in the particular situations

Freire was working, the peasants were not isolated.

and
Rather, they were systematically exploited by a political
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economic elite

— and

continue to be po exploited.

Under these

conditions, their v;orld-view is alienated from the political and

economic realities of the objective vrorld in v/hich they live,
i, personally, am in agreement wiuh Freire's goals,

I am,

hov;ever, tr^ang to point out that Freire’s understanding of

what is hraman is quite culture-bound and, thus, dogmatic.

Another way in v;hich Freire avoids moral responsibility for
his actions was through his use of the concept of "fear of freedom."

He argued that many of the oppressed are afraid of the respon-

sibility of freedom associated

v;ith

liberation and, thus,

tacitly help to perpetuate oppression.

In addition, the oppressors

are afraid to give up their false freedom to oppress and accept
the true freedom of liberation.

If this concept is carried too

far, it can be used to counter any criticism of his theories or

methods.

Instead of thoughtfully dealing with criticism, it

becomes possible to unconsciously deflect it by labeling it as
defensiveness.

Freire wrote that, "Dialogue is an I— Thou relationship betvjeen
two Subjects.

Each time the ’thou’ is changed into an object,

and ’it,’ dialogue is subverted and education is changed to

deformation.

He used Martin Buber’s terminology and, I assume,

intended to use his conception of dialogue.

But Buber pointed out

another with any
that in an I-iou relationship, one cannot approach
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intent in mind.

The dialogical relationship is an end in itself.

He specifically stated that the intention to educate is incompatible

with an I~You relationship.
a deformation.
vihat

Education, then, is always associated with

This places the burden upon

tiiO

educator to decide

kind of deformation to value, and to continually x/restle

with the question of the rightness of that value.
The idea of "consciousness raising" has become widely accepted

by educators and social activists.

But

v/hat

does the tenn mean?

It implies that one kind of consciousness (the consciousness

raiser's) is higher, or better, than another (the consciousness

raisee's).

The v/hole issue of what are the criteria by which one

can be established as being better than another is not generally
addressed.

Indeed, the language masks the issue.

I strongly

suggest that the tern "consciousness changing" be used instead.
It does not automatically imply that one kind of consciousness is

better, or worse than another, and makes it a little more difficult
to hide behind the dogmatic assumption of superiority.

By dwelling upon what 1 see as weaknesses in his philosophy,
I do

not want to overlook the strengths of Freire's concept of

dialogue.

I

strongly support his objectives and I am excited oy

the potentials of his pedagogy.

However, the use of generative

linked to his
themes as psychological tools is not inextricably

dialogical method.

This realization has led many people to

m.isuse of his methods.
express great concern about the potential
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particularly by the United States Agency for International
Development which has demonstrated an interest in them.

The

morality of Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed can not be judged
solely on the basis of written reports.

It can only be judged in

praxis; in the synthesis of reflection and action.

As with any

form of engineering or behavioral technology, the quality of the

world it creates will reflect the quality of the minds and
hearts that employ it.

For this reason, I feel that Freire’s

technique must be linked with Gandhi's value of ahimsa, and

Burtt's approach to understanding.
Social Mutualism

Despite their differences, all four men approached their work

with a Mutuality value orientation, which found expression in their

dialogical methods and philosophies.

An examination of their

methods and philosophies reveals a number of factors which are
characteristic of social mutualism.

These can be arranged into

three clusters, which I will call the elements of social Mutuality.

Element One ; Mutuality occurs within a meaningful whole . Those
who are engaged in a mutualistic interaction are viewed as members
of the same group, not as members of different pseudo-species.

As

such, each is of intrinsic value, and each occupies a meaningful

position within the whole.

Mutualistic acts promote meaningfulness

and x>rholeness, raLher than alienation and fraginentaticn.

Means and

170

ends are not alienated from each other, but are joined end of

equal importance.

Element

Tv;o

;

Mutuality requires openmindednes

.

This means

that one must strive to be free of dogma, which requires thau one

have the humility to recognize one’s limitations.

It is also

necessary that one try to be aware of one’s presuppositions and try
to be free of self-interests which might distort one’s understanding
of others.

Element Three ;

Mutuality promotes the welfare of others .

One

acts not just to promote one’s own welfare, but the welfare of

others as well.

The basic psychological motive which promotes these

acts is love.
Burtt, Gandhi, and Freire did not speak of dialogue in the

ideal sense established by Buber.

They used dialogue as a means

to an end; philosophic understanding, social change, and education.

Their means however, embodied the three elements of social Mutuality.
The difference between them and Buber was that dialogue in Buber’s

sense does not involve a dialectic.

True; there are two or more

parties involved, and they do maintain their separate identities,
without
but while they are in dialogue there is a full communion,

tension or conflict.

The others used dialogue as a means of

forces.
achieving a synthesis of differing ideas, or social

approaches can be
The relationship betv/een these differing
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visuala.zed as a spect-ruin.

At.

one end of the spectrum is the

dialogical, or mutualistic state as formulated by Buber.

It

is an ideal which cannot be actualized in this world,
but tov;ard

which we may elect to strive.
is monologue, or domination.

At the other end of this spectrum
At the domination extreme there is

no possible synthesis of opposing forces, only perpetual antagonism,

The only resolution possible is the complete victory of

one, at the complete destruction of the other.

Thus, a dialectical

synthesis is impossible at either end of the spectrum.

Dialectical conflicts fall between these extremes.

Just where

they fall is determined by the methods employed to achieve a
synthesis.
end,

side.

Gandhi, for example, would lie close to the Mutualistic

Freire might fall closer to the middle, but on the mutualistic
Adolf Hitler would rest far on the domination side.
If we take a closer look at this model, we will recognize that

the methods of dialogue and monologue are in dialectical conflict,
as are the value orientations which underly them. Mutuality and
DoiTiination.^2

The resolution of each dialectical conflict between

ideas or social forces, also involves a resolution of the dialec-

tical conflict between the methods and values v;hich might be
employed.

It behooves us, in this day and age, to try to solve

our social problems by employing methods which fall tovjard the

Dialogue Alutuality end of the spectrum.

With the av;esome military
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power that we now hold in our hands, monologue/Domination may not

mean the victory of one at the destruction of the other, but the
destruction of us all.
Thinking on a more humble scale, the seemingly perennial
human values associated with "good" tend to be identified with
dialogue, and those of "evil" with monologue.

We will be known

and remembered by the synthesis of these two extremes as they are

actualized in the praxis of our lives.
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CHAPTER

IV

ENVIRONMENTAL MUTUALISM

The fir.al victory of man’s machinery over natvres’
materials is the next logical process in evolution,
as nature's control of human society was the
transition from anarchic and pviny individualism to
the group acting as a powerful, intelligent
organism. Machinery, science, and intelligence
moving on the face of the earth may well affect
it as the elements do, upbuilding, obliterating,
and creating; but they are man's forces and will
be used to hasten his dominion over nature.

Simon N, Patten^

Man is amazing, but he is not a masterpiece. . .
Perhaps the artist was a little mad. Eh? VJhat
do you think? Sometimes it seems to me that man
is come where he is not wanted, where there is
no place for him; for if not, why would he v;ant
all of the place? Why should he run about here
and there making a great noise about himself,
talking about the stars, disturbing the blades
of grass?
Joseph Conrad

.

p

In defying nature, in destroying nature, in
building an arrogantly selfish man-centered,
artificial world, I do not see how man can
I have faith in
gain peace or freedom or joy.
latent
possibilities
the
faith
in
future,
man's
in man
faith
is
but
it
experiment:
in the human
forces
the
wjth
as a part of nature, v/orking
that govern the forests and the seas; faith in
man sharing in life, not destroying it.

Marston Bates^

mutualism
To what extent are the three elements of social
environment?
relevant as guides for interacting with our non-human

between human beings and
Obviously, there are enormous differences
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non-hvunan objects, which would appear to argue against the possi-

bility of ervironmental mutualism.

One of the most important of

these is the impossibility of conscious, symbolic communication be-

tween humans and their non-human environment.

We cannot talk

things over with our local ecosystem and reach a mutually

beneficial agreement.^
It is not at all surprising that many of the people who have

written about social mutualism have based their ideas upon the
process of dialogue.

Language plays a central role in the exchange

of information between people, particularly on a conscious level.

Through language we are able to communicate our needs to others,
defend our interests, discuss the views and needs of others, take
steps to correct misunderstandings, and negotiate agreements.

Non-verbal communication has been increasingly recognized as
playing an important part in our interactions

v/ith

each other,

but two people in face-to-face conversation provide the basic
image of social communication.
attempt to
If language is a prerequisite of mutuality, the

environment
establish a mutualistic interaction with our non-human
is doomed to failure.

mutuality.

However, language is not a prerequisite of

orientation
Under the guidance of the Mutuality value

we can act to establish a mutualistic state.

Such a state can be
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defined by the presence of a reciprocal, double-vrin relationship

between the parties involved.

The mutualistic process through

which this state is reached (if, indeed, it is ever actually

achieved for any length of time) involves an exchange of infor-

mation between the parties, and the selection of these actions
vjhich will foster the m.utualistic state.

between the

tv;o

The great difference

is that humans can act with mutualistic intentions

and can exercise conscious choice.

In general, our non-human

environment can do neither.
Language is the major means by which people exchange inforiTiation.

In order to establish dialogue (a form of mutualism)

there must be a reciprocal exchange of information, and each

speaker must try to insure that the interests of the other are
satisfied, rather than each trying to insure their own interests
at the expense of the other.

These characteristics of reci-

procity and double-win are not dependent upon spoken language,
and can be found in modes of interaction other than verbal com-

munication,

Love-making, for example, at its best is a form of

non-verbal dialogue, or mutuality.
Despjte the fact that ve do not interact with our non-human
it in
environment through speech or writing, we are engaged with
a complex exchange of information.

Ecology

is, in large part,

evolution is the selective
a study of these feedback systems, and
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change in these systems through time,

lihat

environment j which in turn influences us,

ve do influences our
VJe

have discovered that

the ways in which we interact with the world arouno us have

profound effect^ upon our health, the availability of resources,
and many other aspects of our lives.

The very perception of our

environmental problems is, at its root, a perception of the feedback
relationship betv;een people and their environment.
People have always been involved in a reciprocal exchange of

information
tacit level,

vri.th

VJe

their environment, although generally only on a
are now trying to incorporate our growing aware-

ness and understanding of these processes into the ways in which
v;e

consciously plan cir lives,

VJe

are discovering that our efforts

shortto dominate our non-human environment in order to achieve

term goals is having harmful long-term effects upon us.

Environ-

mental mutualism will not establish a reciprocal relationship
exists.
between people and their envirorjnent; that already

VJhat

awareness of that
it will do is help us to make wise use of our
the mutual advantage
relationship, and foster acts which will be to
of both parties.

The

u.-rm '-’environmental

Mutuality" might be used in

tv;o viays.

which underlies the way in
The first refers to the value orientation
themselves with respect to the way
which people make decisions among

they interact with their environment.

This is a form of social
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mutualism.

The only distinction is that they are dealing with

each other on issues related to the environment,

I

prefer not

to use "environmental Mutuality" in this sense.

The second- sense ox the term refers to the value orientation

underlying the ways in which individuals and groups interact
with their environment*
and non~humans.

It refers to interactions between humans

Envi.ronmental Mutuality in the first sense was

really dealt with in the third chapter, and I will not explore
it any further here, except as it is relevant to specific issues
v/hich may arise in ny discussion of our interactions with non-

humans.

Rather, 1

iitll

focus upon mutualistic interactions betvreen

Individual people and their non-human ecological environment,

I

will emphasise individual, rather than societal or cultural
interact: ons with the environment, because a familiarity with
this level of interaction will be of a greater immediate relevance
to education.

I

will focus upon interactions with our ecological

environment, rather than

v/ith

individual objects or wholely non-

living aspects of our environment, because it is this level of

interaction

v/liicn

is

iriost

rcj-svant to the central issues of my

dissertation.
It is veiy important to keep in mind that I will not attempt
to advocate specifix. ways in vinich people should physically

interact

vri.th

their environment.

Instead, 1 will try to identify
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the value orientation which should play an important part in

guiding them in their effort to gain knowledge about, and make

decisions concerning their environment and the ways in which
they ought to intei-act with it.

If I give specific examples

of ways in which people can interact with and alter their en-

vironment, it is to illustrate the process involved, rather than
to recommend the specific result of the process.

I

will be

pointing to the values v:hich I feel should underly the ways in

which we decide

hov; vie

should act.

My assumption is that in many

situations, if not most, there is a great variety of behavioral

options which may lead to a wise mutualistic interaction.

Different individuals, societies, and cultures may make very
different, but equally mutualistic and environmentally effective
decisions, which are in harmony with their own special character.

My proposal is that

v/e

foster the mutualistic approach to making

these decisions.
It is, also, important to keep in mind that all value

orientations are always present in a culture.

This implies that

are guided solely
it is impossible to reach the point at which we

by that of Mutuality.

Both Domination

sjid

Submission value

the most
orientations will always be with us, and may be

appropriate guides in some situations.

Although I will be
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focussing aljnost entirely upon Mutuality in my discussion, I
do not propose that Mutuality should become our universal guide.
VJhat

VJhat is this

i^ Nature ?

non-human thing with which we are to interact?

Most people would call it "nature,” or the "natural viorld."
VJhat is

In popuj.ar usage the word appears to refer to

nature?

that part of the world xvhich is not human.

divided into

But

tvjo

parts: humanity and nature.

Thus, the world is

This is the

distinction associated with the Judeo-Christian tradition, in

which people are viewed as the only creatures on earth which
share a spiritual link with God.

least partly supernatural.

In this sense, we are at

However, when we now speak of humanity

that
as distinct from nature, we generally do not mean to say

we are supernatural.^
V/e

us is
can discover what we do mean by asking, "What about

not natural?"

Our teeth, feet, eyes, and legs are natural.

So,

and those for
too, are our needs to sleep, eat, and excrete,
sex, shelter, and warmth.

What of us is not natural?

In answer

to our homes, cities, art
to this question, people often point

clothes, music
machines, politics, books, sciences, religions,

hopes, and dreams.

is natural
The distinction between what of us

leads to the distinction between
and vhat is unnatural generally
sense
culture (in the anthropological
the blc-physical world and

of the word).

What sets us apart from nature is the phenomenon

of culture.

Culture permits us to consciously act upon our environment to
get what we need in order to survive and, hopefully, to enjoy a

quality of life beyond that of mere biological survival.

We

still suffer floods, crop fai].ures, diseases, droughts, rainy
days, and other calamities, but our ingenuity, forethought, and

technology allovr us to alleviate their full potential impact.

Many people, those who are strongly guided by the Domination
value orientation, believe that we will eventually be able to

completely control nature and become totally secure from its
vicisitudes.

Movement in this direction defines their concept

of progress.

There is, hov/ever, a problem v/ith this view.

It implies

that we are apart from nature and can do to it as we please without

repercussions.

It further implies that we can ultimately achieve

complete separation from nature (see figure 5a).

This view is

not in keeping with our ecological understanding of the world.

It

seems to be strongly colored by a wish-fulfillment fantasy: ”If I

close my eyes real tight and wish with

things will go away and

I

a.i.!

my might, all the bad

can get everything

I

want."

From an

from
ecological perspective we are not, and cannot be, separate

nature.

We are within it.

We are a subset of nature, with our
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ovm unique characteristics (see figure

I?b),

Some people might agree, "Yes, ve are animals and share a

common biological identity with the other creatures of this world.
As such, we also depend upon the life supporting ecological

processes, of course.

But there is also something in us which

is outside of nature and uniquely human.

That is our conscious

intelligence, and the cult\iral characteristics which SiB derived

from it," (see figure 5c).
There is a merit to this argument, because we have charac-

teristics which are truely unique.

But if this is the case, then

why do we not also place the unique characteristics of other
Spiders, for example, might

organisms outside of nature?

classify their webs as something outside of nature, as might the

beaver its dam, the archer fish its ability to spit water, and the
whales their sonar.

Are

v/e

not being unnecessarily anthropocentric

in much the same way that a tribal group might ethnocentrically

call itself, "The People?"

Perhaps all we are trying to do is

call ourself, "The Species."

Why is it that we must invest so

unique and
much effort into trying to define ourselves as wholely

superior beings?
used are of innate
It can be arg'^ed that the exaraples I just

whereas culture is learned
traits which are transmitted genetically,

but we are not the only
This would appear to make us different,
animals capable of learning.

We are discovering that some of the
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elements of culture also exist elsewhere in the animal kingdom.

At one time

v:e

defined ourselves as the tool using animal, but

wo found sea otters using stones to open clams, and birds using

cactus spines to probe bark for insects.

We then called

ourselves the tool making animal, until we found chimpanzees

fabricating clubs by pulling twigs and leaves off of branches.

We then said that we

alo.-.*

fabricate tools and save them for

future use, until we found chimps dragging their clubs around

with them.

Even the argument that we alone are capable of

symbolic communication is being questioned.
The capacity for culture has been evolving for a long time,

and did not suddenly appear in our species.

When we examine the

of emerging
living and fossil records we can find many suggestions

pre-human
potentials for culture, both in the line of our

predecessors, and elsewhere in the animal world.
about us.
say that there is not something special

This is not to

Our capacity

it is in any other species
for culture is far more developed than

rather than a qualitative
on earth, but this is a quantitative,

difference.

be a part of nature,
Let us, then, consider culture to

nature.
instead of something separate from

Cultural processes are

processes, just as the
exceptional in contrast to biological
to physical processes.
biological are exceptional in contrast

natural.
however, are of nature and are

All

This may all seem to be a verbal game, but what is of

crucial importance is the world-views which underly the verbal
distinctions.

In the view that

I

am proposing, the terms

"nature" and "natural" cease to have any obvious meaning,

and the human/nature dichotomy is weakened.

Everything is

It will be a lot easier to approach

"nature" and is "natural,"

our non-human environment in a mutualistic manner if vc view

ourselves as linked with, rather than separate from it.
As our power to manipulate the world increased over the

course of the past few centuries, we increasingly saw our

destiny as that of subjugating nature, mastering it, and
forming it as we willed.

The world was viewed as a stage upon

which we conducted the human dance.

The objects in our ecological

environment were seen as stage props, v;hich could be pushed
around as we wished,

VJe

are now beginning to realize, however,

that they are not simply passive props; they are fellow dancers.

We are beginning to realize that the name of the dance is not

Humanity, but Life.

The dance is too important to endanger by

upstaging the other dancers and making them miss their step.
of underThe pattern is subtle indeed, and there is no chance

standing it

withouf-^

paying attention to the detailed interweaving

of choreography and music.

did not matter much
At one time our parts were small and it
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what we did, because our actions were of relatively little significance,

Now, however, we are primadonnas with the power to make

or break the show.

But if the

.-^how

folds, so do we.

But despite

our sense of self-importance we are not too sure just how the

dance goes.

We search for the Choreographer, Director, or

Producer, but we do not know what they look like and cannot recog-

nize them in the crowd, if they are in the crowd at all.
only hope lies in the dance itself:

Our

a great production of music

and motion which could collapse at any moment.
Perhaps we can stumble about for a while, watching, listening,
trying to pick up the steps and rhythm.

As we watch, we discover

well; steps
that the other dancers seem to know their parts very

of song and
flow smoothly as they engage in a complex interplay

dance.

high platform,
We feel that if we were able to watch from a

see, hear, and underand listen with an omniscient ear, we could

stand the grand, ever-changing design.

But we are down on tne

improvise faltering steps and
stage, jostled by the crowd as we

discordant notes.
bluster, we push and stumble
We discover that if, in bluff and
of confusion around us, as
about, we create an expanding wave

knocked down, and their songs are
other dancers are bumped and
have
to begin again, but some
interrupted. They get up and try
discover
and others are limping. We
difficulty finding the melody,

by
motionless, we are overwhelmed
that if we remain silent and
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the others, knocked down ourselves and trampled.

We must discover

the underlying, evolving pattern that unifies our performarices,

and develop our own unique vari-ibions which, although characteris-

tically ours, harmonizes with those of our fellow dancers.

learning slowly, but we are learning.

We are

Let us hope that we can

join the harmony before we have been so disruptive that there is

no dance left to join.
Our task is to learn to interact with our non-human ecological

environment in such a way that the outcome will be to our advantage.
Since we depend upon our environment for survival, and to maintain
lives of a certain quality (whatever that quality may be) the

outcome must also be to the advantage, or at least not to the

detriment of our bio-physical world.
then, is very much like a dance.

find our feet trod upon.

The pattern of interaction,

If we do not dance well, we may

On the other hand, if we find the rhythm

and establish a mutualistic relationship with our partner, we can

enjoy the dance.

We may even be able to change the step a bit and

lead our partner along with us.

There is, however, a limit in the

variation which we can introduce, and to the rapidity with which
v/e

can introduce it.

This is the limit of the laws governing

life and ecological and cultural processes,
partner.
A point of clarification: Nature is not our
is the dance; both dancers and choreography.

N_ature

The dancers are the

objects of our world.
plants, animals, rocks, rivers, and other
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including ourselves.

We are in the dance with them, and are

equally a part of nature.

We are a subset of nature, not distinct

from it.
It would be useful to abandon the use of the word, "nature."

It is a word with many meanings, and which conjures up the

dichotomous human/nature world-view.

In one sense the word

refers to those portions of our v/orld other than humar.i ty and

human culture,

I propose that we use "non-human environment,"

or "bio-physical environment" instead.

ambiguous terms.

They are much less

In a second sense, "nature" refers to plants

and animals in their "natural" environment without human interI find it difficult to discover a word which can

ference.

replace "nature" in this sense, "Ecological environment" is too
"Non-human

broad, because it would include people as well,

ecological environment" is accurate, but awkward.

In the balance

of this dissertation I will use the word, "nature," in this
sense,

I

will not use the word, "nature," to refer bo a system

separate from us, but to refer to the other parts of the greater

system of which we are a part.

There is still some ambiguity in this

iise

of the word,

rather than
because we are creating a dichotomy of convenience,
one which is genuine.

nature?

Is the non-urban landscape of New England

growth forests
The agricultural land and second (or third)
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are the product of intensive human impact.

somewhere

Does the line lie

between cities and active farms, active farms and

abandoned fields, or second growth forests and pristine wilderness?

Where do

body fats?

v/e

place bald eagles which contain DDT in their

We are dealing with a continuuin between the extremes

of untouched nature and an environment of complete human

fabrication (e.g., a

spc« e

capsule).

The dividing line is merely

a useful fiction, and we must not lose sight of this fact.

Another word which we should exercise great care in using,
if not cease to use altogether, is ’’natural,”

First of all, if

everything is a part of nature, then everything is natural
(characteristic of, or a product of nature) and the word ceases
to have meaning.

The greatest problem with the use of this word,

place in
though, does not lie so much in our understanding of our

but in
the physical structure of the universe (our world-view),
significance of our
our understanding of the moral, or religious

environment (our ethos),

’l^^hat

is natural, and therefore beautiful

and therefore ugly
and good, to one person may be uncivilized,
and bad, to another.
two important, but
Paul Santmire has argued that there are

within the society of the
largely unarticuiated religious cults
rustic life,” and the
United States; the "cult of the simple
of compulsive manipulation.”

’’cult

The first, which is a religion of
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nature, is a curreiit expression of the nineteenth century theme.

Nature versus Civilization.

—

Thoreau’s philosophy increasingly popular toda^
is the prototype of the first theme. Nature versus
Civilization, Positively, this theme means the
individual seeks Deity, virtue, and vitality in
nature, especially wild nature, and that he strives
for personal purity and vitality of soul through
communion with the v:orld of nature. So intense is
the relationship to nature which this theme
occasions that there is usually little psychic
energy left for sustained intellectual and moral
involvement in the practical political arena,
whether that be with a view to upholding, transforming, or overthrowing the inherited order.
That is the negative side of the nineteenth
century religion of nature in America, a withdrawal from the organized city of man. That
city is generally viewed as the godless, virtueless, artificial arena of the m.echanized,
mindless, heartless mass-m*an,^

Although this statement does not adequately reflect the social

philosophy of Thoreau, the author of "On the Duty of Civil
Disobedience," it is an extreme statement of an attitude which is
vn.despread among members of the environmental, and back-to-the-land

movements.

The v/ord "natural" thus acquires the meaning of pure,

virtuous, and good,

VJe

are admonished to move out of the city to

a home (built of natural materials) in a natural setting, where we
;^-ill

eat natural foods and act naturally,

"It’s natural," and,

"It’s
"It’s nature’s way," have become modern equivalents to,

God’s will."

Carried to its extreme, everything that is uniquely

human is unnatural and, thus,

bad— a

form of original sin

19U
I

am not suggesting that there is no merit in a great many

“natural” practices.
v;ord

VJhat I do

object to is that this use of the

describes things as being good without reference to the reasons

for their being, good.

In effect, the word has become a smoke

screen, or barrier to clear understanding, behind which the user

hides a bundle of beliefs, dogmas, and presuppositions.

not everything in nature is good from our perspective.

After all,
If they were,

for example, we would not want to cure disease, or store food for

use betv;een growing seasons, because diseases and winter are a
part of nature.

Advertisers are learning to take advantage of this unthinking

assumption that to be natural is to be good.

All sorts of yjroducts

are being sold as "natural,” or "nature's way.”

A notable and

particularly absurd example is the recent promotional campaign
for a brand of cigarette, v;hich contains no

artificial flavoring;

"The natural cigarette is here!"
or
I suggest that we use the words "good” or "bad," "healthy"

unhealthy," "desireable" or "undesirable," or whatever other words
rather than
V7hich indicate the values underlying our statements,

simply saying that something is natural, or unnatural.

Such terms

underlying criteria
are more likely to force us to probe for the
forth, and decide whether
of goodness, health, desirability, and so

or net

v;e

agree with what is being said.
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The ethos underlying what Santmire called the cult of

compulsive manipulation is quite different from that of the
cult of the simple rustic life.

This cult is a religion of

civilization, which grew from a second, conflicting nineteenth

century theme. Civilization versus Nature.

Nature was viewed

as something mechanical, material, and intended to be used for

human ends.
VJhile the Puritan used nature to glorify God by the

fruitful exercise of his Divinely bestowed dominion,
the capitalist used nature to enhance his o’.m enterprise and so to fulfill what he considered to be
his own Divinely ordained destiny. For both, then,
the chief criterion for man's dealing with nature was
utility . Hence we can conveniently refer to this
coalescing of the Puritan doctrine with the apology
for capitalism as the utilitarian view of nature. . .

.

Positively, this religion means that society seeks
to overcome the ancient enemies of mankind: natural
disaster, disease, and, above all, hunger. It also
iTieans that men strive to build a society with a level
of economic productivity and a breadth of popular
distribution of goods which \ri.ll provide the underpinning for political institutions vdiich, in turn,
will prohibit the enslavement of the individual.
Poverty is the door to serfdom; remove the fj.rst and
the second will disappear as well.

At its heart, this is the Domination value orientation.
0 SS ,

points out,

as we see, it has positive features.

"'the

As oantmire

theme Civilization versus Nature was egalitarian,

conservative.
whereas the theme Nature versus Civilization was

civilization was
Similarly, in a religious context, the faith in
that is yet
r'rogressj ve, founded on a vision of a commonwealth
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to come, wh*-ireas the faith in nature generally was regressive,

structured on a vision of a peaceable kingdom that has been lost or
that is in the process of being lost through the incursions

-.f

civilizaticn.
The negative aspects of the religion of civilization led to
our environmental problems.

The negative aspects of the religion

of nature led to a retreat from civilization and the quest for

social justice.

At its extreme it is an expression of the Sub-

mission value orientation.

On the positive side, the former

motivates us to deal with the problems of our society, and the
latter motivates us to deal with the problems of our biophysical
environment.

Neither, however, can help us to solve the major

problems of our day, because they are a reflection of the human/

nature dichotomy and make it difficult to recognize that our
problems may share a common origin.

We need to affirm "both civilization and nature, both the
progressive forces implicit in human society and the rejuvenative
civilization
pov/ers implicit in the wilderness, without setting
or nature in opposition to the other. "9

It is the value

affirmation.
orientation of Mutuality which underlies such an

What is Environmental Mutualism?
social mutualism in
A number of the authors who have exandned
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detail have al-o commented upon mutualistic (or dialogical; interactions with non-humans.

Although they generally did so only in

p'^ssing, and their understanding of non-hunan ecological processes

was limited, it will be useful to examine their ideas, because they

rest upon a sound understanding of mutuality among people.
group of writers has focussed upon what

I

Another

consider to be mutualistic

interactions between people and their bio-physical environment.

An examination of their ideas will be of considerable value to
this discussion, although the strength of the ecological background
is offest by their general unfamiliarity with the sizable

literature concerning mutualistic interactions between people.
(Again, we see the influence of the human/nature dichotomy.)

Perhaps we will be able to achieve some sort of a synthesis of
these two valuable resources.

Edwin A. Burtt’s primary interest was in enhancing philosophic

understanding, and his statements about nature were made in terms
of knowledge about nature.

He believed that love, as he construed

it, is the value which m.ost promotes understanding.

Through

only to
love ”we can respond in open and free sensitivity not
and such
other personas but to any object attracting our attention,

attaining the truth about
a response is the necessary medium for

from selfLove, in Burtt's sense, involves a freedom
promoting the growth
centeredness, combined with an interest in

of the one loved,

Tiiere are two reasons for

this sort of growth.

being interested in

He pointed out that, from a pragmatic point

of view, it is not sufficient to be free of self interest and

act in a neutral manner toward another person.
to the uay in which we interact with them.

People respond

In order to promote

the fullest positive response from them, we must take a

positive interest in then.

This means being interested in

promoting their fullest growth and expression of what is
ixaportant to them.

But ecological systems, populations, and

most individual organisms do not respond to us as do people.
This element in Burtt's philosophy does not apply to most of
our interactions with our environment.

Nevertheless, being interested in promoting the welfare of

another is central to his concept of love, and love is the

motive which promotes the fullest knowledge of another.

An

interest in promoting the welfare of our environment, although
prerequisite
not a pragmatic element of communication, may be a
to an enhanced understanding of it.

However, although it is

recognize
relatively easy to emphathize with other people and

what is in the
what is in their interest, how do we identify
welfare of something that is not human?

This is one of the

and will be dealt
problems central to environinental mutualism
wi’th

later in this chapter,

Burtt offers us no help here.
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He does, however, provide us with the insight that love is the

guiding motive central to the fullest knowledge of, and mutualistic

irberactions

v.'ith

our environment.

For love in its widest meaning, is simply an intense,
positive interest in an object. When we love a thing
we become deeply engrossed in it with all our senses.
This is true whether the thing is a woman or a flower,
a food or a landscape, a song or a philosophical theory.
In each case we want to come into the closest possible
contact with i’’ — tolook at it, touch it, listen to it,^^
This particular description of love is reminiscent of Martin

Buber's philosophy,

Buber believed that the relationship between

a person and arg/thing else, be it person, animal, rock, or tree,

can be established on either an I-You, or an I-It basis.

In

the It-world I can know a tree as its separate qualities, classify
it, note its parts, understand the v;ay it functions, and overcome

its uniqueness.

In the You-world the tree becomes vinique and

all of the It-qualibies become fused.

He called this a relation-

"Does the tree then have consciousness,

ship of dialogue.

similar to our own?

I

have no experience of that.

But thirJcing

that you have brought this off in your case, must you again divide
the indivisible?

VJhat I

encounter is neither the soul of a tree nor

a dryad, but the tree itself.

1

p

This kind of close personal feeling of relatedness with a

part of nature is important.

It deals with nature not as an abstract

reality.
er*ological process, but as an individually meaningful
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Ecological theory tends to be abstract, alienated knowledge.
It must be linked with a personally meaninglul felt relationship

with nature before

welfare of the

v:e

can expecL people to genuinely value the

-non-hujiian

environment,

Mohandas Gandhi had almost nothing to say about nature.
He did, though, believe that, ”To see the unive:^sal and all-per-

vading Spirit of Truth face to face one must be able
the meanest of creation as oneself, ”^3

love

it is not clear to me

whether he was referring to animal creation in general, or to the
lower social classes of India,

In either event, he

vias

speaking

primarily of a principle of huinility,
Paulo Freire did write about human interactions with nature,
if he meant, "nature," when he wrote, "the world."

He viewed the

world as the setting for human conflict and dialogue.

Dialogue

cannot take place under oppressive conditions and, thus, cannot
be used as an instrument of domination,

"The domination implicit

it is the
in dialogue is that of the world by the dialoguers;

conquest of the world for the liberation of men,"^

He seemed

nature which Leiss
to be echoing the theme of domj.nation of
criticized.

though, because
It is difficult to be sure of this,
"The

ecological theme.
Freire was not specifically addressing an
in his writings.
world" could have either of two meanings

In
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one sense, the world is the world of natural resources from which

people derive their physical and economic wellbeing.
sense, it is the

hman

In another

social reality, v;hich can be transformed

through an historical, dialectical process,

Huey P, Newton made comments similar to Freire's during his
conversations with Eric Erikson in 1971,

He demonstrated, however,

a greater ecological sophistication than had Freire,

People have always struggled against nature, and
it is impossible for us who are struggling for the
necessities of life, who have to set up our own
survival programs, to talk about the struggle
ending. The difference between us and the
capitalists, though, is that we want a rational
relationship with nature, VJe know that the
capitalists have put us in a situation where
nature cannot support us; and because we have not
yet discovered the source of life, vre cannot
support nature either. So our struggle is twofold: we struggle to survive and gain power over
our environment, and we struggle to have a rational
relationship with that environment,- Like I've
said, we are a part of nature ourselves, so we
think the difficulties vie have with the environment are all in the family, you might say, and
can be solved without hostility. The capitalists are not a part of that family. They are
madmen and will destroy nature as well as us, so
our struggle to survive and gain a rational
relationship with the natural world is
directed toward getting rid of these madmenl^
V/hat

Newton seems to have meant by "a rational relationship

will continue to
with nature” is a relationship in which nature
our survival.
provide us with whatever is needed to insure
us.
is valued only foi its usef-ulness to

Nature

His valxie orientation

20 ?
is one of Domination j we do what is necessai"^ to get our

ovor.

way.

The Domination approach to nature is underscored in his comments

which preceded those quoted abore.
V/e' believe that the primaiT- motivating drive of
people is a vri.ll to power, a drive to free themselves from both external and internal controls.
But we do not believe that this drive necessarily
ends in the domination of one group of people
over another: it is only because people lack
knowledge and technology that their natural drive
for control has been distorted into a desire
for power over people rather than a desire for
power over things .

So we can conceive of a time when people will
not find it necessary to steal power from other
people. Given a high level of technological
knowledge, people will control the universe
instead. They will m.ake the stars go in the
direction they desire, and then they can resolve

their differences peacefully.

Although both he and Freire are working for a mutualistic
relationship between people (the oppressed), their proposed relationship with nature is not one of Mutuality; it is strongly

motivated by the desire to dominate.

Neither, then, has much

mutualism.
to offer us in our attempt to understand environmental

Human interactions with our environment are quite complex,
positive
and it will take much more than love, or an intense,

interest in nature to solve our problems.

A large part of the

simply with
complexity lies in the fact that we are not dealing

our objective environment.

believe it to be.

We are dealing with our vjorld as we

Our hopes, expectations, and mythologxc-^

.

-<^7
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a role in cre atinr; our environment as

v;e

understand it,

VJe

need to find a way in which to integrate the meaningful environ-

ment which exists as an image in our minds, and the objective
ecological reality which science is trying to understand.
In her essay, "A Postcard from Delphi," Madeline Doran
exarp.ined

some of the elements associated with the development

of our inner image of a place.

In this case, she examined the

differences in the feelings evoked by the landscapes of Oatman,
an Arizona ghost town, and Delphi, Greece,

The physical land-

scape of each place make their own unique psychological impact

upon the visitor.

She felt, however, that the major source of the

difference lay not so much in the physical site, but in the

historical and cultural associations that the visitor projects
upon it.
This is particularly the case with Delphi,

"Even a Christian,

an agnostic, or an atheist may feel, in the great mountain amphi-

theater, the rumbling thunder, and the circling eagles, the

numinousness of Delphi,

Why?

Because the place itself is in\ested

celebrateo it, 111 ?
with ancient myth and the enduring poetry that has
-

Oatman, on the other hand, lacks a history.

•

The visitor is

lived in the area
unaware of the history of the natives who had
record of geological
before the European conquest, or of the ancient
landscape itself.
events preserved in the rocks of the naked
time that no lasting
White men had lived there for so short a

historical impression had been left.

The visitor, then, comes

without a mythic image

c,o

project upon the town.

It is a dead

landscape.
Lavn-ence Durreil shared her view that there is a special

relationship between h'oman history and the landscape within

which it was set.

lie

added the thought that the landscape

projects its influence upon us as well.

He has argued that the

character of a nation is largely created by the influence of its
landscape upon its people.

Thus, when we visit a country we

should pay as much attention to its landscape as we do to its
cities and people, if we wish to understand it fully.
It is a pity indeed to travel and not get this essential sense of landscape values. You do not need a
sixth sense for it. It is there if you just close
your eyes and breath softly through your nose; you
will hear the whispered message, for all landscapes
ask the same question in the same whisper, ”1 an
watching you are you watching yourself in me?‘'^°

—

In other words there is an interaction between people and their

landscape which creates a new relationship, which is greater than
either alone.

It is a blend of both, and we cannot understand

either without recognizing the reality of this new synthesis.
perspective to
In A God Within Rene Dubos added an ecological
vrrote.
the kind of perception of which Co ran and Durreil

He, too,

a people and
pointed to the complex and subtle interplay beU^een

its environment.

resources
The climate, biological and geological

of the landscape
ecological character, and ae-^thetic qualities

exert a strong influence upon the people who live within it.
the same time, the people change the landscape in order

individual and cultural values.

to

At

realize

The product of this interplay is

the unique quality which we notice in each place we visit.

quality is called the "spirit” of the place.

This

It is the product,

not 01 just the people, or of their environment, but of both in
concert.

This is an important concept.

The spirit is unique in each

place, because the people and land of each place have their own

special characteristics.

This is a much more inclusive concept

than are those of ecology or culture, in their traditional usage.
It implies that when we change one, we will inevitably change the
other, as well.

This means that when

"we

act to change our

environment, we must question not just what

but what we want of ourselves.

vie

want of the land,

Likewise, when we act to change

our society, we must be aware that this may also lead to changes
in our environment,

Dubos called for a new, enlarged approach

to ecology; and ecology of the spirit of place.

environment can
He recognized that there are limits to v/hich an

change and still maintain a viable ecosystem.

The arctic, for

and only then
example, may only be able to support a tundra,

under conditions of a limited impact by people.

The temperate

a va -iety of ecosystems.
/•egions of the world, however, can support
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Dubos suggested that each area has its
’’vocations.”
0'’e

That is,

v:e

ca:i

ov.-n

set of potential

alter an area in order to realize

of these vocations and still maintain a viable ecosystem.

This means that we must determine vrhat are the vocational
potentials, or ecological possibilities of an area before
In determining which of the possibilities

we act to alter it.
to actualize, we must

personal values

vie

alo

consider which of our cultural and

wish to preserve or enhance in the new

spirit of place that will be created.
Dubos’ spirit of place is the product of a reciprocal

relationship between the land and its people.

By calling for

a new kind of ecology, he is calling for a conscious, mutualistic

approach, which will resolve human/environment conflicts in a

manner which is favorable to both.

The new ecology, as a

sciences.
science, would be a synthesis of the natural and social

because
In application, however, it would be much broader,
prescription.
it would go beyond description and analysis, to

values and aspirations
It would apply the combined knowledge of the

environmental engineering, and
of the people, ecological analysis,
spirit.
other relevant fields, and create a new

much an art as

a.

It would be as

science.

kind of ecology.
There is a great need for this new

This

example, in the problem of the
is particularly evident, for

Sahelian drought.

appears to be
The Sahel region of North Africa
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becoming a desert.

This is publicly accepted as the product of

a regional drought, but ecological analysis has suggesteo that it
is the result of the impact of economic and agricultural aid

programs, exacerbated by an arid climate.
The people of the region are largely nomadic herdsmen.

wealth is measured in teims of cattle on the hoof.

Their

As the human

population of the region increased, so too did the hci^is.
There was, however, relatively little water in the region, which

limited the number of cattle it could support.

Foreign aid programs

attempted to solve this problem by sponsoring the drilling of new
wells.

This only created another problem, because once water

became readily available the ecological factor which next limited
herd size was the amount of available pasture land.

The effort

to make water available by drilling deep wells has resulted in

an increase in the herd size, and in overgrazing,^^

As a result of their concept of wealth the nomads have no

desire to limit their* herd size.

The trampling of hooves around

expanding
the boreholes has destroyed vegetation and begun small,

desert areas.

An additional problem was created by French efforts

to introduce cash crops to the area.

"With the best lands given up

people had to bring
to the cultivation of cotton and peanuts,

their own food.
the more marginal lands into use to grow

In many

not take the strain
cases these ecologically fragile zones could
of intensive agriculture.

Chad has emphasized the
The United States agricultural aid to
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f 3.1‘iiis

based upon

practices of our country.

"the

intensive^ mechanized agricultural

The Chineses aid had led to the con-

struction of rice paddies in the drought-stricken region,

Ir.

each case, the visiting specialists have projected their image
of the ideal agricultural landscape upon the Chadinian landscape.

These were culturally biased approaches, which were not

necessarily the most appropriate for Chad.

A mutualistic approach

would have tried to get beyond cultural bias and determine what
is the most viable approach in the unique Chadinian ecological

and cultural context.

Both situations, the aid that originally brought on the
drought, and the aid extended to help solve the problem, are

examples of what Paulo Freire called cultural invasion.

No

real effort had been made to devise aid programs v/hich would

become an integral extension of the historical culture of the
region.

Ever, if it

had not led to a drought, the aid probably

would have created an alienating agricultural system.

This is a

commonly heard complaint about Western aid programs in general.

Many of the problems of the green revolution are associated
with the cultural impact of changes in agricultural practices.
On the most fundamental level, for example, it is not sufficient

simply to produce more food, it must also be eaten.

However,

each culture has its own ideas of vxhat foods arc acceptable,

and few, if any, accept all of the eatable food in their
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enviroiuTient,

In the United States, for exair.ple, few people

are prepared to eat dogs, acorns, or termites.
are readily acceptable in other cultures.

Yet these foods

The difference between

what is, or is 'not acceptable can also be much more subtle.
The Rockefeller Foundation supported a prograia to develop a

variety of corn, called opaque-2, which has a high lysine content.

Most

com

is deficient in this amino acid, and this can lead to

protein deficiency in people whose diet depends heavily upon
corn.

Despite its obvious

dietary’’

advantages, hov;ever, opaque-2

has received poor acceptance in Colombia,
In the lowlands, v;here most of the country's com is
grown and eaten, the people are used to flinty-hard
and lustrous kernels, in contrast to the chalky and
(To urban
dull-appearing kernels of opaque-2 com.
differenthese
product,
consumers buying the packaged
people
the
ces are unnoticeable, and in the highlands
Also,
already eat a corn that is soft in texture).
farmers find that opaque-2 corn does not store
as well as the flint varieties and suffers more
insect damage both in the field and in the crib.
Rural housewivevS, for their part, report that
opaque-2 com grinds less well and cooks differently.

The problem can probably be solved through further breeding

experiments, which nay produce corn varieties without these
drav;backs.

But Colombia did not feel that it had the time to

designed to change
wait, and started a public education program

consumer tastes.

This is a small, almost inconsequential, example

of cultural disruption.

It does, though, illustrate how subtle

?10

the change can be.

Still greater disr-aptions can be associated with tne technology
of the green revolution.

It io a high technology entei-prise

involving special hybrid seed, intensive use of fertilizers,
irrigation, large scale monoculture, and mechanization.

This

requires a radical change in the agricultural practices of Third
VIorld farmers.

It can also increase the disparity of '.ncome

between the poor and wealthy, because the marginal farmers cannot
afford either the technology, the seed, or the risk of losing a
single crop.

The wealthy can afford to take the chance of in-

creasing their income by increasing their production.
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V/hether or not a green revolution program will become a

cultural invasion depends in large part upon whether its

implementation is guided by the values of social domination,
or social mutualism.

V/hether or not it will establish a mutualisoic

relationship with the non-human environment also depends, in
part, upon the way in which the professional agricultural

experts interact with the local farmers.
vrithout
The potential for applying green revolution technology

high.
regard for the welfare of the environment is quite

Never-

that the technology
theless, much research is being done to insure

and the environment are compatible.

best knowledge of

a

But the people who have the

specific agricultural environment are often
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the local farmers.

Unfortunately, the "experts" often dismiss

such people as being ignorant, or backward.

As Brown and

Pariser have pointed out, "we must encourage the examination of
local problems in terms of the use and improvement of local

technologies which are often quite sophisticated and the result
of centuries of development."^^
In a similar vein, P.obert Anderson has pointed out that

the professional experts can learn much about the development

of deep water rice culture in Bengladesh by talking with the

local experts.
.there are already many experts in the field.
These are the farmers who have gained good harvests
in tricky conditions, in floods where water is 12
feet deep, where rice has to be harvested by
clinging to upturned jars and swimming back to the
boat, where each different current calls for
different plant- type, where the plants’ roots
are often not in the ground but actually floating.
Given the nature of research and its isolation from
the actual practice, will scientists and technologists learn from these experts before they begin
to "improve" the technique which has evolved over
hundreds of years
.

.

to
The approach to applying green revolution technology seems

agribe changing, and there is a growing cooperation between

cultural and behavioral scientists.

The emerging perspective

Pariser when they wrote,
is perhaps best summed up by Brown and
be taken for granted;
"The time is past when ’West is best’ can

arrogant and much
’adopt and adapt’ is surely ler. offensively

more to the point.

This is a mutualistic attitude.

It is an
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attitude which seems to be gaining wider acceptance for quite

pragmatic reasons.
As we can see, social mutualism and environmental mutua'ism

are sometimes not easily separated from each other.

Ideally,

environmental mutualism involves our trying to clarify our core
of truth; the needs, desires, and values which we wish to

preserve in the synthesis.

It also involves trying to clearly

establish nature's truth; that is, the dynamic processes which
support life, and which must be honored if we wish life (including

our own) to continue.

There are universal h\iman needs, and there

are values which are unique to each culture, and we should try
to preserve both.

In a similar manner, there are universal

ecological processes, and there are distinctive ecological
elements in each ecological setting, which must be preserved if

we are to preserve its character.

These must all be taken into

consideration when we make a mutualistic decision.

The Elements of Environmental Mutuality
The things of our minds have for us a greater toughness
p,,
than external reality.
John Steinbeck^

—

to
Mutualistic decisions can be made only with reference

environment.
specific people within the context of their specific

that this or that
It is impossible, then, to abstractly state

decision or act is mutualistic.

I want,

insteau, to examine the
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process by which

can go about making nrutualistic decisions.

v/e

More specifically,

I

am trying to identify the attitudes and

values which underly that process.
At the conclusion of the previous chapter

I

identified three

elements which appear to underly the value orientation of

Mutuality as applied in a social context.

The list was based

upon a study of the model of interpersonal dialogue.

To what

extent do these elements apply to environmental mutualism?
Let us examine each of the three elements and their relevance to

our interactions with our non-human ecological environment.
Again, it is important to keep in mind that we are dealing with
an artificial dichotomy, and that there is no clear distinction

between the extremes of "totally human," and "totally without
human influence,"

Element One ; Mutuality Occurs VJithin a Meaningful

previous chapter

I

^Afhole

.

proposed that, dialogue can occur only when

the parties are joined as members of a larger whole.

It is

important to recognize that the way in which our non-human

environment interacts with us differs from the way in v:hich we
interact with it.

The fundamental difference lies in the

phenomena of self-consciousness and mind.

Our ecological

environment is aviare of our presence in the sense that it
it is aware.
^esoonds to our actions, but it is not aware thet
for, or worry about
It is not self-conscious and does not plan

In the

ita future, and it lacks our rich inner life of conscious and

unconscious dreams, fantasies, and desires.

Instead, it responds

to the circumstances which exist in the present.

There are, then, two senses in which we must speak about

being a member of a larger whole.

The first is that of the

ob jec tive whole ) the ecological and evolutionary patterns within

which we are embedded, and which birthed and nourishes us.
The second can be called the ”felt whole" or the psychological

whole ; the unit in which we exist cognitively, mythically,
and emotionally.
It has become well established that we, and all of the

other lives on this earth, do indeed exist as parts of a larger

ecological and evolutionary whole.

EnvironiT*ental mutualism and

our ecological problems cannot be understood vnthout reference
to this concept.

The problem is that this insight is not a

part of the reality of our day-to-day lives.

In 1837, Charles

Darwin wrote: "If we choose to let conjecture run wild, then
animals, our fellow brethren in pain, disease, death, suffering
and famine— our slaves in the most laborious works, our

companions in our amusements

— they

may partake of

oiur origj.n

together.
in one common ancestor— we may be all melted
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theory has, in
In the intervening 1^0 years his evolutionary
scientific commun-'tjT'ovised form, becorri -^videly accepted in t-ne

PIS

However, in the psychological lives of the general public, and
of many scientists, the "melting together" has, at best, progressed

slowly.

Ernst

May-r has

argued that it took nearly 250 years for

evolutionism to become accepted; a process which began about l80
years before, and continued roughly 70 years after the publication
of Darwin's The Origin of Species .

This long period of time over

which the evolutionary view of the world became accepted does not
seem to conform to Thomas Kuhn's theory^^ that revolutionary

changes in scientific thought occur quite rapidly.

Mayr explained

this by arguing that the Darwinian revolution in biology was more

complex than is usually thought,

"The long time span is due to

the fact that not simply the acceptance of a new theory was

involved, as in some other scientific revolutions, but of an entirely

new conceptual world, consisting of numerous separate concepts and
beliefs.

And not only were scientific theories involved, but

also a whole set of metascientific credos.

Of the six changing elements which he reviewed, three involved
scientific theory.

First, the accepted view of the earth's age

had to expand enormously, from theories of a young earth (about

6,000 years old), to one of treat antiquity.

Only then would

we have the span of time necessary for evolutionary change to
take place.

We also had to view change as taking place continually,

at all.
rather than in sudden, catastrophic events, or not

Third,

^16
vre

had to racogntzo

thcit.

evolution does not progress in a line of

increasing perfection from the lowest to the "more evolved" highest.
Instead, evolution had to be seen as involving change in adaptative

response to environmental circumstances, without necessarily

producing ijriprovemeno in an absolute sense.
The last three elements v;ere not simply scientific, but
related to religious, philosophical, and other aspects of our

cultural wor].d-view.

For example, we had to accept the evolutionary

process as something which worked on its own, without the necessity
of a god residing outside of nature who continually tinkers

with

also had to break out of the essentialist view

the creation.

V/e

of the world.

This philosophy, first put forth by Plato, proposes

that the v;orld of our experience is an expression of fundamental,

discrete, and imm.utable forms, or essences, which underly it.
In biological terms, the view of species as expressions of

typologically discrete and jjnmutable essences is incom.patible
with evolution as
of organisms.

x-he

chajiging genetic composition of a population

Finally, we had to do away with our anthropocentric

view of the world as something which exists for our benefit; a
view with which we have not completely done away.
It is net surprising that it took so long for the scientific

And it is not surprising

community to accept the evolutionary

viev;.

that the public in general ?s

still greater difficulty.

’-'rving
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Although the Darvrinian i-evolution may have taken place in the

biological sciences, it is still in progress in the world of
the non~biologist

,

After all, the Copernican revolution has

not completely altered our world view; we

still,

speak of the

sun rising and settj.ng, as if it were revolving around us.

It is much more useful to an astronomer to use the sun as the

central reference point In our solar system than it is to use the
earth.

In our everyday lives, however, it is simpler to place

the earth at the center of our psychological universe.

of us are not

tri''ing

Most

to navigate from one planet to another.

The same cannot be said about our narrowly anthropocentric

view of our world.

Wo are trying to move about within our

ecological environraent, and anthropocentrism is not necessarily
our best point of reference.

But is it possible not to be anthropocentric?
has argued that it is not.

W, H, Murdy

All species value, in an evolutionary

sense, their survival over that of other species,

”To be

anthropocentric is to affirm that mankind is to be valued more

highly than other things in nature

—by

man.

By the same logic,

spiders are to be valued more highly than other things in

nature

— by

spiders.

It is proper for men to be anthropocentric

and for spiders to be arachnocentric.

living species.

This goes for all other

Thus, we value those parts of our environment
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which are instrumental

to

our survival.

He pointed out, though, that we are discovering that more
su'.d

more parts of nature are of instrumental value to us.

His

view of anthropocentrism, then, is based upon ”the recognition
that an individual’s well-being depends on the well-being
of both its social group and ecological support system.

He went on to wi^ite that^ ”An anthropocentric faith in mankind

affirms that we are not isolated monads acting out absurd roles

within a meaningless context, but that we are essential elements
of a meaningful whole and that our individual acts are vitally

significant to the self-actualization of the process of human

evolution itself and to the enhancement of value in the world.
Gchv;eitzer and Leopold have pointed out that we tend to

recognize fellow members of our group to be of intrinsic value.
whole, that
Once we recignize that we are part of an ecological

whole is likely to be viewed as being of intrinsic value.

This

the whole to
does not mean that we will not also use parts of

satisfy our needs.

and
It does mean that our total environment

instrumental value to us.
its parts will be of more than simply

Murdy's article
Despite its avowed focus upon anthropocentrism,

became a discussion of Mutuality.
model of our
Just as astronomers prefer a sun-centered
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solar system j not becauise

sii

earth-centered model could not work,

but because it is far too cuiiibersome j so, too, we must switch to
a view which recognizes our relatedness to, and the intrinsic

value of the whole system of w'nich we are a part.

We must do this

not because it is .inconceivable that we could accomplish the
same results by valuing the individual parts of nature for their

intrinsic value to us.

».e

are discovering that a careful analysis

can lead us to recognize the value of a multitude of parts which

were not previously recognized to be of an obvious instrumental
value.

But the careful examination of all of the parts and

their complex interactions as they relate to each of our decisions
is simply far too cumbersome a task,

Murdy’s reference to a "meaningful whole" is important.

Evolutionary biology and ecology have identified and explored
the processes of the objective whole of which we are all part.

Psychologically, however, few people tacitly feel themselves
to be a part of that whole.

To most of us, the people and

"things of our everyday experience have a much more meaningful

and concrete reality.

How do we integrate ecological abstractions

values,
into the context of our psychological needs, cultural

and historical background in a meaningful v/ay?
creates an
The sheer magnitude of the ecological whole
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enormous problem.

It is dirficu3.t enough Toi people to avoid

ethnocentrism and the creation of pseudocpecies, and to deal
vjith

all of humanity as a

corrara''al

unit.

How can we deal with

something as v^st as all life, or the ecosphere?

It is

probably impossible to do so without resorting to metaphor
and syjabol,

"Mother Earth" and "Spaceship Earth," for example,

are metaphors which incorporate some of the key concepts.

The photographs of the earth taken from an Apollo capsule

presents an important visual symbol; the image of the fertile
earth rising above the horizon of the sterile luriar landscape.
In time, we must evolve still more powerful metaphors and

symbols, which provide psychologically palpable and evocative

references to complex holistic units and concepts.

Another approach to dealing with the problem of enormous
scale is that of actually reducing the scale on whj.ch we are

interacting.

E. F.

Schumacker's book, S mall is Beautiful , has

stimulated a great deal of discussion in this area, particularly
as it relates to our social, economic, and tecnnological scale.

It has been argued that small scale

technology-'’

and decentralized

political systems allow people to become more consciously
involved v/ith, and in control of the forces which influence their
lives.

This philosophy has influenced the back-to-the-land,

self sufficiency, and homesteading movements.

There is also
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value in thin app-^oach to our envirorunent, In addition to its

value as an approach to social systems.

For example, it is

much easier to understand and meaningfully interact with
a fann woodlot^than with an Arabian oil field which is several

thousand miles away.

Small scale, localized systems are more

immediately a part of our experience.

Nevertheless, many of

our environmental problems are on a global scale and we cannot
avoid dealing vzith an environment of enormous magnitude.
In addition to comprehending what it is that we are related
to, we have the problem of identifying the ways in which we are

related to it.
us?

What is our relationship with the world around

In the predominantly Domination approach, we seem to view

our environment as an enemy to be subdued ("the conquest of

nature"), or as a slave to be mastered ("Harnessing the forces
of nature for the betterment of humanity").

Alternatively, the

"Mother Nature" metaphor involves a parent/child relationship.

But even this sense of the way in which we are related to the
world around us may be problematic.
EridiFromia has noted that the easiest and most frequent

models for relatedr.ess are those of the primary ties of
infant relationships,

"We see it in the matriarchal religions in

the soil
which the Great Mother and goddesses of fertility and of

are worshipped.

There seems to be an attempt to overcome the

primary tie to mother and earth in the patriarchal religiona, in
which the great father, the god, king, tribal chief, law, or
state are objects of worship. "3u

But these are relationships of

submission to a superior authority.
dence, rather than maturity.

They foster a childlike depen-

But over the past few thousand years

a new vision of relatedness on the larger scale has developed.

It emphasizes a filial bond of broi-herhood and sisterhood, which

provides solidarity, without restriction upon freedom,

’'This

is the reason why the solution of brotherliness is not one of

subjective preference.

It is the only one which satisfies the

two needs of man: to be closely related and at the same time
free, to be part of a whole and to be independent. "35

Fromm wrote primarily of relationships between people.
However, might his comments provide some insight into our

relationship with our environment?

The relational model of

enemy or slave is appropriate to Domination, but not to

Mutuality.

The model of nature as parent may be appropriate to a

value orientation of Submission, but not to Mutuality,

(It is

interesting, also, to reflect upon our environmental problems
asserting
in light of the psychoanalytic analogy of the child
its identity by rejecting, or destroying its parents.)

Perhaps

provide a
the model of brother and sister relationships can
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•useful metaphor.

This was the view, in spiritual terms, of St.

Francis of Assisi.

Contrary to Church doctrine, he believed that

all of the earth's creatures shared in the same spark of div'i-uty

that was in peo'ple.

His idea of what was a creature was quite

broad, and included Brother Sun, Sister Moon, Brother Fire, and

Sister Bodily Death.

His extremes of asce'bicism certainly

cannot provide a model for our larger society, but his fellow-

feeling with the world about him may.

In any event, we need a

new image of the world which is meaningfulj an image of our world
which can be savored, loved, respected, and which fulfills our
need for relatedness.

Perhaps a sense of filial relationship

with the creatures of the earth will meet this need; perhaps
not.

The scientific view of our world provides a view of the

whole, but it alone is not sufficient.

In some way it must be wedded

with our personal and cultural vision of our environment.

Our

interpretation of the personal meaning oi a scientific theory
is not a scientific process.

It involves the interplay with the

the
scientific view, of our conscious and unconscious needs,

host of
historical and mythical context of our culture, and a

other factors.

It is here where the objective ond psychological

wholes come together.
mer>ning of the
Our interpretation of the psychological

probably will not be
scientific, ecological view need not, and
scientific in nature.

way we
It is, however, important that the

whole not conflict witn
behave in the world of our psychological

22U

our continued well being in the world of our objective whole.
On the other hand, we should not accept a view of our world which
ic scientifically accurate, but which is alienating,

I

that we be g-aided in our selection by a principle which
ca]l The Embrace :

propose
I

will

When confronted by differing psychological

interpreations of the objective view of our world which are
equally compatible with

''lat

view, we should embrace those

which are the most meaningful.
The means by which we achieve our ends should no: be

alienated from those ends.

One cannot achieve mutualistic ends

by means of either dominative or submissive methods.

It is

possible to give the impression of so doing (by manipulating
people into making a preselected decision, for example), but
there is a fundamental difference betv/een pseudo-mutualistic
and mutualistic processes.

Mutuality is

bom

of the belief that

the other person or thing is of genuine value, and is an

important part of the process by which we came to understand

our vjorld and make decisions about how we shall conduct our
lives.

If this belief is based upon a truthful understanding

genuinely mutualistic
of this process, then a failure to act in a
our lives.
manner genuinely diminishes our understanding and
toward
Mutualism is more a process through which we work

certain objectives, than it is the ends themselves.

At the same time, mutualism is not simply a technique for
achieving our ends.

It is more a way of living.

To the t-xtent

that we embrace the values of mutualism, we will genuinely be

motivated to apt in a mutualistic manner.

To the extent that we

do not, we will be motivated by either a will to dominate, or
the futile sense of submission.

These psychological motives will

give shape to the vforld which we create around us.

If we believe

that means and ends are closely bound together, if we value the

welfare of others, and if we recognize that we have human
limitations, we are likely to value nonviolence.

However, life

and death are inseparable, and we cannot live without altering
the world aroiind us and taking other lives.

Is, then, it

possible to be nonviolent toward our non-human environment?

I

believe that it is possible in a limited sense, but that we can
never live in a way which is completely without environsiental
violence.

Although there is no way in which we can avoid

violence, it is possible to avoid unnecessary violence.

But

what violence is, or is not necessary?
Although small scale disturbances of our environment are
impossible to avoid, there are large scale disturbances which

we must avoid.

If, for example, we destroy our ecosystem, or

ourselves
the ozone layer in our atmosphere, we will destroy
as well.

Obviously we should avoid so doing.

It is
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relatively easy to deal with the issues of envirormental violence

when we are dealing with clear issues of physical survival.

It

is the grey areas where psychological and cultural needs of
a non-survival -nature conflict with the interests of our non-hur.an

environment that the problem of violence becomes more ambiguous.

Should we eat meat, vegetables, or both?
for shelter and fuel?
or aesthetic pleasure?

Should we cut trees

Should we plant gardens for either food
To what extent, and by what means should

we control agricultural pests, disease organisms, unsightly weeds,

human and non-human populations?
Although we cannot achieve total nonviolence,

vje

can be

This

motivated by the desire to avoid unnecessary violence.

means that we will have to work, on both the individual and
societal level,

to define what is environmental violence,

and what it is not, and to what extent it is necessary.

It

is important that we be motivated by this value, that we recognize

the intrinsic value of others, and that we accept responsibility

for our actions.

This should temper our actions, and contribute

to an emerging environmental mutualism.

Element Two i Mutuality Peouires Openmindedness .

Humility,

being
in the sense of being aware of one's shortcomings or not
arrogant, is a prerequisite of openmindedness.

Domination is the idea that we can do anything.

Inherent in

Submission is
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based, ia parb, on the perception that we can do nothing.

Mutuality,

however, involves the middle ground; it involves the perception that
oe are neither pov/erless, nor omnipotent.

It is, then, important

that we he aware of both our strengths and our limitations.

The belief

that,

there is a technological solution to all,

or most of our environmental problems is a modern form of hubris.

This is evident, for exoMpie, in the approach of the United

States medical establishment

tx)

the problem of cancer.

By far,

the greatest human and financial resources are devoted to

cancer treatment, and the search for cures.

Essentially, this

is an effort to employ medical technology to achieve control

over the disease.

The Submission approach to the problem would

be to give in and accept cancer as an inevitable facet of our
lives,

A m*utualistic approach, however, would probably emphasize

a preventative solution.

It is known that the majority of

cancers are the result of environmental factors, and we should
be able to identify these factors and avoid them.

The preventative

approach, however, is based upon the recognition of the limitations

we
inherent in human biology and technology , and of the fact that
health.
must refrain from some activities in order to maintain our

This is not a very popular idea.

Many of us even want to lose

exercise habits.
v;eight without altering either our diet or

The debates over whether or not we should build either

nuclear weapons, or nuclear power plants provides another
example, because much of the deoate is generated by differing

opinions about the nature of

hijiraan

abilities.

The proponents

of both feel that "fail safe" devices can be designed and built
into the systems.

Opponents feel that there is not such thing

as a system which is safe from failure, because there is not

such thing as an infallable human being.

If one accepts the

idea that we are not infallible, then we must be extremely

cautious about building devices through which a mistake can
be magnified into a holocaust.

With humility comes a changed perception of our importance
in the world.

As our sense of our self-importance is reduced,

our sense of the relative importance of the other life on earth
should increase.

This may be expressed both in the 'onder standing

that our lives are entwined with theirs, and in the view that

other lives are of intrinsic value.

The recognition that our

powers are limited and that other lives are of intrinsic value
is a fundamental aspect of environmental mutualism.

other
It is impossible for us to live without threatening
lives.

We are biological organisms and depend upon other

organisms for food.

personal
In addition, we all have cultural and
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needs which conflict with the needs of other lives, both human and
If this is so, then it is impossible for us to be

non-human.

totally without self-interest in our interactions with our
environment,

"^here are,

however, times when we should try to do

just this.

First of all, we must do so as a part of doing scientific
research.

There is nothing new in this statement, because

objectivity has long been a fundamental principle underlying the

way in which science is done.

It is important that we understand

our environment; what are its components and the ways in which
they interact.

The sciences, both natural and social, are our

best tools for learning the answers to these questions.
There is, however, something else which we need to know.

Mutuality involves trying to meet the needs of both parties,
our
therefore we need to know what is in the best interest of

non-human bio-physical environment.

This is not a scientific

role in
question, although science can play a significant

answering it.

"Best’' is a

heavily value laden word, and the

our environment is
question of what is in the best interest of

extraordinarily ambiguous.

If, for example, we define "best"

stable population of "x" number of
as, "that which facilitates a
tackle the question with
individuals," then we would be able to
the tools of science.

Unfortunately it is not that simple.
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What

ir.

in the best interest of our environment?

In order to

answer the question we must first take great care not to project
our own self-interests into the answer.

This does not mean

simply ignoring our interests, but consciously recognizing what
they are as a first step toward temporarily transcending then

during the course of our study.

As Burtt has suggested, tiiis

will require considerable training, if not personal tnerapy.
The whole question involves so many conflicting interests,

both ours and those of the multitude of other organisms and
systems in the world, that the most appropriate answer might
be,

"That is in the best interests of our environment which

would occur in the complete absence of humanity and human
influence."

It is not a very good solution, but it provides

an unrealistic extreme against which we can contrast our own
xinrealistic hopes, wishes, desires, dreams, and fantasies.

The two would be in a dialectical tension, and a mutualistic

decisionmaking process would attempt to achieve some sort of
a synthesis of the two.

In practice, things will be quite complex, because

v;e

will

not be dealing with a vague thing called, "environment," but
with specific environmental systems composed of specific
components.

We will also be dealing with many viable communities

of
«nd ecosystems which could not exist without the influence

people.

Is it, for exarriple, in the interest of the New England

rural landscape to cease to exist?

I

think not,

this does

but,

not argue against my proposal of what is in the best interest
of our environment.

Such a landscape, or community, or eco-

system is the product of a mutually successful interaction

between people and their environment.
I

do not really know what is in the interest of our non-

human environment.

Perhaps we can never really know.

Perhaps

such things have no real interests, and the whole concept
is merely a useful fiction.

question, and

I

I do,

though, wish to pose the

argue that it can be answered only to the

extent to which we are able to identify and transcend our own
self-interests.
We can be without self-interest and still be dogmatic or

prejudiced in our understanding of our world.

I am

not speaking

simply on the level of religious dogma, or the more blatant forms
of racial prejudice.

I

want to focus special attention upon

the subtle, tacit ways in which we structure our conception

of our environment. These are operating on the level of the

unconscious presupposition of which Burtt wrote, and of the
ways in which each culture unconsciously creates its own image
of reality.

images of

T<he

These unconscious, unexamined, but firmly embraced

world can be examined on both an .individual

an^-.

a
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cnl^ural
Examine, for instance, the following account.
The stars were phining, and the leaves res tied in the voods
ever so mounful; and I heard an owl, av/ay off, who-whooing
about somebody that was dead, and a whippowill and a dog
crying about somebody that was going bo die; and the wind
was tri'-ing to whisper something to me, and I couldn't make
out what it was, and so it made the cold shivers run over
me.
Then away out in the woods I heard that kind of a
sound that a ghost makes when it wants to tell about
something that's on its mind and can't make itself understood, and so can't rest easy in its grave, and has to go
about that way every night grieving. 1 got sc downhearted
and scared I did wish I liad some company.
Pretty soon a
spider went crawling up my shoulder, and I flipped it off
and it lit in the candle; and before I could Vjudge it was
all shriveled up. I didn't need anybody to tell me that
that was an awful bad sign and would fetch me some bad
luck, so I was scared and most shook the clothes off of
me.
I got up and turned around in my tracks three times
and crossed my breast every time; and then I tied up a
little lock of my hair with a thread to keep the witches
But I hadn't no confidence. You do that when
away.
you've lost a horseshoe that you've found, instead of
nailing it up over the door, but I hadn’t ever heard
anybody say it was any way to keep off bad luck when
you'd killed a spider, 36

Although this is a fictitious account. Huckleberry Finn's
image of the world is representative of one which has been widely
held.

It has its own internal consistency, is peopled by a

specific cast of characters, and has its o\m moral order.
is blatantly superstitious, but it is firmly believed.

It

It is a

predictable
fearful world, but it is also understandable and somewhat
(watch out if you burn a spider)
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On

"thG

individual level, Huck and those who share such a

world-view and ethos, actually believe that the world is put
cogether in this way.

thinks to question.

It is not something which one even

Many people in other cultures have shared

similar understandings of the world as a place peopled by
ghosts, witches, demons, and other such beings.

They are,

however, individuals who are holding to beliefs which are a

part of the culture of which they are a part.

The world-view and

ethos are cultural phenomena, and this makes it incredibly

difficult for members of the culture to question them, because
they do not have alternative models from which to select, and
little or no incentive to do so (indeed, there may be severe

sanctions against so doing).
People did not believe that the earth was flat, or that it
was at the center of the universe, simply because they were

stupid or vrhimsical.
flat, and

In their cultural context the earth was

at the center of their universe.

To believe other-

wise might literally have been unthinkable for most members
of the culture.

This is a form of unconscious, cultural dogmatism.

My examples are extreme, and it is easy for us to develop
an inflated sense of our own sophistication.

But what are our

seeing
cultural dogmas, which blind us to alternative ways of

things?

Those which are the most alive and active are likely

to be the most difficult to identify, because they are the ones

which are shaping our view of our world.

(This does not

necessarily mean they are not appropriate views to hold, just
that they are views which we are not aware of holding.)

There

are others, however, which are changing and which are more

visible to us.

One, for example, is the ethos of progress

the idea that we can improve our earthly lot through c't own

efforts.

This has played a major role in the cultural history

of the United States.

From the manifest destiny of westward

expansion, to Horatio Alger's stories, to our ever increasing

Gross National Product, to lunar exploration, the idea of
progress has shaped our hopes and dreams.

"Bigger and better,"

and "progress is our most important product," provide the keynotes
of our age.

Now we are beginning to realize that bigger is nou

necessarily better, that quality may be more important than quantity,
and that change can occur at too rapid a rate for our own good.
The idea of progress is becoming more visible, and is being

carefully examined.
Another image which has changed is that of wilderness.

To

beasts,
the Puritans the wilderness was a place of chaos, fearful

and evil.

Satan waited in the wood.

One v;ent to the wilderness

it under the
only on errands, and their special errand was to bring

axe and plow; creating order, beauty, and good.

It is only in the
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past- 150

years or so

that,

wilderness began to be viewed as a place

of beauty, to v/hich people journeyed for pleasure and renewal,
I'njsy

people are now surprised to learn that the early Americans

disliked wilderness.

It seems so obvious to us that it is a

place of great beauty and wonder.

What,

I

wonder, will people

think 150 years from now when they contemplate our present

views about wilderness?

We are not dealing here with the process of individual

psychological projection, or selective perception, which distort
our view of our world.

These elements are important and must

be addressed, as Burtt has argued.

But what

I

am pointing out is

that we are all embedded in a socially shared image of reality.

It is a pervasive image v/hich is very difficult to transcend,

because it is at the root of what gives our sense of our world
its stability and meaning.

It can, however, also create problems.

The European -American way of doing things has made an

enormous impact upon the rest of the world.

Airports and hotels

are so similar throughout the globe that it can be very difficult
to tell where in the world we are.

Our agricultural practices

of other
have also circled the globe, sometimes to the detriment

societies.

We have been engaging in what Paulo Freire has

called cultural invasion.

Little thought, though, has been given

unique factors of each locale
to the culturally and environmentally
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.

This has happeiieh, in part, because V/estern advisers and business-

men just aid not realize that there are other valid ways of
doing things.

Their own cultural biases have shaped their approach

to the rest of the world and, thus, helped to create an inter-

national sameness.
V.'e

also have cultaral biases in terms of what we expect of,

and how we ought to inteiact with our non-human ecological
environment.

The value orientations of Domination, Mutuality,

and Submission are a part of this.

It is important that we be

aware of these biasis and be openminded in our attempt to

determine what are our needs, and what are the ways in which we
ought to shape our world in order to meet these needs.

We may

find useful models in other cultures, and we may sometimes find

new
it necessary to transcend the existing models and discover
ways of doing things.
as
This is not an easy task, but it is already happening

the global flow of information and people increases.

We must

other cultures and
be careful, though, as we become familiar with
that we do not become
try to create totally new approaches,

create an alienated
alienated from our own cultural roots and

and alienating vjorld around us.

Welfare of Others.
Element Thre e; Mutuality Promotes the
the interests of both
Mutuality involves an attempt to satisfy
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.

1,0

is, then, not sufricisnt siiiiply to know what are

the Interests of the other; one must be committed to promoting
the other's interests,

E.

A,

Burut wrote of this in

promoting the growth of others.

He

v/as

teniis of

examining the inter-

actions betvreen peop3.e, and viewed them as developing, maturing,

becoming beings.

However, this may not be appropriate with

respect to noii-human ecological systems.

Although we may wish

to promote the growth of an individual, there is a point beyond

which the growth of a population

C8.n

be hanuful, both to the

individuals within the population and to other populations it

may influence.

In some situations, then, it may be more realistic

to think in terms of stability, or adaptation than it would be
to speak of growth,

Aldo Leopold was one of the first and most eloquent pro-

ponents of this approach to ecosystems.

He argued that actions

which promote the vjeifare of an ecosystem are good, and that those
which work to the contrary are bad.

He played an instrumental

role in establishing national wilderness preserves; actions

which embody this value.

Kis work is being carried on by many

organisations and thousands of people, who are working to
preserve wilderness areas,

Naturally, these efforts are not

unclouded by self-interests, such as the desire to preserve

favorite environments for hiking and

can'.ping.

In addition, soriO

people have the mistaken view that wilderness ecosystems are
static, unchanging things, and they attempt to eliminate chsi.ge

factors, such as fire, as components of the systems.

Nevertheless,

their goals seem to be directed toward preserving and promoting
the interests of wilderness.

Those who are working to preserve endangered species also
are often motivated by this environmental Mutuality.

This has

particularly become the case as more and more preservationists
have recognized that a species can be preserved in the wild only

by preserving its habitat.

Their motives, too, are not unclouded.

Generally it is the large, aesthetically pleasing or awe-inspiring
animals which receive their attention.

Often, too, there is

little consideration of the point that a particular species may

become extinct without the added burden of human influence.
Despite this, they are working for the preservation and promotion
of the welfare of other species.

Preservationists such as these are often portrayed as being
a bit strange.

The wilderness preservationists are "anti-civili-

zation," and the wildlife preservationists are pictured as

precious sentimentalists.

Both, of course, are opposed to "progress.

True, some may overstate their case, but there is another reason
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for the negative view that many have of these people.

Kany

are genuinely corrmited to working for the welfare of nor- humans.
To those who do not share this value, such actions roist appear

strange, and might even be threatening if the preservationist's
acts impinge upon their self-interests.

Preservationists who wish to promote non-hioman interests
at the expense of all human interests are no more mutuali stic
than are those people who promote the human without regard for
the non-human.

Environmental mutualism includes a concern for

the interests of both humans and non-humans.

The genuine ex-

tremists, however, are rare am.ong the preservationists, and

their actions do harm to the movement.

The efforts to preserve wilderness areas and endangered
species are examples which are not representative of most

mutualistic endeavours.

Perhaps the majority of preservation

efforts are much more limited and close to home.

Seme people

may try to preserve a park, others a spot of wetland, a stream,
or a grove of trees.

The issues, battles, and threatened areas

exist on a smaller scale.

People who become invoi/ed in such

efforts often do so only when something with which they are
familiar, and which they love is threatened.

This is under-

the
standable, because a genuine corrunitment to promoting

love of that person
interests of another grows out of a respect and
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or -Lhing.
In nratualistic rclationchips, freedom from oelf- interest

and a positive interest in promoting the interests of another
are closely int^rtvrined.

Burtt has argued that the combination

of these two values defines love.

If this is true, then

mutualistic relationships with our environment are loving
relationships.

Our problem is that of creating ways

which

to learn about, and interact with our environment, which

embody the value of love.

Abraham Kaslow has pointed out that:
Classically, “scientific objectivity” has been most
successfully achieved when its objects were m.ost
distant from human aspirations, hopes, and wishes.
It is easy to feel uninvolved, detached, cleareyed, and neutral if one is studying the nature of
rocks or heat or electrical currents. One doesn’t
“care" about it as one does about one’s child*
It is easy to take the laissez-faire attitude with
oxygen or hydrogen and to have noninterfering
curiosity, to be Taoistically receptive, to let
things be themselves. To be blunt about it, it
is easy to be neutrally objective, fair, and
just vjhen you don’t care about the outcome, when
you can’t identify or sympathize, \>nen you neither
love or hate,^^
particular, but his
He was writing of the social sciences in
of our environment.
comment is relevant to mutualistic knowledge

We

^ care

our
about the outcome of our interactions with

interests to protect.
environment, because we have our own

Also,

to interact in a mutualistic
as I have already noted, if we are

we must love the object
manner we cani.ot be emotionally neutral;

of our study.

Maslov proposed that there is a second kind of objectivity,
vhich he called "caring objecti'-ity."
.if you love something or someone enough at the
.
.
level of Being, then you can enjoy its actualization
of itself, vhich means that you vill not want to
interfere with it, since you love it as it is in
itself. You vill then be able to perceive it in
a noninterfering way, vhich means leaving it
alone. This in turn means that you will be tble
to see it as is, uncontaminated by your selfish
wishes, hopes, demands, anxieties, or preconceptions. Since you love it as it is in itself,
neither will you be prone to judge it, use it,
improve it, or in anv other way to project your
own values into it.^^

We need to develop new ways of doing the environmental sciences
which embody science both as an objective study and as a loving
enterprise.

Probably all good scientists love what they study,

but that love is not valued in the same way as is reproducibility,
prediction, and objectivity.

Indeed, the last three factors are

carefully displayed in research papers, while evidence of the loving
relationship between the scientists and the object of study is

systematically excluded.
However, despite the strengths of Maslov’s caring objectivity,
it is a very passive approach to w’hat is being studied.

There comes

in a much
a point at which we must interact with our environment

more active manner.
is inevitable.

We make demands of it, and we alter it.

This

We must, then, also develop methods of environmental

intervention which are guided by love.

Rene Dubos pointed this

out when he wrote of the attention which we should pay to the
”god within" each landscape.

Although there are many examples of this kind of active,
loving interaction between people, there are few v;hich can guide

us in our interactions with non-humans.

In their search for models,

a number of people are examining the ways in which the traditional

cultures, particularly native Araerican ones, interact with their

environments.

Although these explorations will lead us in

important directions, they are not likely to discover models which
are completely satisfying.

We need to evolve new ways which are

appropriate to our own unique circumstances.
A Direction
As we increasingly come to recognize our world as a system of

interrelated people, organisms, and objects, we must develop an
ethos which is compatible with this view of the world.

This is

particularly important at this point in our history, because we
have developed enormous powers to alter, if not destroy, the
earth.

The values underlying social mutualism can, with minor

modification and thoughtful concern, be effective guides in our
interactions with our non-human environment.

I

propose that

we work to enhance the elements of social and environmenta.1
..mtualisr.i

in our culture

I'/hat

ve are dealing with is an evolving change in our culture.

As such, it is not likely to occur rapidly, but over the course
o.f

decades.

We, however, can act to hasten the change by

consciously working to spread the idea.

We will never develop a

>

culture which is completely mutualistic.

It is unrealistic to

even attempt this, because the value orientations of Domination
and Submission are integral and, under some circumstances, useful

elements

in.

alL cultures.

Our task is that of reducing the

relative emphasis upon Domination, and enhancing that of Mutuality.

Many people are already working toward this end on an
individual level.

Efforts to introduce this ethos into our social

institutions has come more slowly.

promising signs.

There are, however, already

Federal requirements for environmental impact

statements represent an important beginning.

There are no

requirements that the statements consider the rights and welfare
of an environment, this is not the motive underlying the requirement,

but the statements do insure that people become
environmental impacts of their actions.

avjare of the

Town conservations

commissions, such as those in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
to
provide another example of an institution which pays attention

the impact of human activities.

In this case, care is given to

the preservation of wetlands in particular.

Their motivation

preserving water
for preserving wetlands, however, is that of

supplies for human use.

Christopher Stone’s proposal that natural

objects be granted legal rights and the legal standing to sue in

defense of those rights, suggests a

v;ay

of introducing into our

legal institutions a concern for the environment as an end in
itself.

Additional approaches will certainly develop in the

coming years.
The key, the fundamental motivation which must underly our

efforts is that of love.

As Lewis Mumford eloquently wrote;

v;e need to confront the threatening omniscience
and omnipotence of posthistoric man is to cultivate
powers equally go^’like in a quite different part of
the personality. Must we not cultivate a force that
came late even in man's conception of godhood the
force that Henry Adams prophetically summoned up in
opposition to the dynajno? I mean the force of love.
And I mean love in all its meanings: love as erotic
desire and procreativeness; love as passion and
aesthetic delight, lingering over its images of
beauty; love as fellow-feeling and neighborly
helpfulness, love as parental solicitude and
sacrifice; love as the miraculous capacity for
overvaluing its OT,m object and, thereby, glorifying it and transfiguring it, releasing for life
something that only the lover can see. V/e need such
a redeeming and all-embracing love at this moment
to rescue the earth itself and all the creatures
that inhabit it from the insensate forces of hate,
violence, and destruction.^^

V/hat

—

This may be edifying, but it is not very encouraging news.
The world has never been blessed with a great abimdance of love,

Although there are some signs that this may be changing, they
are not very strong,

VJe

must, hovxever, act witn love, and in

the faith we can become more loving, because if we do not, then
cy the nature of self-fulfilling prophecies, we will not.
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The effort to promote Mutuality must, in the final analysis,

be pursued on a deeply personal level.
of the ideas and valuOvS of our culture.

We are the living bearers
Unlike any other creatures

on earth, we are able to shape the world around us.

The shape it

takes is the physical and social expression of our collective

ideas and values, hopes and dreams.

The quality of our outer

environment, then, depends in large part upon the quality of

that which wo bear within us.
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CHAPTER

V

EDUCATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MUTUALITY

One of the fundamental objectives of environmental education
(EE)^ is that df preparing people who will be able to work towai'd
the solution of our environmental problems.

Fostering Mutuality

is central to the solution of these problems.

pages

I

In the following

will examine the role that EE can play in fostering this

value orientation.

There are three areas in which
First,

I

I

will focus my attention.

will examine the underlying conceptual structure of EE

and the place within it of education for environmental Mutuality.

Then

I

will examine values education, an approach which is

increasing3.y usea in EE.

I

will propose that education for

Mutuality be the values agenda that values education embrace,

I

will argue that it already embraces much of this agenda, and
that the agenda is ideally suited to EE.

Third,

I

will examine a variety of approaches to EE which

can help to foster 'he elements oi Mutuality,

I

will describe

that are
a number of existing educational methods and content areas
Since much of my teaching experience

useful means of doing this.

be directed
has been in undergraduate education, my attention will
level.
largely to EE as it is implemented on the college

called
(Environmental Education on the college level is often

environmental studies, and

I

will use the latter term in this sense.)
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The

iriajor

goals of EE on both the college and pre-college 1^‘vels

are essentially the same, however, and the points

raise will

1

also be relevant to elementary ind secondary education.

The Place of Mutuality in Environmental Studies

Relatively little has been published in the areas of the

philosophical foundations of, or curriculum development in environmental studies (ES), compared to the wealth of material available
regarding EE in elementary and secondary education.

Since their

goals are similar, it will be useful to examine some of the

literature of pre-college EE in an effort to understand what is, or
should be, happening on the college level.

Gary D. Harvey has

conducted a detailed conceptual analysis of EE and proposed that:
The precept (man-environment relationship)
operationalized in a formal values-laden context
results in the development of two criteria for
differentiating what is, from what is not, environmental education. For a topic (used in the broadest
sense) to be considered part of environmental
education, it must meet both of the following
criteria:
1,

All three components of the pr<-.cept (man,
and relationship) must be present.

2.

A human values component representing
different positions relative to a manenvironment relationship must be present.

descriptions of
To this general description of EE he has added
three of its important educational objectives.

They are stated in

who must be literate.
Lerms of the environmentally educated personj

competent, ^nd dedicated.

Thus, EE attempts to create an;

Environmentally literate person--one who posseses basic
skills understandings, and feelings for the man-environment relationship.

—

Environmentally c ompetent person one who is environmentally
literate, and in addition, has the ability to apply, analyze,
synthesize, and has values consistent with the man-environment
relationship . . ,

—

Environmentally dedicated person one who is environmentally
literate and environmentally competent in the affective
domain, and in addition, is characterized by a values system
in which one acts consistently in a manner compatible with
homeostasis between quality of life and quality of environment. The environmentally dedicated person is inferred to be
able to operate at the highest levels of the psychomotor and
cognitive domain as well as the affective.^
The Belgrade Charter, one of the founding docuir.ents of the

UNESCO environmental education program, states similar goals.
proposes

It

that;^

The goal of environmental education is:
To develop a world population that is aware of, and
concerned about, the environment and its associated
problems, and which has the knowledge, skills, attitudes,
motivations and commitment to work individually and
collectively toward solutions of current problems and
the prevention of new ones.

Harvey's statements and that of the Belgrade Charter provide
foundation
a clear image of what is EE, and I will accept them as the
of my examination of both EE and ES.

When

±

write about these

approaches to education, I am referring to programs which:
- are
-

problem-motivated

and their
focus upon the interrelationships between people
environment

252
-

combine analytical^ valua live, and action-oriented
approaches in an elfort to understand and improve
upon our interactions with our environment,

- attempt to teach people to be environmentally

literate, competent, and dedicated.

The statements which I have quoted make it clear that EE
is not simply an approach to cognitive education.

EE and ES

also involve education in the affective and psychomotor
domains, °

Education for Mutuality falls largely in the affective

domain, because it involves the formation of attitudes and

values within the students.

Education for a conscious awareness

of Mutuality and mutualistic approaches to problems falls
in the cognitive domain, and provides guidance for selecting the

psychomotor activities in which we engage.
Since I will not be exploring mutualistic approaches to

scholarship in any depth, my examination of education for

Mutuality will be weighted toward affective education; toward
teaching Mutuality, rather than teaching about Mutuality.

Never-

theless, there is an important place for Mutuality within the

traditional approaches to scholarship and

discipl''.nar2/’

education.

This will be hinted at in the following pages and has been demonstrated throughout this dissertation.
approaches to ES
The analytical, valuative, and action-oriented
of which deals
define three central programmatic components, each

wloh a different

)cind of

problem and employs different modes

of'
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inquiry and action.

The sciences can play a vital role in ES

programs, particularly in what

I

call their analytical component.

This part of ES is involved with establishing what are the dynamics
of the bio-phy^ical and socio-cultural systems, and of the

interactions between the two.

current state of these systems.

Also, it tries to assess what is the

It aims at both description and

prediction, and includes both the natural and the social sciences.

Historically, this component has played the central role in most
ES programs; reaching

ulie

point at which, in many programs, environ-

mental studies and environmental sciences have become synonymous.
However, despite their great strengths, the sciences do have their

limitations and must be complemented by the other two ES
components.
The second part of ES programs is the valuative component.

Description and prediction are not sufficient in themselves; we
also want to determine what is good or bad, right or wrong,

desirable or

undesirable, healthy or pathological.

These are

questions which involve values and ethics, and are not readily

amenable to scientific solutions.
The distinction between the analytical and valuative

components is important, and substantive.

As I mentioned in

cannot leap directly
Chapter Two, David Hume pointed out that one
one of what
from a statement of what is, or is not, to

ought not .

or

present state of
In other words, an analysis of the

affairs (what is) does not lead directly to a statement of what that
state of affairs ought to be.

In his Frincipia Ethica^ G, E. Koore

reotatea this understanding when he pointed out that one cannot
equate the good (ought) with an object in nature (is).

By

"object in nature" he meant any phenomenon in nature, not just

physical objects.

He referred to the belief that the good is

sjmonymous with an object in nature as the naturalistic fallacy.

As

an example of this kind of fallacious reasoning, he pointed to

social Darv.dnism, which attempted to derive an understanding of

what is ethical from an understanding of evolutionary principles.
The debate over the validity of Moore's conclusions has

played a central role in the literature of twentieth century ethics.
Arguments have been made both in support of and against the idea
that such reasoning is fallacious.

The very fact that there is such

a debate should make us pause before we leap directly from empirical

study into ethical pronouncements.

The ease with which people

are able to use scientific information to support their (often

unconsciously) preconceived conclusions should also make us very
cautious about the role of science in this area.

We need to give

careful thought to what we are doing when we are dealing with
values and ethical issues.

When it comes time to evaluate our interactions with our
image of
environment and project alternatives we must refer to an
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what ought to be.

The task of articulating this vision is better

suited to the humanities, arts, and religion, than to the sciences,
111

projecting an image of what ought to be, they must work with

an understanding of the limitations which bio-physical and socio-

cultural processes place upon what is possible.

Unfortunately, the

humanities, arts, and religion have been slow to become involved
in problems of this sort, and the valuative component of most

environmental studies programs tend to be their most poorly
defined and "mushy'* aspect.
The third component of these programs is that of application .

Once a situation has been analyzed and evaluated, the problem

arises of how to use this information.

The application component

of ES programs deals with the application of knowledge and skills
in an effort to affect change,

anploying the knowledge of the

human/environment d;^mamics developed in the analytical component,
the students are prepared to actively change the world in order to

make their vision of what ought to be, a reality.

In the appli-

cations component they develop the technical and interpersonal
skills necessary to act effectively.

These three components are closely interrelated.

Application

through
involves action on the basis of the understandings derived

valuation
analysis, guided by the values decisions made in the
ccmponent.

informed
In a similar manner, each component must be

by the other two.

V/hat

they have in common is their general area

of study; the interactions between people and their environment
(see figure 6).

An ES program must be examined to determine whether it includes

these three componenT.s. and whether appropriate emphasis is given
to each.

This does not mean tnat a program must keep them

separate from each other.

It is possible, and often preferable, to

blend them together within courses and ether kinds of learning
activities.

At the same time, each part of the program need not

include all three components.

It is necessary that the overall

ES program strike some sort of a balance among them.

Just what

emphasis will be placed upon each component will depend upon the

particular program (e.g,; its special programatic emphasis, the
interests and capabilities of its staff and students, the design
of its curricxilum, the resources available to it, the priorities

of the sponsoring institution).

This view of ES provides a philosophical framework within

which most of the traditional disciplines can be included.

Environ'

mental sciences, political science, engineering, anthropology,
religion, philosophy, law, business and administration, to

mention a few, fit vrithin this scheme and need not lose their
traditional integrity.

It is important, though, that the people

creating a progranv
who are organizing the program be committed to
teaching an undermabic integration of these disc’plines, and in

standing of this integration.

This understanding is a part of
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Figure 6.

CONTENT COMPONENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES
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environmental literacy in higher education.

There is an ecology,

an interrelationship of knowledge, understandings, skills, and

disciplines which must be an integral part of the educational

context of environmental studies.

Education for Mutuality can occur within all three components
of ES.

It is most obviously at home in the valuation component.

On the affective level,

ceachers can help students to explore

mutualistic value alternatives and, perhaps, incorporate them
into their own values systems.

On the cognitive level value

issues can be critically analyzed in terms of Mutuality, and the

value orientation itself can become the object of critical study.

Mutuality can also be introduced into the analysis and application
components.

The ways in which we go about analyzing a problem or

affecting change can strongly influence the results of the
analysis or action.

It

vri-ll

be useful, then, to explore mutualistic

ways of conducting research and acuing as change agents.

Finally,

Mutuality can be introduced not as a topic of study, but as an
environment in which education takes place.

We need to explore

mutualistic ways of teaching, both in terms of pedagogical tools
and interpersonal relationships between teachers and students.

Values Education and Mutuality

ji]_l

S3 programs of w^hich I am

ai'jare

include the analysis

in one way or
component, and a great many include application

another.

Moctj however, do not include the valuation component as

a consciously designed part of their curriculum.

Although they do

deal v/ith values and ethical decisions, they do so in an unconscious,

unreflective, and piecemeal manner.

This may result, in part, from

the fact that most ES programs are rooted in the natural or social

sciences.
to date.

The humanities have played a very limited role in ES
In addition, higher education places great value upon

cognitive knowledge and tends to place little value upon affective
education.

There is, hov;ever, a growing niimber of teachers who are

exploring the cognitive interface between ethics and the environ-

mental sciences.

There are, also, some teachers who are intro-

ducing affective approaches to values education into their classroom.
The valuation component is a difficult one with which to
work.

It involves both an objective examination and questioning

of our values, and making decisions as to which values we will

embrace.

It is necessary that we strike a balance between the

objectivity necessary for thoughtful study and the passionate

valuing which leads to action.

Both aspects of the component are

essQitial to ES.

Many teachers do not
because they do not

vxant to

deal with values in the classroom,

v:ant to take the

responsibility for teaching

a specific set of values to their students.

We live in a pluralistic

fear that the values of
society and people are justifi^'^ in their
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one segment- of our society will be taught at the expense of those

of other parts of our society.

In addition, most teachers simply

do not know what values ought to be taught.

At the same tim-:, we

must face critical environmental problems which influence all
elements of our society.

There are significant value issues which

lie at the heart of these problems and we cannot deal with them by

ignoring them.

VJe

need to find ways in which to work with values

in education, while maintaining a respect for our cultural

diversity.

This is an important issue, which I will explore in

greater depth.
Inherent in the EE and ES goals of fostering environmental
awareness, competence, and motivation is the need to help students
to articulate what kind of an environment they value and wish to

either preserve or create.

The Belgrade Charter points to this

need when it states that one of the goals of environmental action
is, "For each nation, according to its culture, to clarify for

itself the meaning of such basic concepts as 'quality of life'
and 'human happiness' in the context of the total environment, with
an extension of the clarification and appreciation to other cultures,

beyond one's own national boundaries,"

Within this statement is the

central issue of environmental values education.

necessity of articulating values by which

to live,

There is tne
and there is the

differ
injunction to respect the values of other peopl‘d, which may
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from our own.

But how far can we go with ethical relativism?

At the bottom line, someone else’s actions can affect my environ-

ment and, potentially, threaten my life.

Their values, then, are

not simply a personal matter; they can have an

ijiipact

upon me.

The tension between the recognition of the social importance of

values and the desire that they be articulated on an individual
level pervades contemporary values education.
a number of attempts to deal with it

,

There h^ve been

of which I will examine

three.

The use of the word “clarify” in the Belgrade Charter statement
is significant, because it might be a reference to a specific

values education technique called “values clarification.”

This

method places its emphasis upon the valuing process, rather than
upon teaching what one ought to value.

The wide variety of values

clarification activities which have been developed often involve
students in listing or inventorying their values, rank ordering
them, and examining them in a number of ways.

In addition,

students are often asked to state their value positions regarding
conflicts with
thorny situations which involve significant values

no clearly right or wrong solution.

The teacher's role is that

what are their
of helping the students to recognize, or clarify
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values.

During this process the teacher can speak with authority

in areas of truth or falsity, but not in those of belief or

values.

Louis Raths, a principal developer of values clarification,

and his colleagues define "value" in terms of seven criteria, wnich
emphasize the ways in which values are chosen and the ways in
O

which the chooser feels about them and acts upon them.
Choosing:

(1) freely
(2) from alternatives
I,

j)

after thoughtful consideration of the
consequences of each alternative

cherishing, being happy with the choice
to affirm the choice publicly
willing
(5)

Prizing:

(U)

Acting?

(6) doing something with the choice
(7) repeatedly,

in some pattern of life

An advantage of this definition is that each of the criteria can be

stated as an educational objective which can be acted upon and

evaluated
Values clarification is a useful, successful method for helping
students identify and ponder their values

.

The technique can be

and
integrated into a wide variety of educational situations,

students generally enjoy participating in the process.

It takes

non-threatening when
advantage of their interest in themselves, is

properly used, and is fun.
to be value free

As an added bonus, the process appears

(an impression which is incorrect).

As a result,

and secondary levels, and
it has been used widely on the elementary

is beginning to be need on the college

There are, however, some problems
arises out of its veiT successfulness.

lev*'.l..

An important problem

wit-h it.

Since it works so well and

is rewarding to both students and teachers, it is easy to lose

sight of its limitations.

Although values clarification is an im-

portant beginning, it is just that

—

a beginning.

identified one's values, what is the next step?

Once one has

Rodney Allen

has pointed out that, "the educator cannot arouse such awareness
and let the student hang there, especially if that student is

dissatisfied.

An adequate study would have to go beyond that

point, to help students explain how persons develop values, how

values operate in one’s life, and the implications of a variety
of values for decisions and lifestyles,"^

He has also noted that

the ethical standard of values clarification is that of being

happy with one’s choice.

Is this, however, a good standard

and should teachers teach only one standard?

"Values education in

a public institution must deal with the rich variety of human

commitments and a

sp'^^ctnim of

approaches to ethical discourse,

not restrict or approve only certain approaches and religious-

philosophical

corrmi

tments.

.

clarification
A fundairiental presupposition of many values
and once
advocates seems to be that people are inherently good,
in an ethical
ve clarify our values sufficiently we will behave

manner.

despite the
There also seems to be an assumption that,

people who have
heavily individualistic approach to valuing,
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sufficiently clarified their values will interact in a socially

otnical nanner.”^

Ihis would resolve the conflict between social

r-sponsibility and individualistic valuing.

may

welD.

However, although there

be come abstract universal human value needs (as the

research of Abraharn Maslow seems to indicate), the assumptions
of values clarification advocates seem to be simplistic and to

lack a cross-cultural pe-ipeetive.

We learn values, in large

part, through the processes of socialization and enculturation.

Values clarification may only help us to clarify our positions

within this context.

I do

not believe that a personally

clarified value is necessarily ethical, or that individual
values are necessarily compatible
ethics.

I

vrith

either social values or

believe that values clarification can be most successful

when the people in question share similar cultural backgrounds
and have been socialized to accept similar ethical standards.
Lavrrence Kohlberg has developed an approach to education,

which he believes does deal with culturally universal moral
processes, and he has conducted crosscultural studies which

support his point.
content.

He, too, focuses upon process, rather than

He has identified six developmental stages in moral

12
reasoning.*-^

STAGE

LEVEL
0.

Prior to underAmoral S tage .
of rules a-'.d
idea
the
standing
is what is
’’good"
authority,
pleasant, exciting, non-painful
and non- fearful. The person does
what he can do and wants to do.

1«

Pre-conventional

1.

0h> dionce and

Punishment
Orientation The persoii
aefers to power or
authority. Tnis is a
trouble avoiding mind-set.
.

2.

II.

Conventional

3.

Naively Epoist Orientation .
Right action is tnat which
satisfies one’s desires and
needs.
The person talks
of "rights" and motives,
and believes that one good
turn deserves another.
This is a marketplace,
exchange, or "back scratching"
sense of moraiity,
Interpersonal Concordance
Correct
Orientation
behavior is that which wins
approval from others it fits
what others think is proper.
Empathy with others becomes
a factor in moral reasoning,
.

—

h.

III.

Post-conventional

*

5*

Lav7 and Order Orientation .
Good is that vinich is best
for society, the majority,
and the social order. It
is codified in rigid, institutional laws, rules and
principles, which one must
obey.

So cial Contract , Legalistic
Orientation . Right action is
defined in terms of general

individual rights and
principles which the society
apjproves of in its basic
notion of the "social contract." Lav/s should be
obeyed, but one can work to
change lav7s v/hich one does
nou believe are right.
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6.

Conscience or Universal
Prlnciplf-s Orientation ,
kignt, action is defined
in terms of individual
conscience. One is guided
by a set of self-chosen,
abstract principles and
commitments.

These are stages in the development of our ability to reason
about moral issues.

As infants we all reasoned on level one, and

progressed from one stage to the next as our moral reasoning
matured.

In Kohlberg's view, this is a universal, invariable

sequence in our psychological development.

We cannot get to

stage five, for example, wdthout first progressing through stages
one, two, three, and four in that sequence .

His studies seem to

demonstrate that this is true of all cultures, although the average
age at vrhich one begins to reason in terms of each stage may

vary from culture to culture.
vary

bet^^reen

Although the moral content may

cultures, the reasoning process does not.

Kohlberg believes that the teaching of morals is not linked
to the teaching of a particular belief system.

He proposes

that moral education involves both stimulating the students*

moral judgment abilities and helping the student to apply those
judgments to his or her own actions.

The teacher must identify

then challenge
the students* present stage of moral reasoning and

highest stage.
the student to reason in terms of the next
varied.
impertant, because the seque.iCr of stages cannot be

This is
Tf the

teachers reasons on the basis of a level below that of the student,
the student's development will be retarded.

Similarly, reasoning

on a level two or three stages ceyond that of the student will only

create frustration,
Iraplicit in Kohlberg's theory is the belief that the more

abstract levels of moral reasoning are better than the earlier
ones.

This seems to be derived from his belief that

universal moral ideals.

are

L*-.ere

Thus, the more abstract our moral

reasoning, the closer we can come to understanding these ideals.
He believes that these ideals are generated internally within

the individual and are not the product of socialization or

He also believes that, "Basic values are different

enculturation.

largely because we are at different levels of maturity in thinking
about basic moral and social issues and concepts.

Exposure to

others more mature than ourselves helps stimulate maturity in
our own value process,"

Although

I

believe that there is great merit in his develop-

his views
mental scheme of moral reasoning, I hesitate to accept
ideals.
of its implications in terms of universal moral

He

moral ideals is
believes, for example, that one of the universal
"justice or reciprocity,"^^
of Mutuality.

This seems to be close to the idea

ideals of
Are there, then, also universal moral

Domination and Submission?

is filI suspect that v:hat he is doing

presuppositions about what
tering his observations through his own
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is and is not ethical.

And even if there wera a univeisal ideal

of justice, each culture is likely to interpret what is a just act
in its own way, thus frustrating: his search for universality.
1

suspect that there are greater similarities between values

clarification advocates and Kohlberg than either would wish to admit.
Both seem to ground their theories on the assumption of a universal,

intuitive sense of

v/hat is

ethical.

Values clarlficati-ni deals

with this primarily on the affective level.
hand, emphasizes a cognitive approach.

Kohlberg, on the other

They seem to have the

potential of complementing each other quite well,

Rodney Allen has attempted such a synthesis, and has added a
few elements of his own.

The result is a much more complex and

subtle approach to values education, which includes the analysis
of value statements and a systematic approach to moral decision

making.

The most complex and comprehensive of his processes

involves leading the student through nine phases in making a
decision.

First, the student attempts to clarify and comprehend a

situation, then states the issues and conflicts which it involves.
the
The third phase involves trying to emphathize with each of

student
people involved in the conflicts, which requires that the

attempt to overcome his or her

ov/n

biases.

The next phase is that

of stating the intentions or goals of each party.

Then the student

action which are open
tries to lay out the alternative courses of

to each party, and predictc their consequences.

Seventh, the

student considers the specific acts necessary to bring about the
consequences, then makes and justifies his or her ovm decision.
Finally, the student examines the consistency of his or her

decision

v;ith

respect to the decisions which he or she had

previously made,^*^
Allen’s approach also emphasizes the valuing process, rather
than specific values.

The student is the source of the value

content and Allen does not help us in our attempt to decide what
values should be taught.

He does, though, place a strong emphasis

upon an empathetic understanding of other people and their values
and needs, and he requires that students articulate their own

values within a social context.

This is an important contribution.

His approach is still heavily cognitive and, thus, is of more

limited value with children.

It is, though, very useful on the

college level and provides a systematic method for dealing with

values conflict with regard to environmental issues.
The teacher’s role in values education is a sensitive one.
The teacher must help the students to engage in the valuing process,

but must not impose his or her own values upon them.

People may

state specific values either out of compliance, identification,
or internalization.^'^

Values vjhich are stated out of compliance are

reward, but
adopted in order to gain approval or some other social

thoy do not lOxloct a personal oelief,

V/e rr.ay

the values of another person or group.

Although

s].so

vre

identify with

may actually

believe in these values, they are imiportant to us because of our
identification and desire to establish a relationship with the
person or group.

Their specific content, however, is not

particularly important,

VJe

internalize values when

to be intrinsically rewarding.

significant to us.

\.’e

find them

Here it is their content which is

A goal of values education seems to be to help

students to thoughtfully develop their own internalized system of
values.

It is very important, then, that the teacher not impose

his or her value system upon the students in order to avoid their

adopting them through either compliance or identification.
Does this mean that teachers should not try to foster

specific values?

I think not,

values should we teach?”

but the problem becomes, "what

Values clarification and Rodney Allen

have avoided the issue by placing the valuing responsibility upon
the student.

Kohlberg, on the other hand, has made the specific

proDosal that the public schools should teach the moral value of
"justice.”-®

He argued that justice is a socially pluralistic

value, and that it does not necessarily favor either minority
or majority social groups.

country's political system.

Justice is a

wide--'

In addition, it is central to our

There is merit to his argument.

anging concey^t, which can be applied

variety of value issues and conflicts.

tc

a

In addition, it can be
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embodied not only in the overt educational content, but also
in
the educational process employed by the teacher.

On the other

hand, is uhe teaching of justice in keeping with the objective

of helping students to internalize their own values

?

Kohlberg

might argue that it is, because justice is a universal moral
ideal, vxhich will emerge within the mature person.

I, however,

believe that it is more a matter of how justice is taught.

It

must be taught in a manner v/hich is mutualistic, rather than
dominating.

Indeed, the idea of justice can be subsumed under

that of Mutuality,
I

propose that values education not attempt to teach specific

values, but that it attempt to foster the value orientation of

Mutuality,

If its educational objective is to help students

to develop their ovm internalized system of values, then teaching

methods must be employed vihich discourage both compliance and
identification.

The values which underly the educational process

should promote what is in the welfare of the students, rather than
the selfish interests of the teacher.

In other words, they should

be mutualistic in nature.

Mutuality is particularly appropriate in ES prograiAs, because
the very world which they study is problematic and in a state of

change.

There are few clearly defined solutions to the multitude

of complex, ES issues, and the teacher ccjinot

asswe

the role of a

??2

deliverer of certain knov/ledge.

It is important, then, that the

guiding programmatic values be amenable to open, mutualistic

learning on the part of both the students and the teachers.
In addition, as I have argued in the earlier chapters of this

dissertation, the solution to our environmental problems depends,
in part, upon enhancing Mutuality,

One of the goals of ES is to

prepare students who will be competent to work tov;ard the solution
of our environmental problems and, if my argument is valid, these

programs should help students to internalize the value orientation
of Mutuality.

This approach also resolves the tension between social

responsibility and an individualistic valuing process.

Mutuality

does not emphasize the group at the expense of the individual, or
the individual at the expense of the group.

It places value upon

the welfare of all parties involved in an interaction.

In

Florence Kluckhohn’s scheme (see Chapter One), the value
interorientation of Individualism is Domination on the level of

personal relationships.

The tension in values education, between

becomes
mutualistic goals and a dominating valuing process,

understandable.

I

believe that the best of educators have tacitly

by teaching Mutuality,
resolved the problem in their own teaching
and teaching mutualistic ally.
we need to introduce the
In order to educate for Mutuality
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value orientation into all of the values loci of a
classroom.

Much of the concern about values in education is based upon
the
fear that the teacher will inpose his or her values upon the
student.

Here we have

and the student .

t\>ro

important values loci; the teacher

Values, however, may also be inherent in the

discipline, or content being taught.

Science, for exajnple, is

based upon a cluster of values (e.g.; objectivity, predictability,
and reproducibility) which the student must learn in order to be
able to do science.

In addition, there are values inherent in

the educational process , or methodology being used.

There are,

for example, considerable differences between the values underlying

teacher-centered and student-centered, or inquiry-based and rote-

memory approaches to education.

These values loci, which represent

educational loci in the classroom, are also influenced by the

institutional setting within which they are located.

This, in turn,

is influenced by the society and culture of which it is a part

(see figure 7).

The values agenda, or hidden values curriculum of a classroom
or other learning situation is the product of the interaction

between the four loci and their institutional setting.

An analysis

of the values of individual loci, or of the institution will not

necessarily reveal what is the values agenda of a program.

The

inquiry values inherent in the sciences, for example, can be lost
in an educational process which emphasizes the unquestioning

.

Content

0—0

*>v

Stiident(s)

>

igiire

7.

ELEMENTS

VJfllCH

Values Agenda

CONTRIBUTE TO THE VALUES AGENDA
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of Tact-G,

As another example, the teacher *s values may

be of xittle significance in the face of student peer pressure.
The full interaction of the values loci and their inGtUutio. -al

setting, the values ecology of the situation, must be taken into

account if we vash to understand what is being taught.

Similarly,

we cannot effectively teach specific values without including
the full values ecology'' in our planning,
I

propose that teachers of environmental studies work to

include Mutuality as a fundamental part of each of the loci of

values education.

As I have already argued, the process and

methods of education should be mutualistic.

The educational

content should include mutualistic interpretations of and
approaches to the solution of environmental issues.

The teacher

is in a central power position and should be motivated by the

value orientation.

The students should be included as copar-

ticipants in a mutualistic process of designing and conducting
ES programs.

We need, also, to develop mutualistic educational

methods, EE and ES texts and educational materials which include

mutualistic views of environmental issues, and programs for

preparing teachers to teach in a mutualistic manner,

ihe

objective is to create a values agenda which is mutualisuic
value orientation.
and which will help students to internalize the
Domination
This will not be an easy task, given the strong
culture.
orientation of our institutions, society, and

ApTiroaches

t-o

i

eachinp f oi’ Mut'ualit.y in Environjnental Studies

Values education is one way of dealing with Mutuality in R3.
There are other ways in which education for Mutuality can be

introduced into the analysis, valuation, and application

components of ES, and into the values loci.
I

In the following pages

will examine the elements of Mutuality in an effort

’’a

suggest

questions, issues, methods, and content which should be considered

by teachers, program planners, and educational administrators.

My focus will be upon environmental mutualism, but it will also
be necessary to touch upon social mutualism.

Education for Mutuality is not just values education,

A

value orientation is not a specific value; it is an orientation,
an attitude of predisposition to chose certain kinds of values and,
thus, actions.

The mutualistic elements of being a part of a

meaningful whole, openmindedness, and promoting the welfare of
others are more evocative phrases than they are a descriptive defini
tion.

Mutuality is, essentially, a valuing style.

It is, then,

very difficult to teach, and formal modes of education play a
relatively limited role in the process through which it is learned.
However, a careful?.'/ designed educational environment may help
to foster it.

each other

All of the parts of the ES program should complement

2

0o
«

I

For example, if ve want to help students to feel a sense of

meaningful relatedness to a larger v;hole, be it a local community,
humankind, or the ecosphere, th>-re needs to be a conginencc
the ethos and 'the world-view which

vje

teach.

betv.’cen

VJhat is the

educational message in a weather map which includes only the

political boundaries of our ovm country, and on which all

meteorological activities terminate at these boiuidaric''?
patterns are not determined by political patterns.

Weather

Should not the

boundaries of the maps v/hich we see on television and in newspapers
be determined by the weather?

This would provide an holistic

view of weather, and would demonstrate the meteorological commonalities among nations.

But most people are only interested in what

the weather will be like in their ovm little fragment of the

world.

The maps which we commonly see foster a world-view of

political and meteorological isolation, rather than wholeness.
If we try to foster attitudes and values ’which embody wholeness and
a world-view based upon fragmentation, we are likely to create an

ethos and world-viev; which are alienated from each other.

Each

should be compatible with, and supportive of the other.
If Mutuality can only exist within a meaningful v/hole, then
is the
ES must help students to deal with the question of what

whole of which they are a part.

If the answer to this question is

it must be ansv/ered by
to be truely meaningful to each student, then
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the whole p.^rson and not by only his or her cognitive self.

A

number of traditional disciplines help to foster a holistic worldviev;;

for example, geology can give us a perception of our

pli

ice

in time, ecolo'gy our place in the living system, astronomy our

place in space, and anthropology our place in the human family.

Most of

trie

courses in these fields, however, teach only the

facts and modes of inquiry, and do not explore the students'

feelings about these views of their world.

Introducting an

affective component into these courses would be useful in

helping students to internalize these views,

Abraham Kaslow has pointed out the difference between
extrinsic and intrinsic learning.

Extrinsic learning is content

oriented and is based upon the goals of the teacher.
external to the learner and impersonal.

It is

Intrinsic learning is

based in the learner, and deals with personal experiences and
values.

These learnings are unique instances, not the results of
In my life I think of the death
dril.l and repititions.
of my children, and of my grandbirth
the
father,
of my
In such experiences do ve
moments.
child, as such
we are, what we might become.
what
discover who we are,
In this realm of intrinsic learning, intrinsic teaching,
and intrinsic education I think that the arts, and
especially the ones that I have mentioned [music, art,
dancing and rhythmj , are so close to the psychological
this
and biological core, so close to this identity,
biological identity, that rather than think of these
they must
courses as a sort of whipped cream or lujoiir,
education.!^
in
become basic experiences
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The individual artistic and poetic experience of our environment
is important and should become a legitim.ate part of ES programs.

The arts and the sciences deal with two different facets of

.uman

experience which must be united in our exploration of our environment.

If they are split and isolated from each other, then our

understanding of ourselves in our environment will also be split
and fragmented.
One of the courses

I

teach at Hampshire College, called

"Views of Nature," is designed to help students to understand the

different ways in which people perceive their non-human environment.
It is centered around a number of books by nature writers.

As a

part of the course the students write essays or poems about their
own experiences in nature which try to evoke what was personally

meaningful about the experiences.
successful parts of the course.

This has been one of the most
It helps them to identify and

understand, on both affective and cognitive levels, those aspects of
their environmental interactions that are personally important.
In addition, their experience as people reflecting upon nature,

and as writers, helps to inform their reading of the nature wTiters.
As an unexpected outcome, a number of students who were supposed
to be poor writers did some fine work.

It would be interesting

to experiment with introducing this approach to our environment into
a tr'aditional ecology course.

?80

The scien't-l ic

viev;

of the v/orld, although of enormous

importance to ES, is not able to provide a personally meaninpful

view of our environment.

It must also be integrated with the

history and inner life of the students.
that,

Harvey Cox has stated

"All hutuau beings have need to tell and hear stories and

to have stories to live by.

Religion, whatever else it has done,

has provided one of the

ways of meeting this abiding need."^*^

'.r.in

As he sees it, stories unite one's history, emotions and values.

Currently there is a great deal of interest in ancient myths
and religions.

This interest may be based, in part, upon the

desire to find a personally meaningful story, or understanding
of the world.

There have also been a number of recent books,

which have combined new findings in animal behavior and human
evolution with a lot of speculation in an attempt to explain
the roots of human behavior.
to develop new mythologies.

These, too, can be viewed as attempts

Myth and religion provide the linkage

between ethos and world-view, and it will be useful for ES to
explore this avenue.

Environmental studies programs should provide models for
holistic approaches to our environment.
a

Where, though, is there

program which integrates the sciences, arts, humanities and

religion?

The issues and themes associated with our interactions

Mutuality
with our environment, and the educational approaches to
across all
are so broad and far ranging that they appear to cut
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academic disciplines.

No program can handle it all, and each

must employ its own philosophy and standards of selection.
need, however, to give greater breadth to

liS

programs.

We

Environ-

mental educators have frequently been criticized for focusing upon
the non-human environm.ent and avoiding our social environment.

Similar complaints can be made about many ES

prograiris.

The

extent to which these complaints are time is a measure of the
extent to

i%’hich

such programs are failing to meet the objectives

of environmenual studies.

There is so much information available to us that we cannot

conceivably deal with it all and must, necessarily, be selective
Specialization is a principle of selection

in what we study.

which limits the field of information with which a person must
remain current.

However, this can also lead to a narrow,

fragmented view of the world.

We need to develop other, equally

legitimate principles of selection, which will help us to avoid

fragmentation in our understandings.

If this is to happen in

higher education, we must also develop more meaningful definitions
of academic rigor.

The National Conference on Environmental

Studies Programs in Higher Education has made the following

recommendation.

'‘We

recommend a redefinition of 'rigor' as it

broad impliapplies to interdisciplinary studies. Perception of
inculcation
cations is at once 'rigorous' and condi\cive to the
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precision, intensity, and depth of analysis. Interdisciplinary

environnenta.l education need not apologize on the grounds of
'rigor.

*‘*2^

be extended

The definition of a rigorous education should also
to.

include affective approaches to knowledge.

The need for openmindedness, which includes hamility and

freedom from self-interest, in education for Mutuality underscores
the need for a broader definition of rigor.

Openmindedness is

central to academic rigor, yet teaching openmindedness involves
far more than either cognition, or any single academic discipline.

At its extreme, it is not simply an educational problem, but a
therapeutic one as well,

Lawrence Kubie has argued that our

neuroses distort our perception of the world around us and our
choices of actions.
our neuroses.

What we create in our world, then, reflects

We must deal with the neurotic aspects of ourselves

if we are to become openminded and free of self-interest.

"Without self-knowledge in depth we can have dreams, but no art.

We can have the neurotic raw material of literature but not
mature literature.

V/e

can have no adults, but only aging children

who are armed with words and paint and clay and atomic weapons,
none of which they understand.
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Education for Mutuality must include education for self-knowledge.
This sort of psychological education,

however, is not generally

likely that
well regarded by the academic community, and it is not

many people who are teaching in the traditional disciplines will
become involved with it.

There are many stucients who are willing

to engage in such an exploration, if the opportunity were made

available to them.

Many of them are finding informal opportunities

when formal ones are absent.

We need to strenghten psychological

education in our colleges and develop techniques which are

particularly appropriate for working toward Mutuality; including
techniques which deal with our personal relationship with our

non-human environment as well as with other people.
It is not just our students who need to engage in this sort
of learning.

We, the teachers, also need to deal with our own

neurotic processes, and need to gain insight into our own motives
and interests.

Haslow has pointed out that, ’’Teachers and other

kinds of professionals suffer from having been indoctrinated
into a mastering, manipulating, controlling outlook toward

nature, toward people, especially toward children."

He felt that

the best people to assume a helping role are those who are the

most emotionally and physically healthy and mature, because,
"The better person you are, the less neurotic you are, the less need

you have to manipulate, control, and force people into imitations of
yourself rather than help them grow in their own style.
A note of caution: The line between psychological education and

psvchological therapy car be difficult

i^o

identify, and the^e is a

potential for the iinproperly trained teacher to do real harm to
the student.

Althou^jh therapy may be complementary to, and

inseparable from education for Mutuality, it is not the task of
the educator.

The easiest way to approach the issue of openmindedness in

higher education is through the selection of the traditional
educational content.

This involves including a diversity of

viewpoints in what is being studied, rather than filtering it
through a particular political, class, ethnic, sexual, economic,
or other limiting perspective, and helping the students to gain
an empathetic understanding of these different views.

The

efforts to introduce feminist and Third World interpretations
of history provide examples of this approach.

In education for

environmental mutualism, we can attempt to introduce historical
and multi-cultural perspectives on the diverse ways in which

people have interacted with, valued, and understood their
environments.

In addition to providing a more holistic view of

the topics, this approach may help students to gain insight into
the nature of their own interactions, values, and understanding;

both through the recognition that there are alternative approaches
and by being forced to articulate and examine their own deeply
held presuppositions.
The ''Views of Nature” course, which

I

mentioned earlier, was
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designed
the

priii'.arily

cissjjT.p i-ion

vath this objective in mind.

It is based upon

that part of what we see in nature is a reflection

of ourselves, because we psychologically project ourselves upon what

ve are viewing'.

This is particularly true in nature literature,

V7h?ch explores the author’s experience of nature.

We read

books by Loren Eiseley, Annie Dillard, Henry Beston, Aldo Leopold,
Edward Abbey, and Sally Carrighar, and some biographic pieces

about them.

One focus of class discussion was the similarities

and differences between the views of nature which the authors

reported, and the students' personal responses to those views.

The students also had the opportunity to explore and become aware
of their own views by doing some nature writing of their own.

Although this sort of course does not necessarily teach openmindedness, it does encourage self-awareness, which is a first
step toward openmindedness,
I

have also helped to teach a workshop in lifestyles, which

provided students the opportunity to examine their own style of
living and project alternatives which they wish to explore.
In addition, it strongly encouraged them to examine their

o^im
/

assumptions and biases about how one ought to live.

Between class

meetings the students either critically examined or tried to
alter an aspect of their way of living (e.g.j diet, transportation,

what they did with their time, images of their ideal homes, and
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patt/sms of consumption)

•

Class discussions focused upon their

experiences during the week, and encouraged divergent points
of view (something which is not always easy, considering the

interests of the students who would register for such a course).
We also read and discussed a number of popular books about
lifestyle, and some articles critical of the views expressed in
those books.
The "American Literary Landscape"^^ course offered at

Hampshire College provides another example of this approach to
teaching.

The course examines the cultural history of the image

of landscape in the American mind.

It provides an historical per-

spective on our changing understanding of what is our landscape
and how we ought to interact with it.

In addition to providing

traditional academic rigor in American Studies, the course
includes educational methods which encourage the students'

affective exploration of their personal landscapes and sense of
place.

The course provides a model for integrating cognitive

and affective education on the college level.

It is remembered as

a significant educational experience by many students, because

it encouraged their first awareness of their own culture-bound

presuppositions about their environment.
College teachers, however, tend not to engage in either

interdisciplinary or affective approaches to teaching.

Harvey

Cox has pointed out that, "Like other people, academics arc

hesitant

to

stray from fields where they feel they are more or

less masters into questions on which they would have to give up

any pretense to omniscience

.

,

,

Only when people are freed from

the need to control and master can they run the risk of admitting

they are not omnipotent."

Education for Mutuality requires that

teachers be able to interact with students as co-learners and

not employ what Paulo Freire called the banking concept of
education.

This requires that they recognize their own limitations,

that they are not and need not be omnipotent, and that teaching can
also be a learning experience.

In other words, it requires a degree

of humility.

Both the Global Survival Freshman Year Program at the University
of Massachusetts, Amherst, and the Environmental Studies and

Public Policy Program at Hampshire College have embraced the concept
of teacher and student as co-learners.

27
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This has been embodied

both in the ways in which teachers and students interact with
each other, and in their programmatic design.

The design of both

programs has provided the flexibility necessary to allow students
to play an important role in program planning, designing and

teaching courses, program evaluation, and the day-to-day administrative
details.

As a teacher in both of these programs I have seen the

approach to
pxc optional efforts which the students invested in this

learning.

I

have also seen the maturing effect it has had upon those
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who have been most closely involved in the general planning
and operational details.

For many students, the boundaries between

learning, the content learned, and the other aspects of their

daily lives began to become less distinct; they began to become

affectively integrated.

The teachers' experiences were similar.

No effort was made to sacrifice traditional academic rigor.

V/hat

we did try to sacrifice was the narrowriess and will- to -mas ter,

which can become crutches of insecure teachers,
I

have been writing of humility as it relates to social

mutualism, but we also need to foster humility with respect to
our environment.

On this level, humility may be fostered through

our efforts to teach the vievj of our place in time, space,
ecosystem, and the human family, which I have already suggested

might help us to develop a sense of cur place in a meaningful whole.
We are, each of us, part of a \iniverse of time, space, lif^ and

people v;hich is far greater than we, and of a complexity beyond
our full comprehension.
taught.

This avjareness

cari

be humbling if properly

We should be careful not to make this vision a fearful

one, because the desire to control may be

bom

of fear.

If this

but as
is taught not as a view which is ovex-whelming and fearful,
a view of an awe-inspiring universe of which

part, then we may be humble before a

X'jorld

x^e

are a meaningful

of wonder.

?89

Many people have spoken or written of the inportance of
of wonder to EE.

a sense

In her fine book, The wSense of Wonder ,^^ Rachel

Carson emphasized the importance of a child's sense of the wonder
in nature and the necessity of cherishing' and preserving that

sense in one's adult years.

There should be a place for the

wonderful in £S, and an effort should be made to foster the growth
and expression of this sense in students.

turned on and off like a light bulb.

But wonder cannot be

The teacher can share his

or her own wonder, and try to create situations in which the

students will also wonder at their environment.
The sense of wonder can be stimulated on different levels
of abstraction.

Some people, for example, can be captivated by

the beauty, elegance, and endless ramifications of a mathematical

description of a subatomic phenomenon.

Others are awe-struck by

the astronomical view of a cosmos in which stars are continually

being born, maturing, and dying in an ever expanding universe.
In terms of education for Mutuality it is important that such

views be integrated into a sense of a personally meaningful
whole.

For this reason, perhaps the majority of people find

wonder in less abstract, physically involving experiences.

Take,

in a
for example, Edward Abbey's description of a huge stone arch

Utah desert.
will venture, in
If Delicate Arch has any significance it lies, I
seas:;.-, and
the
startle
the power of the odd and unexpected to
us
compel
to
surprise the mind out of their ruts of habit,
o
full
is
v;hich
a reawakened awareness of the wonderful—that
wonder.
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A weird, lovely, fantastic object ont of nature’ like
Delicate Arch has the curious ability to remind us likerock and sunlight and wind and wildness that out there
is a different world, older and greater and deeper by
far than ours, a world which surrounds and sustains the
little world of men as sea and slcy surrounding and sustain
a ship, 'The shock is real.
For a little while we
discover nothing can be taken for granted, for if this
ring of stone is marvelous then all which shaped it is
marvelous, and our journey here on earth, able to see
and touch and hear in the midst of tangible and mysterious things-in- themselves is the most sti-arige and
daring of all adventures. 30

—

—

Abbey emphasizes the importance of the unexpectedness and
novelty of the sight.

It has the power to shake the viewer out

of everyday, stereotyped seeing.

Unfamiliar sights, or familiar

things seen in new ways have special ability to kindle wonder.
It is also important that the experience be as fully involving
as possible, so that one experiences without detaching oneself from

the experience and examining it.

Many EE, and some ES programs

include outdoor activities which provide an opportunity for
this sort of experience,

A special effort should be made to

facilitate such wonder-full activities.
One summer I helped to lead a group of summer campers on an

overnight hike up one of the mountains in New Hampshire’s

Presidential Range.

This was the first

tiine

that many of the boys

be there
had climbed a mountain, and one of them did not want to

at all.

called
He was a city boy from the Bronx, although everyone

him Brooklyn.

He was overweight, uncomfortable in the outdoors,

themselves in the woods.
and often made fun of those who enjoyed

m
"Bird watchers" he called them, with a sour expression on his
face.

After hours of hiking we reached an empty cabin and

decided to stop for the night.

He removed his pack, dropped it

to the groiind* and sat on it exhausted and grumbling.

After a while

he and some of the others stared down into the valley and made

amazed remarks about the fact that they had walked all that way.
It was late and the sun was beginning to set.

We all stood

watching the sky redden as the sun sank to the horizon.
colors were incredibly deep and bright.

The

Shortly before it set,

the light reflected off the surface of a distant lake, which rested

between us and the sun.

Suddenly there were two blinding red

stars, one above -the horizon and another in the valley.

The one

in the forest burned brighter and brighter, then faded, and the sun
set.
VJe

stood quietly in wonder, then the group slowly broke up,

Brooklyn remained there in silence, crying.
the rest of the night.

He did not say much for

He got up early in the morning and saw the

sunrise reflecting off the dew covered forest canopy, each tree
a flame.

The next summer Brooklyn returned well read in woodcraft, a

little less heavy, and eager to be off.

He had spent the winter

and other
reading everything he could find about hiking, camping,

outdoor activities.

In the following years he became one of the

and appreciation
best outdoorsmen in the camp and shared his skills

with others.

0Q-?

Alt.hcuj^b

it.

does not fully account for the chani^e, his

first experience on that mountain was a turning point in
his attitude toward the outdoors.

He had a full affective, cognitive,

and psychomotor experience which, although it was initially un-

comfortable, became personally meaningful and valuable.

The

experience, though, did not lead to a passive sense of humility.

It led to a positive valuing of that kind of experience,
environment, and activity.

We tend to value that with which we

have had a positive experience, and the more fully we experience
it, the more deeply we value it,

V/e

should work to include

intense positive experiences of our environment as a part of ES,
We need to reestablish, contact with our non-human ecological

environment.

We need to regain an experiencial understanding of

the cylcical patterns of night and day, growth and decay, weather,

and the multitude of other phenomena from which our built

environment has isolated us.

Outdoor education provides some

valuable techniques for doing this; two of which
briefly,

I

will mention

Steve Van Matre’s method, "acclimatization," places

strong emphasis upon direct sensory involvement

vjith the

environment.

Ke asks educators to involve their students in "the most sensory

experiences imaginable: mud baths, bog crawls, marsh wading— and

let’s do it at times blindfolded or ear-plugged
->eTis3s

ir.

—with

all of our

total operation: tas+e, smell., touch, sigho, and sound.
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This is a strongly affective approach to EE, although a good deal
of cognitive learning also takes place.

for use with children in sumner

elementary school level EE.

ca'r.ps,

It was originally designed

but is finding its way into

Some of its methods can be adapted

for use with much older students.

Another approach, called the 2[i-hour experience, can be
12

readily used with all ages,'^

It employs

education methods within a 2i4-hour formate.

during

siiort

a variety of outdoor

Participants rest

catnaps, but they are essentially active at all hours

of daylight and darkness.

The unusual formate promotes an

intense learning experience, and provides an opportunity to become

directly aware of the daily cycle of events in nature.

There is

enough flexibility within the formate to tailor a trip to meet a

variety of EE and ES objectives.
Adventure education is a popular and rapidly growing field of

outdoor education.

It brings students into an intense

experiencial involvement with the outdoors environment and, thus,

may be of considerable value in ES.

It generates a great deal

of enthusiasm on the part of students, can be used in a variety

group-building,
of educational contexts, can be a valuable tool in
selfand seems to be of value in helping participants to develop

confidence and a positive self-image.
people

a-’.'e

Although a grovjing number of

beginning to perceive adventure educc'tion as synoni'mous

with envirorunental education, this is not necessarily the case.
It can play an important role in EE and ES, but care must be

taken not to lose si^ht of their goals as a result of the

enthusiasm generated by adventure education methods.
A rnimber of people have been concerned about the way in which

some adventure education programs use outdoors experiences to
improve- participants’

self image, and cooperation within groups.

Stated simply, some programs are based upon the belief that this

happens when individuals and groups face and overcome adversity.
In this case, the adversary is a difficult or hostile outdoors

environment (e,g.,5 climbing a rock face, hiking through difficult
terrain, camping in bitter cold, and canoing or crossing a

raging river)

.

This approach is a militaristic one in which

individuals develop self-confidence, and groups of people learn
to cooperate t’nrough the effort to dominate the environment.

To

what extent, though, is this attitude necessary in order to
accomplish the programmatic objectives?
education programs

d-.

Many successful adventure

take a much less dominating approach to

nature, and it is unfair to dwell overlong upon this issue.

We

must, hov/ever, be continually aware of what value orientations

underly our teaching.
to the
The issue of mutualistic means and ends is not limited
•ji'eiation ships

between

teache'>'o

:^id

students.

It is also relevant

to the vays in which they interact with non-hxL-nans,

for example, at time when
b.'ology course.

had to set up

'a

V/e

I

I

recall,

was a lab assistant in a freshman

were studying the circulatory system and

demonstration of a living heart.

I

I

anesthetized

a large turtle, placed it on its back in a dissecting pan and

tied dovm its legsj each appendage stretched out tovjard a corner.

Using a hole saw mounted on an electric drill,

I

cut a 2-3 inch

hole through its plastron into the chest cavity.

Bone fragments

collected like sawdust and the cut smoked from the friction of the
spinning blade.

by

Man.y of the

women were squeamish and made faint,

shrill protests on behalf of the animal.

themselves for the job that had to be done.

The men braced
I

tried to be on

top of it all and explained that the turtle could not feel anything
and, besides, it was all educationally necessary.

The beating

heart was exposed, connected to recording instruments, physio-

logical ex]Deriments were conducted, and we all had an instructive
and successful lab session.

I

wonder now, though, what was

also taught about the living turtle and the value of a turtle's
life.

The experience of seeing the living, beating heart and the

blood pulsing through living tissue is something
communicated through print or film.

X'jhich

cannot be

It is v/onderful, and it is the
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complete antithoois of a mutualistic relationship with the turtle,
I

value that educationval experience, and it also disturbs me.

sc-'-t

This

of animal experimentation may, if properly handled, contribute

to a mutualistic appreciation of turtles in the abstract, but ve

must know what we are doing.

If we are out to foster a mutualistic

relationship with the individual animal, this is not the proper
educational method to use

.

If we are interested in turtles as a

population, or species, then such an approach may have its place,

but

'ohe

teacher and students should also consider the effect of

that death upon the population as a part of the educational activity.

Many schools are examining the role of animal experimentation in
their curriculum, both for humanitarian and political reasons,
V/e

should also examine the role of animal experiinentation from

the perspective of education for Mutuality,

There is positive and

negative pedagogic value in both participating in and refraining

from such experiments.

It is important that we be aware of what are

our educational objectives and whether our methods are in harmony

with them.

The same can be said of all of our other teaching methods.

People are not likely to become interested in promoting the

welfare of their non-hujnan environment until they have direct,
positive experiences of that environiaent.

The same can be said of

their relationship with their human environment.

approaches to experiential EE and

F.S

However, most

emphasize the experience of

nature, to the exclusion of the urban and suburban environment.

This is a serious problem, because the human environment is not
;iust

sparkling rivers, trackless forests, and pure mountain air.

Many people in EE tend to disregard or be hostile to the urban
environment; the environment in which the majority of people are

located and which, despite its serious problems, many find
of positive value.

VJe

to

be

need to find ways of facilitating direct,

positive experiences of the urban environment, as well as of
the non-human environment.

We need to find ways to help students

to recognize not only the disfunctionai aspects of the urban environ-

ment, but also

ii-s

healthy, and socially and individually fulfilling

roles in h\iman life and history.
The Boston Children's Museum developed two urban EE projects,

which were designed to focus participants' attention upon the
*

3

physical and social environraent of the city,-^
imaginative workbook called, Citygames ,

One was an

Employing an exciting

children's gamebook formate, Citygames leads the participants on
a scavanger hunt throughout Boston,

The second p’^oject was a

combined museum exhibit and street fair focussing upon the
(environment of Center Street, a main street in Jamaica Plain,

Massachusetts,

It attempted to turn three storefront blocks along

the street into a learning tool.

During the one-day fair specialized

?90

exhibits vjcrG pjAced in stores, merchants taught an aspect of
theii* trade, ano the

Kuscum staff conducted participatory

educational demonstrations on the sidewalks.
mented by a ma,ior e>vhibit in the Museum.

This was comple-

Both of these projects

portrayed the city not as a place of environmental horrors, but
as an arena of human interactions and creativity.

It is important that

and ES deal with the full human

environment; the built, social, and natural environments.^^

We

can find both positive and negative elements in each, and none

should be rejected or ignored.

VJe

cannot foster an environmentally

mutualistic ethos by ignoring the positive aspects of the
environments which we create.

Global studies, or "Education

for Global Survival," provides an important model for such an

integrated approach,

The Global Survival Freshman Year Program,

which was rooted in this approach, focussed its curriculum upon
issues involving natural resources, environmental deterioration,

peace and war, cross-cultural communication, and population.

It

fused the agendas of a niunber of educational movements, including

environmental education, peace studies, and international
education.

It was a rare model of EE as envisioned in the Belgrade

Charter,
that
There is a good deal of data available which demonstrates

educational
the Program was quite successful in meeting its
objectives,

h'evertheless, it was suspended at the end of the 1976-77

29)
academic year, after four years of operation.

One of the main

reasons for this was that the University administration and Program
staff were unable to generate enough support in the form of adjunct

faculty from the academic departments.

However, the issue goes

deeper than this, to the political and institutional structure of
the University.

Throughout higher education there are factors,

such as faculty reward systems, departmental structures, and

disciplinary specialization, which make it very difficult for
any interdisciplinary or pedagogically innovative program to
survive,

It is very easy for individual teachers to introduce
However,

some degree of Mutuality into what and how they teach.

before this can be done on a large scale, we must find ways of
dealing with these major institutional problems.

Directions for Further Research

In this dissertation I have explored the philosophical

foundations of education for environmental Mutuality.

The next

step is to develop the tools necessary’- to do and evaluate this
sort of education.

The following questions point to specific

progress
rCvSearch problems, the solutions of which will help us
in this direction.

How can we evaluate a student’s value orientation?

We

post-testing, which
need to develop methods of pre-testing and

value orientations are.
will help us to determine what students’

and vha^ value orientations they are leamine.

Kluckhohn’s and

Strodtbeck's anthropological research instrument^® may provide an

important model for the kinds of educational research instruments
vihich we need -to develop.

How can we determine the extent to which an educational
environment is mutualistic?

V/e

need to develop methods of

evaluating institutions, cxirricula, educational materials,
teaching methods, and other factors in the educational environment
for the presence of the three elements of Mutuality.

As a part

of this effort, we may need to develop a list of the elements of

Domination and Submission, and determine the extent to which
they are also present.
To what extent is the present educational environment

mutualistic?

Employing these evaluation methods, we need to

determine what value orientations our present institutions, curricula, materials, and methods are teaching.

reexamination of education,

This will involve a major

A study of specific adventure education

methods and programs, for example, would resolve the debate over
environment.
the extent to which they are fostering domination of the
VJhat,

influencial
in our total life experiences, are the most

learn?
factors in determining what value orientations we will

I

limited role in shaping
expect that formal education has a relatively

our \alue orientations.

VJhat are the

most important factors?

The
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answers to this question will help us to decide where we can

effectively direct our educational efforts.

niost

If, for example,

we discover that our early home environment has a profound

and perhaps

li'f e-long

influence, we might want to put a good

deal of our resources into teaching mutualistic methods of
parenting.
Are there periods in our psychological development during

which we are most likely to aquire our value orientations?

The

answers to this question will also help us to decide where to

direct our educational efforts.
V/hat are the

underlying economic, political, institutional,

and social structures within our schools and society which promote
and hinder education for Mutuality?
is primarily oriented to Domination.

We live in a culture which

The creation of a mutualistic

learning environment will involve changes in our institutions and
society, as well as in our pedagogy.

We need to discover what

specific changes must be made,
VJhat acts are

dissertation

I

environmentally mutualistic?

Throughout this

have focussed upon the ways in which we should

decide how to act, avoiding specific proposals of what acts are
mutualistic.

We need, however, to identify specific decisions,

policies and actions which are clearly mutualistic and use them
as case studies in environmental education programs.
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How does one teach for environmental Mutuality?

I

know of no

programs which have been designed with the specific objective of

teaching for envirormental Mutuality.
this direction,

vve

V;e

need to experiment in

need to develop the curricula, materials, and

methods which will effectively achieve this educational objective,
VJhat

are the limitations of Mutuality?

I

have not argued

that mutualistic approaches to problems are invariably the most

appropriate means of dealing

\;ith them.

Under what circumstances

would Submission or Domination be appropriate?
To what extent will we have to move outside of the formal

school system in order to successfully educate for Mutuality?
One of the ways of dealing with the political and institutional

resistances to education for Mutuality in our schools is to sidestep the problems and teach elsewhere.

Non-formal education

has played an important role in environmental education,
arid

many public and private agencies have already made a

commitment to it.

These include non-profit educational organi-

zations, philojithropic foundations,

Ul'JESCO,

foreign aid missions,

United
the World Bank, and a number of labor unions (such as the

Auto Worlcers) and private businesses (such as Weyerhaeuser).
need to

fi3id v/ays in

We

which to make effective use of this approach

to education.
of people
How can we develop systems vhiich are supportive

who are trying to teach for Mutuality,

introducing a strong values
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position into one's teaching can create

political situation.

a

potentially explosive

Teachers, administrators, school committee

members, anyone involved in education for Mutuality, need to

be mutually supportive of each other in their efforts to teach
effectively, and to respond to pressures which make this difficult.

How can we involve the full community in planning these
programs?

39

Education for Mutuality should be guided

value orientation in its planning process.

'*/

tliis

Ideally, the process

should include the teachers, students, admins trators, parents, and

other members of the community who will be affected,

V/e

need to

explore ways in which, and the limits to which, this can be

accomplished.
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